1. 06 Aug, 2015 11 commits
    • Al Viro's avatar
      freeing unlinked file indefinitely delayed · f34efdfe
      Al Viro authored
      commit 75a6f82a upstream.
      
      	Normally opening a file, unlinking it and then closing will have
      the inode freed upon close() (provided that it's not otherwise busy and
      has no remaining links, of course).  However, there's one case where that
      does *not* happen.  Namely, if you open it by fhandle with cold dcache,
      then unlink() and close().
      
      	In normal case you get d_delete() in unlink(2) notice that dentry
      is busy and unhash it; on the final dput() it will be forcibly evicted from
      dcache, triggering iput() and inode removal.  In this case, though, we end
      up with *two* dentries - disconnected (created by open-by-fhandle) and
      regular one (used by unlink()).  The latter will have its reference to inode
      dropped just fine, but the former will not - it's considered hashed (it
      is on the ->s_anon list), so it will stay around until the memory pressure
      will finally do it in.  As the result, we have the final iput() delayed
      indefinitely.  It's trivial to reproduce -
      
      void flush_dcache(void)
      {
              system("mount -o remount,rw /");
      }
      
      static char buf[20 * 1024 * 1024];
      
      main()
      {
              int fd;
              union {
                      struct file_handle f;
                      char buf[MAX_HANDLE_SZ];
              } x;
              int m;
      
              x.f.handle_bytes = sizeof(x);
              chdir("/root");
              mkdir("foo", 0700);
              fd = open("foo/bar", O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0600);
              close(fd);
              name_to_handle_at(AT_FDCWD, "foo/bar", &x.f, &m, 0);
              flush_dcache();
              fd = open_by_handle_at(AT_FDCWD, &x.f, O_RDWR);
              unlink("foo/bar");
              write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
              system("df .");			/* 20Mb eaten */
              close(fd);
              system("df .");			/* should've freed those 20Mb */
              flush_dcache();
              system("df .");			/* should be the same as #2 */
      }
      
      will spit out something like
      Filesystem     1K-blocks   Used Available Use% Mounted on
      /dev/root         322023 303843      1131 100% /
      Filesystem     1K-blocks   Used Available Use% Mounted on
      /dev/root         322023 303843      1131 100% /
      Filesystem     1K-blocks   Used Available Use% Mounted on
      /dev/root         322023 283282     21692  93% /
      - inode gets freed only when dentry is finally evicted (here we trigger
      than by remount; normally it would've happened in response to memory
      pressure hell knows when).
      Acked-by: default avatarJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      [ kamal: backport to 3.19-stable: no fast_dput() ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      f34efdfe
    • Al Viro's avatar
      9p: don't leave a half-initialized inode sitting around · 72069d8f
      Al Viro authored
      commit 0a73d0a2 upstream.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      72069d8f
    • Sanidhya Kashyap's avatar
      hpfs: kstrdup() out of memory handling · be901bdf
      Sanidhya Kashyap authored
      commit ce657611 upstream.
      
      There is a possibility of nothing being allocated to the new_opts in
      case of memory pressure, therefore return ENOMEM for such case.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMikulas Patocka <mikulas@twibright.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      be901bdf
    • Rafael J. Wysocki's avatar
      ACPI / PNP: Reserve ACPI resources at the fs_initcall_sync stage · 3e47907f
      Rafael J. Wysocki authored
      commit 0294112e upstream.
      
      This effectively reverts the following three commits:
      
       7bc10388 ACPI / resources: free memory on error in add_region_before()
       0f1b414d ACPI / PNP: Avoid conflicting resource reservations
       b9a5e5e1 ACPI / init: Fix the ordering of acpi_reserve_resources()
      
      (commit b9a5e5e1 introduced regressions some of which, but not
      all, were addressed by commit 0f1b414d and commit 7bc10388
      was a fixup on top of the latter) and causes ACPI fixed hardware
      resources to be reserved at the fs_initcall_sync stage of system
      initialization.
      
