This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to
save the existence of verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's
security blob, and LSMs can make access decisions based on this data.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for a singular dm-verity
volume, identified by roothash, through "dmverity_roothash" and all
signed and validated dm-verity volumes, through "dmverity_signature".
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: fixed some line length issues in the comments]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

dm-verity provides a strong guarantee of a block device's integrity. As
a generic way to check the integrity of a block device, it provides
those integrity guarantees to its higher layers, including the filesystem
level.

However, critical security metadata like the dm-verity roothash and its
signing information are not easily accessible to the LSMs.
To address this limitation, this patch introduces a mechanism to store
and manage these essential security details within a newly added LSM blob
in the block_device structure.

This addition allows LSMs to make access control decisions on the integrity
data stored within the block_device, enabling more flexible security
policies. For instance, LSMs can now revoke access to dm-verity devices
based on their roothashes, ensuring that only authorized and verified
content is accessible. Additionally, LSMs can enforce policies to only
allow files from dm-verity devices that have a valid digital signature to
execute, effectively blocking any unsigned files from execution, thus
enhancing security against unauthorized modifications.

The patch includes new hook calls, `security_bdev_setintegrity()`, in
dm-verity to expose the dm-verity roothash and the roothash signature to
LSMs via preresume() callback. By using the preresume() callback, it
ensures that the security metadata is consistently in sync with the
metadata of the dm-verity target in the current active mapping table.
The hook calls are depended on CONFIG_SECURITY.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
[PM: moved sig_size field as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

This patch introduces a new LSM blob to the block_device structure,
enabling the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related
to block devices. Currently, for a device mapper's mapped device containing
a dm-verity target, critical security information such as the roothash and
its signing state are not readily accessible. Specifically, while the
dm-verity volume creation process passes the dm-verity roothash and its
signature from userspace to the kernel, the roothash is stored privately
within the dm-verity target, and its signature is discarded
post-verification. This makes it extremely hard for the security subsystem
to utilize these data.

With the addition of the LSM blob to the block_device structure, the
security subsystem can now retain and manage important security metadata
such as the roothash and the signing state of a dm-verity by storing them
inside the blob. Access decisions can then be based on these stored data.

The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in
other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock.
The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the
struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the
security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct
block_device is deallocated or freed.

This patch also introduces a new hook security_bdev_setintegrity() to save
block device's integrity data to the new LSM blob. For example, for
dm-verity, it can use this hook to expose its roothash and signing state
to LSMs, then LSMs can save these data into the LSM blob.

Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in
dm-verity, if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a
different dm-verity target with a new roothash and signing information,
the previously stored data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is
crucial to re-invoke the hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up
to date. This necessity arises from the design of device-mapper, where a
device-mapper device is first created, and then targets are subsequently
loaded into it. These targets can be modified multiple times during the
device's lifetime. Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the
creation of the block device, its actual contents are not initialized at
this stage and can change substantially over time. This includes
alterations from data that the LSM 'trusts' to those it does not, making
it essential to handle these changes correctly. Failure to address this
dynamic aspect could potentially allow for bypassing LSM checks.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy
authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it affecting their
programs. When the mode is changed, a 1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS will
be reported.

This patch adds the following audit records:

    audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=4294967295
      ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
    audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=1 old_enforcing=0 auid=4294967295
      ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1

The audit record only emit when the value from the user input is
different from the current enforce value.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails,
allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified
of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE
itself.

This patch introduces 3 new audit events.

AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420) indicates the result of an IPE policy evaluation
of a resource.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421) indicates the current active IPE policy
has been changed to another loaded policy.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) indicates a new IPE policy has been loaded
into the kernel.

This patch also adds support for success auditing, allowing users to
identify why an allow decision was made for a resource. However, it is
recommended to use this option with caution, as it is quite noisy.

Here are some examples of the new audit record types:

AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420):

    audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
      pid=297 comm="sh" path="/root/vol/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
      ino=3897 rule="op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW"

    audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
      pid=299 comm="sh" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
      ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"

    audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
     pid=300 path="/tmp/tmpdp2h1lub/deny/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
      ino=131 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"

The above three records were generated when the active IPE policy only
allows binaries from the initramfs to run. The three identical `hello`
binary were placed at different locations, only the first hello from
the rootfs(initramfs) was allowed.

