- 24 Apr, 2017 2 commits
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Petr Vandrovec authored
When TPM2 log has entries with more than 3 digests, or with digests not listed in the log header, log gets misparsed, eventually leading to kernel complaint that code tried to vmalloc 512MB of memory (I have no idea what would happen on bigger system). So code should not parse only first 3 digests: both event header and event itself are already in memory, so we can parse any number of digests, as long as we do not try to parse whole memory when given count of 0xFFFFFFFF. So this change: * Rejects event entry with more digests than log header describes. Digest types should be unique, and all should be described in log header, so there cannot be more digests in the event than in the header. * Reject event entry with digest that is not described in the log header. In theory code could hardcode information about digest IDs already assigned by TCG, but if firmware authors cannot get event log format right, why should anyone believe that they got event log content right. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4d23cc32 ("tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log") Signed-off-by:
Petr Vandrovec <petr@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jarkko Sakkinen authored
Remove a useless constant that slipped through me when I did the code review. This commit fixes the issue. Cc: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org> Fixes: 69c558de63c7 ("tpm/tpm_crb: Enable TPM CRB interface for ARM64") Signed-off-by:
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- 19 Apr, 2017 1 commit
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James Morris authored
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
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- 18 Apr, 2017 2 commits
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- 17 Apr, 2017 1 commit
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James Morris authored
Merge tag 'keys-next-20170412' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
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- 11 Apr, 2017 1 commit
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Stephan Müller authored
Select CONFIG_CRYPTO in addition to CONFIG_HASH to ensure that also CONFIG_HASH2 is selected. Both are needed for the shash cipher support required for the KDF operation. Signed-off-by:
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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- 06 Apr, 2017 6 commits
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John Johansen authored
The path_max parameter determines the max size of buffers allocated but it should not be setable at run time. If can be used to cause an oops root@ubuntu:~# echo 16777216 > /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/path_max root@ubuntu:~# cat /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/path_max Killed [ 122.141911] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880080945fff [ 122.143497] IP: [<ffffffff81228844>] d_absolute_path+0x44/0xa0 [ 122.144742] PGD 220c067 PUD 0 [ 122.145453] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP [ 122.146204] Modules linked in: vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock ppdev vmw_balloon snd_ens1371 btusb snd_ac97_codec gameport snd_rawmidi btrtl snd_seq_device ac97_bus btbcm btintel snd_pcm input_leds bluetooth snd_timer snd joydev soundcore serio_raw coretemp shpchp nfit parport_pc i2c_piix4 8250_fintek vmw_vmci parport mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 btrfs raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear hid_generic usbhid hid crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd vmwgfx psmouse mptspi ttm mptscsih drm_kms_helper mptbase syscopyarea scsi_transport_spi sysfillrect [ 122.163365] ahci sysimgblt e1000 fb_sys_fops libahci drm pata_acpi fjes [ 122.164747] CPU: 3 PID: 1501 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.4.0-59-generic #80-Ubuntu [ 122.166250] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/02/2015 [ 122.168611] task: ffff88003496aa00 ti: ffff880076474000 task.ti: ffff880076474000 [ 122.170018] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81228844>] [<ffffffff81228844>] d_absolute_path+0x44/0xa0 [ 122.171525] RSP: 0018:ffff880076477b90 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 122.172462] RAX: ffff880080945fff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000001000000 [ 122.173709] RDX: 0000000000ffffff RSI: ffff880080946000 RDI: ffff8800348a1010 [ 122.174978] RBP: ffff880076477bb8 R08: ffff880076477c80 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 122.176227] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffff88007f946000 R12: ffff88007f946000 [ 122.177496] R13: ffff880076477c80 R14: ffff8800348a1010 R15: ffff8800348a2400 [ 122.178745] FS: 00007fd459eb4700(0000) GS:ffff88007b6c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 122.180176] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 122.181186] CR2: ffff880080945fff CR3: 0000000073422000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [ 122.182469] Stack: [ 122.182843] 00ffffff00000001 ffff880080946000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 122.184409] 00000000570f789c ffff880076477c30 ffffffff81385671 ffff88007a2e7a58 [ 122.185810] 0000000000000000 ffff880076477c88 01000000008a1000 0000000000000000 [ 122.187231] Call Trace: [ 122.187680] [<ffffffff81385671>] aa_path_name+0x81/0x370 [ 122.188637] [<ffffffff813875dd>] profile_transition+0xbd/0xb80 [ 122.190181] [<ffffffff811af9bc>] ? zone_statistics+0x7c/0xa0 [ 122.191674] [<ffffffff81389b20>] apparmor_bprm_set_creds+0x9b0/0xac0 [ 122.193288] [<ffffffff812e1971>] ? ext4_xattr_get+0x81/0x220 [ 122.194793] [<ffffffff812e800c>] ? ext4_xattr_security_get+0x1c/0x30 [ 122.196392] [<ffffffff813449b9>] ? get_vfs_caps_from_disk+0x69/0x110 [ 122.198004] [<ffffffff81232d4f>] ? mnt_may_suid+0x3f/0x50 [ 122.199737] [<ffffffff81344b03>] ? cap_bprm_set_creds+0xa3/0x600 [ 122.201377] [<ffffffff81346e53>] security_bprm_set_creds+0x33/0x50 [ 122.203024] [<ffffffff81214ce5>] prepare_binprm+0x85/0x190 [ 122.204515] [<ffffffff81216545>] do_execveat_common.isra.33+0x485/0x710 [ 122.206200] [<ffffffff81216a6a>] SyS_execve+0x3a/0x50 [ 122.207615] [<ffffffff81838795>] stub_execve+0x5/0x5 [ 122.208978] [<ffffffff818384f2>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x71 [ 122.210615] Code: f8 31 c0 48 63 c2 83 ea 01 48 c7 45 e8 00 00 00 00 48 01 c6 85 d2 48 c7 45 f0 00 00 00 00 48 89 75 e0 89 55 dc 78 0c 48 8d 46 ff <c6> 46 ff 00 48 89 45 e0 48 8d 55 e0 48 8d 4d dc 48 8d 75 e8 e8 [ 122.217320] RIP [<ffffffff81228844>] d_absolute_path+0x44/0xa0 [ 122.218860] RSP <ffff880076477b90> [ 122.219919] CR2: ffff880080945fff [ 122.220936] ---[ end trace 506cdbd85eb6c55e ]--- Reported-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by:
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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John Johansen authored
Boot parameters are written before apparmor is ready to answer whether the user is policy_view_capable(). Setting the parameters at boot results in an oops and failure to boot. Setting the parameters at boot is obviously allowed so skip the permission check when apparmor is not initialized. While we are at it move the more complicated check to last. Signed-off-by:
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John Johansen authored
Once the loop on lines 836-853 is complete and exits normally, ent is a pointer to the dummy list head value. The derefernces accessible from eg the goto fail on line 860 or the various goto fail_lock's afterwards thus seem incorrect. Reported-by:
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Nicolas Iooss authored
When building the kernel with clang, the compiler fails to build security/apparmor/crypto.c with the following error: security/apparmor/crypto.c:36:8: error: fields must have a constant size: 'variable length array in structure' extension will never be supported char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)]; ^ Since commit a0a77af1 ("crypto: LLVMLinux: Add macro to remove use of VLAIS in crypto code"), include/crypto/hash.h defines SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK to work around this issue. Use it in aa_calc_hash() and aa_calc_profile_hash(). Signed-off-by:Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Signed-off-by:
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Valentin Rothberg authored
Add the _APPARMOR substring to reference the intended Kconfig option. Signed-off-by:
Valentin Rothberg <valentinrothberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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kbuild test robot authored
security/apparmor/lib.c:132:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'aa_policy_init' with return type bool Return statements in functions returning bool should use true/false instead of 1/0. Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/boolreturn.cocci Signed-off-by:
Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 04 Apr, 2017 11 commits
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Since all callers of smk_netlbl_mls() are GFP_KERNEL context (smk_set_cipso() calls memdup_user_nul(), init_smk_fs() calls __kernfs_new_node(), smk_import_entry() calls kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)), it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from netlbl_catmap_setbit(). Signed-off-by:
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Tetsuo Handa authored
smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts). Signed-off-by:
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Stephan Mueller authored
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by the caller. The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API. The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API. As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size. The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with SP800-56A. Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
Merge branch 'keyctl-restrict' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/martineau/linux into keys-next To quote Mat Martineau: """ Keyrings recently acquired the ability to validate keys before they are linked using kernel internal APIs. This patch set enables configuration of restricted keyrings from userspace. These patches apply to linux-fs/keys-misc and are also available here: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/martineau/linux.git/log/?h=keyctl-restrict v13: Detect and avoid cycles in restriction references, and change restrictions to store a single key pointer rather than arbitrary data. v12: Rework the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command to take an additional parameter, renamed some functions based on feedback, and dropped an unnecessary locking change (patch 1 in previous set). v11: Configure restrictions using KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING instead of using a keyring payload at creation time. Make the garbage collector aware of restrictions. v10: Fixups from maintainer feedback. Added some missing documentation. v9: Rebased on linux-fs/keys-misc (v4.9-rc5) v8: Add option to look for signing keys within the destination keyring. Fix a consistency issue with keyring locking and restriction checks. v7: Rework key restriction payload syntax. Move key-type-specific payload parsing to the key-type. Attach more restriction information to keyrings (restriction function, data, and data free) so future restrictions are not limited to storing a key ID to use for key validation. Validate key before using it to verify another key. Modify key type locking model to allow key type lookup during keyring creation. v6: Return error if only restrict_key is supplied, address misc. review comments. v5: Fixed signature bypass problem in patch 3/6 v4: Added userspace restriction options based on builtin keyrings. restrict_link_by_signature implementation is no longer modified. Split up v3's patch 2/5 to isolate the change to key.h. v3: Updated commit message for patch 2/5 (restrict_link_by_signature_indirect) v2: Payload is now preparsed """ Signed-off-by:
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Mat Martineau authored
Add a restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain link restriction that searches for signing keys in the destination keyring in addition to the signing key or keyring designated when the destination keyring was created. Userspace enables this behavior by including the "chain" option in the keyring restriction: keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, keyring, "asymmetric", "key_or_keyring:<signing key>:chain"); Signed-off-by:Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
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Mat Martineau authored
Adds restrict_link_by_signature_keyring(), which uses the restrict_key member of the provided destination_keyring data structure as the key or keyring to search for signing keys. Signed-off-by: -
Mat Martineau authored
Look up asymmetric keyring restriction information using the key-type lookup_restrict hook. Signed-off-by: -
Mat Martineau authored
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality was only available using internal kernel APIs. With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring. To restrict a keyring, call: keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type, const char *restriction) where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction option syntax is specific to each key type. Signed-off-by: -
Mat Martineau authored
The keyring restrict callback was sometimes called before __key_link_begin and sometimes after, which meant that the keyring semaphores were not always held during the restrict callback. If the semaphores are consistently acquired before checking link restrictions, keyring contents cannot be changed after the restrict check is complete but before the evaluated key is linked to the keyring. Signed-off-by: -
Mat Martineau authored
The restrict_link functions used to validate keys as they are linked to a keyring can be associated with specific key types. Each key type may be loaded (or not) at runtime, so lookup of restrict_link functions needs to be part of the key type implementation to ensure that the requested keys can be examined. Signed-off-by: -
Mat Martineau authored
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the restriction. The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by unregistering key types. Signed-off-by:
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- 03 Apr, 2017 16 commits
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Jiandi An authored
This enables TPM Command Response Buffer interface driver for ARM64 and implements an ARM specific TPM CRB start method that invokes a Secure Monitor Call (SMC) to request the TrustZone Firmware to execute or cancel a TPM 2.0 command. In ARM, TrustZone security extensions enable a secure software environment with Secure Monitor mode. A Secure Monitor Call (SMC) is used to enter the Secure Monitor mode and perform a Secure Monitor service to communicate with TrustZone firmware which has control over the TPM hardware. Signed-off-by:
Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org> Tested-by:
Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by:
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Jiandi An authored
TCG ACPI Specification Family "1.2" and "2.0" Version 1.2 Revision 8 introduces new start method for ARM SMC. - Add new start method (type 11) for ARM SMC - Add start method specific parameters offset for ARM SMC start method Signed-off-by:
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Jarkko Sakkinen authored
This commit adds support for requesting and relinquishing locality 0 in tpm_crb for the course of command transmission. In order to achieve this, two new callbacks are added to struct tpm_class_ops: - request_locality - relinquish_locality With CRB interface you first set either requestAccess or relinquish bit from TPM_LOC_CTRL_x register and then wait for locAssigned and tpmRegValidSts bits to be set in the TPM_LOC_STATE_x register. The reason why were are doing this is to make sure that the driver will work properly with Intel TXT that uses locality 2. There's no explicit guarantee that it would relinquish this locality. In more general sense this commit enables tpm_crb to be a well behaving citizen in a multi locality environment. Signed-off-by:
Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Tested-by:
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Jerry Snitselaar authored
Since check_locality is checking to see if a certain locality is active, return true if active otherwise return false. Cc: Christophe Ricard <christophe.ricard@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Signed-off-by:
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Jérémy Lefaure authored
When PM_SLEEP is disabled crb_pm_suspend and crb_pm_resume are not used by SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS even if PM is enabled: drvers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c:540:12: warning: ‘crb_pm_suspend’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function] static int crb_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) ^ drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c:551:12: warning: ‘crb_pm_resume’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function] static int crb_pm_resume(struct device *dev) ^ The preprocessor condition should be on CONFIG_PM_SLEEP, not on CONFIG_PM. However, this patch fixes this warning by using __maybe_unused on function that are in the preprocessor condition. Fixes: 848efcfb560c ("tpm/tpm_crb: enter the low power state upon device suspend") Signed-off-by:Jérémy Lefaure <jeremy.lefaure@lse.epita.fr> Reviewed-by:
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Nayna Jain authored