      The story is as follows.  First, a boot regression was reported due
      to an apparent resource reservation ordering change after a commit
      that shouldn't lead to such changes.  Investigation led to the
      conclusion that the problem happened because acpi_reserve_resources()
      was executed at the device_initcall() stage of system initialization
      which wasn't strictly ordered with respect to driver initialization
      (and with respect to the initialization of the pcieport driver in
      particular), so a random change causing the device initcalls to be
      run in a different order might break things.
      
      The response to that was to attempt to run acpi_reserve_resources()
      as soon as we knew that ACPI would be in use (commit b9a5e5e1).
      However, that turned out to be too early, because it caused resource
      reservations made by the PNP system driver to fail on at least one
      system and that failure was addressed by commit 0f1b414d.
      
      That fix still turned out to be insufficient, though, because
      calling acpi_reserve_resources() before the fs_initcall stage of
      system initialization caused a boot regression to happen on the
      eCAFE EC-800-H20G/S netbook.  That meant that we only could call
      acpi_reserve_resources() at the fs_initcall initialization stage
      or later, but then we might just as well call it after the PNP
      initalization in which case commit 0f1b414d wouldn't be
      necessary any more.
      
      For this reason, the changes made by commit 0f1b414d are reverted
      (along with a memory leak fixup on top of that commit), the changes
      made by commit b9a5e5e1 that went too far are reverted too and
      acpi_reserve_resources() is changed into fs_initcall_sync, which
      will cause it to be executed after the PNP subsystem initialization
      (which is an fs_initcall) and before device initcalls (including
      the pcieport driver initialization) which should avoid the initial
      issue.
      
      Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100581
      Link: http://marc.info/?t=143092384600002&r=1&w=2
      Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99831
      Link: http://marc.info/?t=143389402600001&r=1&w=2
      Fixes: b9a5e5e1 "ACPI / init: Fix the ordering of acpi_reserve_resources()"
      Reported-by: default avatarRoland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      3e47907f
    • Michal Hocko's avatar
      ext4: replace open coded nofail allocation in ext4_free_blocks() · 61bd00c1
      Michal Hocko authored
      commit 7444a072 upstream.
      
      ext4_free_blocks is looping around the allocation request and mimics
      __GFP_NOFAIL behavior without any allocation fallback strategy. Let's
      remove the open coded loop and replace it with __GFP_NOFAIL. Without the
      flag the allocator has no way to find out never-fail requirement and
      cannot help in any way.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      61bd00c1
    • Eryu Guan's avatar
      ext4: correctly migrate a file with a hole at the beginning · 4e792b2a
      Eryu Guan authored
      commit 8974fec7 upstream.
      
      Currently ext4_ind_migrate() doesn't correctly handle a file which
      contains a hole at the beginning of the file.  This caused the migration
      to be done incorrectly, and then if there is a subsequent following
      delayed allocation write to the "hole", this would reclaim the same data
      blocks again and results in fs corruption.
      
        # assmuing 4k block size ext4, with delalloc enabled
        # skip the first block and write to the second block
        xfs_io -fc "pwrite 4k 4k" -c "fsync" /mnt/ext4/testfile
      
        # converting to indirect-mapped file, which would move the data blocks
        # to the beginning of the file, but extent status cache still marks
        # that region as a hole
        chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile
      
        # delayed allocation writes to the "hole", reclaim the same data block
        # again, results in i_blocks corruption
        xfs_io -c "pwrite 0 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
        umount /mnt/ext4
        e2fsck -nf /dev/sda6
        ...
        Inode 53, i_blocks is 16, should be 8.  Fix? no
        ...
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      4e792b2a
    • Eryu Guan's avatar
      ext4: be more strict when migrating to non-extent based file · 261c583a
      Eryu Guan authored
      commit d6f123a9 upstream.
      