Field ipe_op followed by the IPE operation name associated with the log.

Field ipe_hook followed by the name of the LSM hook that triggered the IPE
event.

Field enforcing followed by the enforcement state of IPE. (it will be
introduced in the next commit)

Field pid followed by the pid of the process that triggered the IPE
event.

Field comm followed by the command line program name of the process that
triggered the IPE event.

Field path followed by the file's path name.

Field dev followed by the device name as found in /dev where the file is
from.
Note that for device mappers it will use the name `dm-X` instead of
the name in /dev/mapper.
For a file in a temp file system, which is not from a device, it will use
`tmpfs` for the field.
The implementation of this part is following another existing use case
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE in security/lsm_audit.c

Field ino followed by the file's inode number.

Field rule followed by the IPE rule made the access decision. The whole
rule must be audited because the decision is based on the combination of
all property conditions in the rule.

Along with the syscall audit event, user can know why a blocked
happened. For example:

    audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
      pid=2138 comm="bash" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
      ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
    audit[1956]: SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=59
      success=no exit=-13 a0=556790138df0 a1=556790135390 a2=5567901338b0
      a3=ab2a41a67f4f1f4e items=1 ppid=147 pid=1956 auid=4294967295 uid=0
      gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0
      ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)

The above two records showed bash used execve to run "hello" and got
blocked by IPE. Note that the IPE records are always prior to a SYSCALL
record.

AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421):

    audit: AUDIT1421
      old_active_pol_name="Allow_All" old_active_pol_version=0.0.0
      old_policy_digest=sha256:E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649
      new_active_pol_name="boot_verified" new_active_pol_version=0.0.0
      new_policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F
      auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1

The above record showed the current IPE active policy switch from
`Allow_All` to `boot_verified` along with the version and the hash
digest of the two policies. Note IPE can only have one policy active
at a time, all access decision evaluation is based on the current active
policy.
The normal procedure to deploy a policy is loading the policy to deploy
into the kernel first, then switch the active policy to it.

AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422):

    audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="boot_verified" policy_version=0.0.0
      policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F2676
      auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1

The above record showed a new policy has been loaded into the kernel
with the policy name, policy version and policy hash.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

As is typical with LSMs, IPE uses securityfs as its interface with
userspace. for a complete list of the interfaces and the respective
inputs/outputs, please see the documentation under
admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intended deletion
did not happen.

This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.
Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

IPE is designed to provide system level trust guarantees, this usually
implies that trust starts from bootup with a hardware root of trust,
which validates the bootloader. After this, the bootloader verifies
the kernel and the initramfs.

As there's no currently supported integrity method for initramfs, and
it's typically already verified by the bootloader. This patch introduces
a new IPE property `boot_verified` which allows author of IPE policy to
indicate trust for files from initramfs.

The implementation of this feature utilizes the newly added
`initramfs_populated` hook. This hook marks the superblock of the rootfs
after the initramfs has been unpacked into it.

Before mounting the real rootfs on top of the initramfs, initramfs
script will recursively remove all files and directories on the
initramfs. This is typically implemented by using switch_root(8)
(https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/switch_root.8.html).
Therefore the initramfs will be empty and not accessible after the real
rootfs takes over. It is advised to switch to a different policy
that doesn't rely on the `boot_verified` property after this point.
This ensures that the trust policies remain relevant and effective
throughout the system's operation.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.

Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.

This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of
kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It
accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for
bprm_check_security, file_mprotect, mmap_file, kernel_load_data,
and kernel_read_data.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Introduce a core evaluation function in IPE that will be triggered by
various security hooks (e.g., mmap, bprm_check, kexec). This function
systematically assesses actions against the defined IPE policy, by
iterating over rules specific to the action being taken. This critical
addition enables IPE to enforce its security policies effectively,
ensuring that actions intercepted by these hooks are scrutinized for policy
compliance before they are allowed to proceed.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

IPE's interpretation of the what the user trusts is accomplished through
its policy. IPE's design is to not provide support for a single trust
provider, but to support multiple providers to enable the end-user to
choose the best one to seek their needs.

