1. 05 Aug, 2019 30 commits
  2. 01 Aug, 2019 8 commits
    • Kleber Sacilotto de Souza's avatar
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGS · ef502875
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      Intel provided the following information:
      
       On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
       value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
       last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
       speculatively written segment value.
      
      That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
      entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.
      
      Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
      out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
      are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.
      Reported-by: default avatarAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      
      CVE-2019-1125
      
      (backported from commit f36cf386)
      [tyhicks: Backport to Xenial:
       - Dropped VULNWL_HYGON() change since this kernel version doesn't know
         about Hygon processors
       - Rename X86_FEATURE_PTI to X86_FEATURE_KAISER]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      ef502875
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      x86/entry/64: Use JMP instead of JMPQ · db89140f
      Josh Poimboeuf authored
      Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ
      instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed.  Some
      assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP
      when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation.  For
      some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot.
      
      Change it back to "JMP" as originally intended.
      
      Fixes: 18ec54fd ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      
      CVE-2019-1125
      
      (backported from commit 64dbc122)
      [tyhicks: Adjust context in entry_64.S]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      db89140f
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      x86/speculation: Enable Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations · 66537e88
      Josh Poimboeuf authored
      The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
      Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
      enabled.  Enable those features where applicable.
      
      The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".
      
      There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:
      
      - When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
        value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction.  This means they can
        write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
        be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
        handler:
      
      	if (coming from user space)
      		swapgs
      	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
      	// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
      	// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2
      
        If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
        speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
        may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
        load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.
      
        Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
        coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
        switch back to the user GS.  On AMD, this variant isn't possible
        because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
        accesses.
      
        NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
      	doesn't exist quite yet.
      
      - When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
        unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
        restricts GS values to user space addresses only.  That means the
        gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
        needs to be read from user space first.  Something like:
      
      	if (coming from user space)
      		swapgs
      	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
      	mov (%reg1), %reg2
      	// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
      	// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3
      
        It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
        there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
        exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future).  Without
        tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.
      
        Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:
      
        - If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
          susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
          reading user space memory, even L1 cached values.  This effectively
          disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.
      
        - If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
          still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
          memory.  But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
          user value from L1, if it has already been cached.  This is probably
          only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.
      
      Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.
      
      Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
      is serializing on AMD.
      
      [ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
        	by Dave Hansen ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      
      CVE-2019-1125
      
      (backported from commit a2059825)
      [tyhicks: Backport to Xenial:
       - Adjust the file path to and context in kernel-parameters.txt
       - Rename X86_FEATURE_PTI to X86_FEATURE_KAISER]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      66537e88
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations · 4b0c9c8a
      Josh Poimboeuf authored
      Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks.  It can affect any
      conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
      handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic in
      the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user
      GS.
      
      For example:
      
      	if (coming from user space)
      		swapgs
      	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
      	mov (%reg), %reg1
      
      When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and
      then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value.  So the user can
      speculatively force a read of any kernel value.  If a gadget exists which
      uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the
      contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel
      attack.
      
      A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can
      speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest
      of the speculative window.
      
      The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except:
      
        a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset)
           isn't user-controlled; and
      
        b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the
           "from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described
           above).
      
      The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a
      CR3 write when PTI is enabled.  Since CR3 writes are serializing, the
      lfences can be skipped in those cases.
      
      On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI.
      
      To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate
      features for alternative patching:
      
        X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
        X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
      
      Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed.
      
      The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      
      CVE-2019-1125
      
      (backported from commit 18ec54fd)
      [tyhicks: Backport to Xenial:
       - Adjust context in calling.h
       - Minor rework of fencing in entry_64.S due to differences in entry points
       - Add a FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY to a swapgs, in NMI entry path, that
         wasn't present in newer kernels
       - Indent macros in calling.h to match the rest of the file's style
       - Move include of calling.h later in entry_64.S to fix build failure]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      4b0c9c8a
    • Fenghua Yu's avatar
      x86/cpufeatures: Combine word 11 and 12 into a new scattered features word · 1dc11691
      Fenghua Yu authored
      It's a waste for the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_* feature bits to occupy two
      whole feature bits words. To better utilize feature words, re-define
      word 11 to host scattered features and move the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_*
      features into Linux defined word 11. More scattered features can be
      added in word 11 in the future.
      
      Rename leaf 11 in cpuid_leafs to CPUID_LNX_4 to reflect it's a
      Linux-defined leaf.
      
      Rename leaf 12 as CPUID_DUMMY which will be replaced by a meaningful
      name in the next patch when CPUID.7.1:EAX occupies world 12.
      
      Maximum number of RMID and cache occupancy scale are retrieved from
      CPUID.0xf.1 after scattered CQM features are enumerated. Carve out the
      code into a separate function.
      
      KVM doesn't support resctrl now. So it's safe to move the
      X86_FEATURE_CQM_* features to scattered features word 11 for KVM.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
      Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
      Cc: "Sean J Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
      Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
      Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
      Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
      Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
      Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: x86 <x86@kernel.org>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560794416-217638-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
      
      CVE-2019-1125
      
      (backported from commit acec0ce0)
      [tyhicks: Backport to Xenial:
       - Adjust context in cpufeatures.h
       - No need to modify cpuid.h since we're missing commit d6321d49
         ("KVM: x86: generalize guest_cpuid_has_ helpers")
       - No need to modify cpuid-deps.c since we're missing commit
         0b00de85 ("x86/cpuid: Add generic table for CPUID dependencies")
       - Change CPUID_EDX to CR_EDX since we're missing commit 47f10a36
         ("x86/cpuid: Cleanup cpuid_regs definitions")]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      1dc11691
    • Borislav Petkov's avatar
      x86/cpufeatures: Carve out CQM features retrieval · 3e663426
      Borislav Petkov authored
      ... into a separate function for better readability. Split out from a
      patch from Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> to keep the mechanical,
      sole code movement separate for easy review.
      
      No functional changes.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Cc: x86@kernel.org
      
      CVE-2019-1125
      
      (cherry picked from commit 45fc56e6)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      3e663426
    • Kleber Sacilotto de Souza's avatar
      UBUNTU: Start new release · 76fe6a2b
      Kleber Sacilotto de Souza authored
      Ignore: yes
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      76fe6a2b
  3. 29 Jul, 2019 2 commits