      Currently the check in ext4_ind_migrate() is not enough before doing the
      real conversion:
      
      a) delayed allocated extents could bypass the check on eh->eh_entries
         and eh->eh_depth
      
      This can be demonstrated by this script
      
        xfs_io -fc "pwrite 0 4k" -c "pwrite 8k 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
        chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile
      
      where testfile has two extents but still be converted to non-extent
      based file format.
      
      b) only extent length is checked but not the offset, which would result
         in data lose (delalloc) or fs corruption (nodelalloc), because
         non-extent based file only supports at most (12 + 2^10 + 2^20 + 2^30)
         blocks
      
      This can be demostrated by
      
        xfs_io -fc "pwrite 5T 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
        chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile
        sync
      
      If delalloc is enabled, dmesg prints
        EXT4-fs warning (device dm-4): ext4_block_to_path:105: block 1342177280 > max in inode 53
        EXT4-fs (dm-4): Delayed block allocation failed for inode 53 at logical offset 1342177280 with max blocks 1 with error 5
        EXT4-fs (dm-4): This should not happen!! Data will be lost
      
      If delalloc is disabled, e2fsck -nf shows corruption
        Inode 53, i_size is 5497558142976, should be 4096.  Fix? no
      
      Fix the two issues by
      
      a) forcing all delayed allocation blocks to be allocated before checking
         eh->eh_depth and eh->eh_entries
      b) limiting the last logical block of the extent is within direct map
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      261c583a
    • Lukas Czerner's avatar
      ext4: fix reservation release on invalidatepage for delalloc fs · e726980a
      Lukas Czerner authored
      commit 9705acd6 upstream.
      
      On delalloc enabled file system on invalidatepage operation
      in ext4_da_page_release_reservation() we want to clear the delayed
      buffer and remove the extent covering the delayed buffer from the extent
      status tree.
      
      However currently there is a bug where on the systems with page size >
      block size we will always remove extents from the start of the page
      regardless where the actual delayed buffers are positioned in the page.
      This leads to the errors like this:
      
      EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): ext4_da_release_space:1225:
      ext4_da_release_space: ino 13, to_free 1 with only 0 reserved data
      blocks
      
      This however can cause data loss on writeback time if the file system is
      in ENOSPC condition because we're releasing reservation for someones
      else delayed buffer.
      
      Fix this by only removing extents that corresponds to the part of the
      page we want to invalidate.
      
      This problem is reproducible by the following fio receipt (however I was
      only able to reproduce it with fio-2.1 or older.
      
      [global]
      bs=8k
      iodepth=1024
      iodepth_batch=60
      randrepeat=1
      size=1m
      directory=/mnt/test
      numjobs=20
      [job1]
      ioengine=sync
      bs=1k
      direct=1
      rw=randread
      filename=file1:file2
      [job2]
      ioengine=libaio
      rw=randwrite
      direct=1
      filename=file1:file2
      [job3]
      bs=1k
      ioengine=posixaio
      rw=randwrite
      direct=1
      filename=file1:file2
      [job5]
      bs=1k
      ioengine=sync
      rw=randread
      filename=file1:file2
      [job7]
      ioengine=libaio
      rw=randwrite
      filename=file1:file2
      [job8]
      ioengine=posixaio
      rw=randwrite
      filename=file1:file2
      [job10]
      ioengine=mmap
      rw=randwrite
      bs=1k
      filename=file1:file2
      [job11]
      ioengine=mmap
      rw=randwrite
      direct=1
      filename=file1:file2
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      e726980a
    • Filipe Manana's avatar
      Btrfs: fix fsync data loss after append write · f5880941
      Filipe Manana authored
      commit e4545de5 upstream.
      
      If we do an append write to a file (which increases its inode's i_size)
      that does not have the flag BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC set in its inode,
      and the previous transaction added a new hard link to the file, which sets
      the flag BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING in the file's inode, and then fsync
      the file, the inode's new i_size isn't logged. This has the consequence
      that after the fsync log is replayed, the file size remains what it was
      before the append write operation, which means users/applications will
      not be able to read the data that was successsfully fsync'ed before.
      