This requires the policy to be rather flexible and modular so that
integrity providers, like fs-verity, dm-verity, or some other system,
can plug into the policy with minimal code changes.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: added NULL check in parse_rule() as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an
complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs
today.

Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource
should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach,
is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust
of a current resource.

The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which
resource can be trusted.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Fix sparse warning:

security/lockdown/lockdown.c:79:21: warning:
 symbol 'lockdown_lsmid' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

The LSM framework has an existing inode_free_security() hook which
is used by LSMs that manage state associated with an inode, but
due to the use of RCU to protect the inode, special care must be
taken to ensure that the LSMs do not fully release the inode state
until it is safe from a RCU perspective.

This patch implements a new inode_free_security_rcu() implementation
hook which is called when it is safe to free the LSM's internal inode
state.  Unfortunately, this new hook does not have access to the inode
itself as it may already be released, so the existing
inode_free_security() hook is retained for those LSMs which require
access to the inode.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+5446fbf332b0602ede0b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/00000000000076ba3b0617f65cc8@google.comSigned-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Some cleanup and style corrections for lsm_hooks.h.

 * Drop the lsm_inode_alloc() extern declaration, it is not needed.
 * Relocate lsm_get_xattr_slot() and extern variables in the file to
   improve grouping of related objects.
 * Don't use tabs to needlessly align structure fields.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code.

Before:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when
  discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any
  other negative error code otherwise.

After:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED*
  when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or
  any other negative error code otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook vm_enough_memory to 0 or a negative error code.

Before:
- Hook vm_enough_memory returns 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
- LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 1.

After:
- Hook vm_enough_memory reutrns 0 if permission is granted, negative
  error code if not.
- LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 0.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Move management of the perf_event->security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of
allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the
infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated
there.  There are no longer any modules that require the perf_event_free()
hook.  The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Move management of the infiniband security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the LSM infrastructure.  The security modules
tell the infrastructure how much space they require at initialization.
There are no longer any modules that require the ib_free() hook.
The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak, selinux style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Move management of the dev_tun security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the LSM infrastructure.  The security modules
tell the infrastructure how much space they require at initialization.
There are no longer any modules that require the dev_tun_free hook.
The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak, selinux style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Create a helper function lsm_blob_alloc() for general use in the hook
specific functions that allocate LSM blobs. Change the hook specific
functions to use this helper. This reduces the code size by a small
amount and will make adding new instances of infrastructure managed
security blobs easier.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Move management of the key->security blob out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the
blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how
much space is required, and the space is allocated there.  There are
no existing modules that require a key_free hook, so the call to it and
the definition for it have been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Merge tag 'kbuild-fixes-v6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild

Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada:

 - Fix RPM package build error caused by an incorrect locale setup

 - Mark modules.weakdep as ghost in RPM package

 - Fix the odd combination of -S and -c in stack protector scripts,
   which is an error with the latest Clang

* tag 'kbuild-fixes-v6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
  kbuild: Fix '-S -c' in x86 stack protector scripts
  kbuild: rpm-pkg: ghost modules.weakdep file
  kbuild: rpm-pkg: Fix C locale setup

This simplifies the min_t() and max_t() macros by no longer making them
work in the context of a C constant expression.

That means that you can no longer use them for static initializers or
for array sizes in type definitions, but there were only a couple of
such uses, and all of them were converted (famous last words) to use
MIN_T/MAX_T instead.

Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 3a7e02c0 ("minmax: avoid overly complicated constant
expressions in VM code") added the simpler MIN_T/MAX_T macros in order
to avoid some excessive expansion from the rather complicated regular
min/max macros.

The complexity of those macros stems from two issues:

 (a) trying to use them in situations that require a C constant
     expression (in static initializers and for array sizes)

 (b) the type sanity checking

and MIN_T/MAX_T avoids both of these issues.