Currently, there is an unnecessary 1 msec delay added in i2c_nuvoton_write_status() for the successful case. This function is called multiple times during send() and recv(), which implies adding multiple extra delays for every TPM operation. This patch calls usleep_range() only if retry is to be done. Signed-off-by:
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.8) Reviewed-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
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Andy Shevchenko authored
In order to make GPIO ACPI library stricter prepare users of gpiod_get_index() to correctly behave when there no mapping is provided by firmware. Here we add explicit mapping between _CRS GpioIo() resources and their names used in the driver. Signed-off-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Hon Ching \(Vicky\) Lo authored
The current code passes the address of tpm_chip as the argument to dev_get_drvdata() without prior NULL check in tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma. This resulted an oops during kernel boot when vTPM is enabled in Power partition configured in active memory sharing mode. The vio_driver's get_desired_dma() is called before the probe(), which for vtpm is tpm_ibmvtpm_probe, and it's this latter function that initializes the driver and set data. Attempting to get data before the probe() caused the problem. This patch adds a NULL check to the tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma. fixes: 9e0d39d8 ("tpm: Remove useless priv field in struct tpm_vendor_specific") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Hon Ching(Vicky) Lo <honclo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
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Jerry Snitselaar authored
Make sure size of response buffer is at least 6 bytes, or we will underflow and pass large size_t to memcpy_fromio(). This was encountered while testing earlier version of locality patchset. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 30fc8d13 ("tpm: TPM 2.0 CRB Interface") Signed-off-by:
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James Bottomley authored
Sessions are different from transient objects in that their handles may not be virtualized (because they're used for some hmac calculations). Additionally when a session is context saved, a vestigial memory remains in the TPM and if it is also flushed, that will be lost and the session context will refuse to load next time, so the code is updated to flush only transient objects after a context save. Add a separate array (chip->session_tbl) to save and restore sessions by handle. Use the failure of a context save or load to signal that the session has been flushed from the TPM and we can remove its memory from chip->session_tbl. Sessions are also isolated during each instance of a tpm space. This means that spaces shouldn't be able to see each other's sessions and is enforced by ensuring that a space user may only refer to sessions handles that are present in their own chip->session_tbl. Finally when a space is closed, all the sessions belonging to it should be flushed so the handles may be re-used by other spaces. Note that if we get a session save or load error, all sessions are effectively flushed. Even though we restore the session buffer, all the old sessions will refuse to load after the flush and they'll be purged from our session memory. This means that while transient context handling is still soft in the face of errors, session handling is hard (any failure of the model means all sessions are lost). Fixes-from: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Tested-by:
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James Bottomley authored
Currently the tpm spaces are not exposed to userspace. Make this exposure via a separate device, which can now be opened multiple times because each read/write transaction goes separately via the space. Concurrency is protected by the chip->tpm_mutex for each read/write transaction separately. The TPM is cleared of all transient objects by the time the mutex is dropped, so there should be no interference between the kernel and userspace. Signed-off-by:
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James Bottomley authored
Signed-off-by:
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Jarkko Sakkinen authored
Added an ability to virtualize TPM commands into an isolated context that we call a TPM space because the word context is already heavily used in the TPM specification. Both the handle areas and bodies (where necessary) are virtualized. The mechanism works by adding a new parameter struct tpm_space to the tpm_transmit() function. This new structure contains the list of virtual handles and a buffer of page size (currently) for backing storage. When tpm_transmit() is called with a struct tpm_space instance it will execute the following sequence: 1. Take locks. 2. Load transient objects from the backing storage by using ContextLoad and map virtual handles to physical handles. 3. Perform the transaction. 4. Save transient objects to backing storage by using ContextSave and map resulting physical handle to virtual handle if there is such. This commit does not implement virtualization support for hmac and policy sessions. Signed-off-by:
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Jarkko Sakkinen authored
Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header and the handle area. For ContextSave and FlushContext we mark the body to be part of the handle area. This gives validation for these commands at zero cost, including the body of the command. The more important reason for this is that we can virtualize these commands in the same way as you would virtualize the handle area of a command. Signed-off-by:
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Jarkko Sakkinen authored
Signed-off-by:
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Jarkko Sakkinen authored
Check that the length matches the length reported by the response header already in tpm_transmit() to improve validation. Signed-off-by:
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