      This happens because neither the inode item nor the delayed inode get
      their i_size updated when the append write is made - doing so would
      require starting a transaction in the buffered write path, something that
      we do not do intentionally for performance reasons.
      
      Fix this by making sure that when the flag BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is
      set the inode is logged with its current i_size (log the in-memory inode
      into the log tree).
      
      This issue is not a recent regression and is easy to reproduce with the
      following test case for fstests:
      
        seq=`basename $0`
        seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
        echo "QA output created by $seq"
      
        here=`pwd`
        tmp=/tmp/$$
        status=1	# failure is the default!
      
        _cleanup()
        {
                _cleanup_flakey
                rm -f $tmp.*
        }
        trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
      
        # get standard environment, filters and checks
        . ./common/rc
        . ./common/filter
        . ./common/dmflakey
      
        # real QA test starts here
        _supported_fs generic
        _supported_os Linux
        _need_to_be_root
        _require_scratch
        _require_dm_flakey
        _require_metadata_journaling $SCRATCH_DEV
      
        _crash_and_mount()
        {
                # Simulate a crash/power loss.
                _load_flakey_table $FLAKEY_DROP_WRITES
                _unmount_flakey
                # Allow writes again and mount. This makes the fs replay its fsync log.
                _load_flakey_table $FLAKEY_ALLOW_WRITES
                _mount_flakey
        }
      
        rm -f $seqres.full
      
        _scratch_mkfs >> $seqres.full 2>&1
        _init_flakey
        _mount_flakey
      
        # Create the test file with some initial data and then fsync it.
        # The fsync here is only needed to trigger the issue in btrfs, as it causes the
        # the flag BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC to be removed from the btrfs inode.
        $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0 32k" \
                        -c "fsync" \
                        $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
        sync
      
        # Add a hard link to our file.
        # On btrfs this sets the flag BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING on the btrfs inode,
        # which is a necessary condition to trigger the issue.
        ln $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
      
        # Sync the filesystem to force a commit of the current btrfs transaction, this
        # is a necessary condition to trigger the bug on btrfs.
        sync
      
        # Now append more data to our file, increasing its size, and fsync the file.
        # In btrfs because the inode flag BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING was set and the
        # write path did not update the inode item in the btree nor the delayed inode
        # item (in memory struture) in the current transaction (created by the fsync
        # handler), the fsync did not record the inode's new i_size in the fsync
        # log/journal. This made the data unavailable after the fsync log/journal is
        # replayed.
        $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 32K 32K" \
                     -c "fsync" \
                     $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
      
        echo "File content after fsync and before crash:"
        od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
      
        _crash_and_mount
      
        echo "File content after crash and log replay:"
        od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
      
        status=0
        exit
      
      The expected file output before and after the crash/power failure expects the
      appended data to be available, which is:
      
        0000000 aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa
        *
        0100000 bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
        *
        0200000
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      f5880941
    • Filipe Manana's avatar
      Btrfs: fix race between caching kthread and returning inode to inode cache · 13321418
      Filipe Manana authored
      commit ae9d8f17 upstream.
      
      While the inode cache caching kthread is calling btrfs_unpin_free_ino(),
      we could have a concurrent call to btrfs_return_ino() that adds a new
      entry to the root's free space cache of pinned inodes. This concurrent
      call does not acquire the fs_info->commit_root_sem before adding a new
      entry if the caching state is BTRFS_CACHE_FINISHED, which is a problem
      because the caching kthread calls btrfs_unpin_free_ino() after setting
      the caching state to BTRFS_CACHE_FINISHED and therefore races with
      the task calling btrfs_return_ino(), which is adding a new entry, while
      the former (caching kthread) is navigating the cache's rbtree, removing
      and freeing nodes from the cache's rbtree without acquiring the spinlock
      that protects the rbtree.
      