Now, in the whole (long) discussion about all this, it was pointed out
that the whole type sanity checking is entirely unnecessary for
min_t/max_t which get a fixed type that the comparison is done in.

But that still leaves min_t/max_t unnecessarily complicated due to
worries about the C constant expression case.

However, it turns out that there really aren't very many cases that use
min_t/max_t for this, and we can just force-convert those.

This does exactly that.

Which in turn will then allow for much simpler implementations of
min_t()/max_t().  All the usual "macros in all upper case will evaluate
the arguments multiple times" rules apply.

We should do all the same things for the regular min/max() vs MIN/MAX()
cases, but that has the added complexity of various drivers defining
their own local versions of MIN/MAX, so that needs another level of
fixes first.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b47fad1d0cf8449886ad148f8c013dae@AcuMS.aculab.com/
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'ubifs-for-linus-6.11-rc1-take2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/ubifs

Pull UBI and UBIFS updates from Richard Weinberger:

 - Many fixes for power-cut issues by Zhihao Cheng

 - Another ubiblock error path fix

 - ubiblock section mismatch fix

 - Misc fixes all over the place

* tag 'ubifs-for-linus-6.11-rc1-take2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/ubifs:
  ubi: Fix ubi_init() ubiblock_exit() section mismatch
  ubifs: add check for crypto_shash_tfm_digest
  ubifs: Fix inconsistent inode size when powercut happens during appendant writing
  ubi: block: fix null-pointer-dereference in ubiblock_create()
  ubifs: fix kernel-doc warnings
  ubifs: correct UBIFS_DFS_DIR_LEN macro definition and improve code clarity
  mtd: ubi: Restore missing cleanup on ubi_init() failure path
  ubifs: dbg_orphan_check: Fix missed key type checking
  ubifs: Fix unattached inode when powercut happens in creating
  ubifs: Fix space leak when powercut happens in linking tmpfile
  ubifs: Move ui->data initialization after initializing security
  ubifs: Fix adding orphan entry twice for the same inode
  ubifs: Remove insert_dead_orphan from replaying orphan process
  Revert "ubifs: ubifs_symlink: Fix memleak of inode->i_link in error path"
  ubifs: Don't add xattr inode into orphan area
  ubifs: Fix unattached xattr inode if powercut happens after deleting
  mtd: ubi: avoid expensive do_div() on 32-bit machines
  mtd: ubi: make ubi_class constant
  ubi: eba: properly rollback inside self_check_eba

After a recent change in clang to stop consuming all instances of '-S'
and '-c' [1], the stack protector scripts break due to the kernel's use
of -Werror=unused-command-line-argument to catch cases where flags are
not being properly consumed by the compiler driver:

  $ echo | clang -o - -x c - -S -c -Werror=unused-command-line-argument
  clang: error: argument unused during compilation: '-c' [-Werror,-Wunused-command-line-argument]

This results in CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR getting disabled because
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR is no longer set.

'-c' and '-S' both instruct the compiler to stop at different stages of
the pipeline ('-S' after compiling, '-c' after assembling), so having
them present together in the same command makes little sense. In this
case, the test wants to stop before assembling because it is looking at
the textual assembly output of the compiler for either '%fs' or '%gs',
so remove '-c' from the list of arguments to resolve the error.

All versions of GCC continue to work after this change, along with
versions of clang that do or do not contain the change mentioned above.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4f7fd4d7 ("[PATCH] Add the -fstack-protector option to the CFLAGS")
Fixes: 60a5317f ("x86: implement x86_32 stack protector")
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/6461e537815f7fa68cef06842505353cf5600e9c [1]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>

Since ubiblock_exit() is now called from an init function,
the __exit section no longer makes sense.

Cc: Ben Hutchings <bwh@kernel.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202407131403.wZJpd8n2-lkp@intel.com/Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>

Pull turbostat updates from Len Brown:

 - Enable turbostat extensions to add both perf and PMT (Intel
   Platform Monitoring Technology) counters via the cmdline

 - Demonstrate PMT access with built-in support for Meteor Lake's
   Die C6 counter

* tag 'v6.11-merge' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/lenb/linux:
  tools/power turbostat: version 2024.07.26
  tools/power turbostat: Include umask=%x in perf counter's config
  tools/power turbostat: Document PMT in turbostat.8
  tools/power turbostat: Add MTL's PMT DC6 builtin counter
  tools/power turbostat: Add early support for PMT counters
  tools/power turbostat: Add selftests for added perf counters
  tools/power turbostat: Add selftests for SMI, APERF and MPERF counters
  tools/power turbostat: Move verbose counter messages to level 2
  tools/power turbostat: Move debug prints from stdout to stderr
  tools/power turbostat: Fix typo in turbostat.8
  tools/power turbostat: Add perf added counter example to turbostat.8
  tools/power turbostat: Fix formatting in turbostat.8
  tools/power turbostat: Extend --add option with perf counters
  tools/power turbostat: Group SMI counter with APERF and MPERF
  tools/power turbostat: Add ZERO_ARRAY for zero initializing builtin array
  tools/power turbostat: Replace enum rapl_source and cstate_source with counter_source
  tools/power turbostat: Remove anonymous union from rapl_counter_info_t
  tools/power/turbostat: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines

Pull CXL updates from Dave Jiang:
 "Core:

   - A CXL maturity map has been added to the documentation to detail
     the current state of CXL enabling.

     It provides the status of the current state of various CXL features
     to inform current and future contributors of where things are and
     which areas need contribution.

   - A notifier handler has been added in order for a newly created CXL
     memory region to trigger the abstract distance metrics calculation.

     This should bring parity for CXL memory to the same level vs
     hotplugged DRAM for NUMA abstract distance calculation. The
     abstract distance reflects relative performance used for memory
     tiering handling.

   - An addition for XOR math has been added to address the CXL DPA to
     SPA translation.

     CXL address translation did not support address interleave math
     with XOR prior to this change.

  Fixes:

   - Fix to address race condition in the CXL memory hotplug notifier

   - Add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() for CXL modules

   - Fix incorrect vendor debug UUID define

  Misc:

   - A warning has been added to inform users of an unsupported
     configuration when mixing CXL VH and RCH/RCD hierarchies

   - The ENXIO error code has been replaced with EBUSY for inject poison
     limit reached via debugfs and cxl-test support

   - Moving the PCI config read in cxl_dvsec_rr_decode() to avoid
     unnecessary PCI config reads

   - A refactor to a common struct for DRAM and general media CXL
     events"

* tag 'cxl-for-6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl:
  cxl/core/pci: Move reading of control register to immediately before usage
  cxl: Remove defunct code calculating host bridge target positions
  cxl/region: Verify target positions using the ordered target list
  cxl: Restore XOR'd position bits during address translation
  cxl/core: Fold cxl_trace_hpa() into cxl_dpa_to_hpa()
  cxl/test: Replace ENXIO with EBUSY for inject poison limit reached
  cxl/memdev: Replace ENXIO with EBUSY for inject poison limit reached
  cxl/acpi: Warn on mixed CXL VH and RCH/RCD Hierarchy
  cxl/core: Fix incorrect vendor debug UUID define
  Documentation: CXL Maturity Map
  cxl/region: Simplify cxl_region_nid()
  cxl/region: Support to calculate memory tier abstract distance
  cxl/region: Fix a race condition in memory hotplug notifier
  cxl: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros
  cxl/events: Use a common struct for DRAM and General Media events

Pull unicode update from Gabriel Krisman Bertazi:
 "Two small fixes to silence the compiler and static analyzers tools
  from Ben Dooks and Jeff Johnson"

* tag 'unicode-next-6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/krisman/unicode:
  unicode: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros
  unicode: make utf8 test count static

In the same way as for other similar files, mark as ghost the new file
generated by depmod for configured weak dependencies for modules,
modules.weakdep, so that although it is not included in the package,
claim the ownership on it.
Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>

Pull more smb client updates from Steve French:

 - fix for potential null pointer use in init cifs

 - additional dynamic trace points to improve debugging of some common
   scenarios

 - two SMB1 fixes (one addressing reconnect with POSIX extensions, one a
   mount parsing error)