      This race resulted in memory corruption due to double free of struct
      btrfs_free_space objects because both tasks can end up doing freeing the
      same objects. Note that adding a new entry can result in merging it with
      other entries in the cache, in which case those entries are freed.
      This is particularly important as btrfs_free_space structures are also
      used for the block group free space caches.
      
      This memory corruption can be detected by a debugging kernel, which
      reports it with the following trace:
      
      [132408.501148] slab error in verify_redzone_free(): cache `btrfs_free_space': double free detected
      [132408.505075] CPU: 15 PID: 12248 Comm: btrfs-ino-cache Tainted: G        W       4.1.0-rc5-btrfs-next-10+ #1
      [132408.505075] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20150316_085822-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
      [132408.505075]  ffff880023e7d320 ffff880163d73cd8 ffffffff8145eec7 ffffffff81095dce
      [132408.505075]  ffff880009735d40 ffff880163d73ce8 ffffffff81154e1e ffff880163d73d68
      [132408.505075]  ffffffff81155733 ffffffffa054a95a ffff8801b6099f00 ffffffffa0505b5f
      [132408.505075] Call Trace:
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff8145eec7>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff81095dce>] ? console_unlock+0x356/0x3a2
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff81154e1e>] __slab_error.isra.28+0x25/0x36
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff81155733>] __cache_free+0xe2/0x4b6
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa054a95a>] ? __btrfs_add_free_space+0x2f0/0x343 [btrfs]
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa0505b5f>] ? btrfs_unpin_free_ino+0x8e/0x99 [btrfs]
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff810f3b30>] ? time_hardirqs_off+0x15/0x28
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff81084d42>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0xf
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff811563a1>] ? kfree+0xb6/0x14e
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff811563d0>] kfree+0xe5/0x14e
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa0505b5f>] btrfs_unpin_free_ino+0x8e/0x99 [btrfs]
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa0505e08>] caching_kthread+0x29e/0x2d9 [btrfs]
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa0505b6a>] ? btrfs_unpin_free_ino+0x99/0x99 [btrfs]
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff8106698f>] kthread+0xef/0xf7
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff810f3b08>] ? time_hardirqs_on+0x15/0x28
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff810668a0>] ? __kthread_parkme+0xad/0xad
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff814653d2>] ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70
      [132408.505075]  [<ffffffff810668a0>] ? __kthread_parkme+0xad/0xad
      [132408.505075] ffff880023e7d320: redzone 1:0x9f911029d74e35b, redzone 2:0x9f911029d74e35b.
      [132409.501654] slab: double free detected in cache 'btrfs_free_space', objp ffff880023e7d320
      [132409.503355] ------------[ cut here ]------------
      [132409.504241] kernel BUG at mm/slab.c:2571!
      
      Therefore fix this by having btrfs_unpin_free_ino() acquire the lock
      that protects the rbtree while doing the searches and removing entries.
      
      Fixes: 1c70d8fb ("Btrfs: fix inode caching vs tree log")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      13321418
    • Filipe Manana's avatar
      Btrfs: use kmem_cache_free when freeing entry in inode cache · 6c7f16ec
      Filipe Manana authored
      commit c3f4a168 upstream.
      
      The free space entries are allocated using kmem_cache_zalloc(),
      through __btrfs_add_free_space(), therefore we should use
      kmem_cache_free() and not kfree() to avoid any confusion and
      any potential problem. Looking at the kfree() definition at
      mm/slab.c it has the following comment:
      
        /*
         * (...)
         *
         * Don't free memory not originally allocated by kmalloc()
         * or you will run into trouble.
         */
      
      So better be safe and use kmem_cache_free().
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      6c7f16ec
  2. 04 Aug, 2015 1 commit
  3. 30 Jul, 2015 9 commits
  4. 28 Jul, 2015 1 commit
  5. 23 Jul, 2015 18 commits