* tag '6.11-rc-smb-client-fixes-part2' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
  smb3: add dynamic trace point for session setup key expired failures
  smb3: add four dynamic tracepoints for copy_file_range and reflink
  smb3: add dynamic tracepoint for reflink errors
  cifs: mount with "unix" mount option for SMB1 incorrectly handled
  cifs: fix reconnect with SMB1 UNIX Extensions
  cifs: fix potential null pointer use in destroy_workqueue in init_cifs error path

Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:

 - NVMe pull request via Keith:
     - Fix request without payloads cleanup  (Leon)
     - Use new protection information format (Francis)
     - Improved debug message for lost pci link (Bart)
     - Another apst quirk (Wang)
     - Use appropriate sysfs api for printing chars (Markus)

 - ublk async device deletion fix (Ming)

 - drbd kerneldoc fixups (Simon)

 - Fix deadlock between sd removal and release (Yang)

* tag 'block-6.11-20240726' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
  nvme-pci: add missing condition check for existence of mapped data
  ublk: fix UBLK_CMD_DEL_DEV_ASYNC handling
  block: fix deadlock between sd_remove & sd_release
  drbd: Add peer_device to Kernel doc
  nvme-core: choose PIF from QPIF if QPIFS supports and PIF is QTYPE
  nvme-pci: Fix the instructions for disabling power management
  nvme: remove redundant bdev local variable
  nvme-fabrics: Use seq_putc() in __nvmf_concat_opt_tokens()
  nvme/pci: Add APST quirk for Lenovo N60z laptop

Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:

 - Fix a syzbot issue for the msg ring cache added in this release. No
   ill effects from this one, but it did make KMSAN unhappy (me)

 - Sanitize the NAPI timeout handling, by unifying the value handling
   into all ktime_t rather than converting back and forth (Pavel)

 - Fail NAPI registration for IOPOLL rings, it's not supported (Pavel)

 - Fix a theoretical issue with ring polling and cancelations (Pavel)

 - Various little cleanups and fixes (Pavel)

* tag 'io_uring-6.11-20240726' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
  io_uring/napi: pass ktime to io_napi_adjust_timeout
  io_uring/napi: use ktime in busy polling
  io_uring/msg_ring: fix uninitialized use of target_req->flags
  io_uring: align iowq and task request error handling
  io_uring: kill REQ_F_CANCEL_SEQ
  io_uring: simplify io_uring_cmd return
  io_uring: fix io_match_task must_hold
  io_uring: don't allow netpolling with SETUP_IOPOLL
  io_uring: tighten task exit cancellations

Pull vfs fixes from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains two fixes for this merge window:

  VFS:

   - I noticed that it is possible for a privileged user to mount most
     filesystems with a non-initial user namespace in sb->s_user_ns.

     When fsopen() is called in a non-init namespace the caller's
     namespace is recorded in fs_context->user_ns. If the returned file
     descriptor is then passed to a process privileged in init_user_ns,
     that process can call fsconfig(fd_fs, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE*),
     creating a new superblock with sb->s_user_ns set to the namespace
     of the process which called fsopen().

     This is problematic as only filesystems that raise FS_USERNS_MOUNT
     are known to be able to support a non-initial s_user_ns. Others may
     suffer security issues, on-disk corruption or outright crash the
     kernel. Prevent that by restricting such delegation to filesystems
     that allow FS_USERNS_MOUNT.

     Note, that this delegation requires a privileged process to
     actually create the superblock so either the privileged process is
     cooperaing or someone must have tricked a privileged process into
     operating on a fscontext file descriptor whose origin it doesn't
     know (a stupid idea).

     The bug dates back to about 5 years afaict.

  Misc:

   - Fix hostfs parsing when the mount request comes in via the legacy
     mount api.

     In the legacy mount api hostfs allows to specify the host directory
     mount without any key.

     Restore that behavior"

* tag 'vfs-6.11-rc1.fixes.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  hostfs: fix the host directory parse when mounting.
  fs: don't allow non-init s_user_ns for filesystems without FS_USERNS_MOUNT