- 11 Oct, 2019 40 commits
-
-
Will Deacon authored
[ Upstream commit eb337cdf ] SSBS provides a relatively cheap mitigation for SSB, but it is still a mitigation and its presence does not indicate that the CPU is unaffected by the vulnerability. Tweak the mitigation logic so that we report the correct string in sysfs. Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
Jeremy Linton authored
[ Upstream commit 526e065d ] Return status based on ssbd_state and __ssb_safe. If the mitigation is disabled, or the firmware isn't responding then return the expected machine state based on a whitelist of known good cores. Given a heterogeneous machine, the overall machine vulnerability defaults to safe but is reset to unsafe when we miss the whitelist and the firmware doesn't explicitly tell us the core is safe. In order to make that work we delay transitioning to vulnerable until we know the firmware isn't responding to avoid a case where we miss the whitelist, but the firmware goes ahead and reports the core is not vulnerable. If all the cores in the machine have SSBS, then __ssb_safe will remain true. Tested-by:
Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Jeremy Linton authored
[ Upstream commit d2532e27 ] Track whether all the cores in the machine are vulnerable to Spectre-v2, and whether all the vulnerable cores have been mitigated. We then expose this information to userspace via sysfs. Signed-off-by:
Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by:
-
Jeremy Linton authored
[ Upstream commit 8c1e3d2b ] Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace. Signed-off-by:
-
Marc Zyngier authored
[ Upstream commit 73f38166 ] We currently have a list of CPUs affected by Spectre-v2, for which we check that the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. It turns out that not all firmwares do implement the required mitigation, and that we fail to let the user know about it. Instead, let's slightly revamp our checks, and rely on a whitelist of cores that are known to be non-vulnerable, and let the user know the status of the mitigation in the kernel log. Signed-off-by:
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by:
-
Jeremy Linton authored
[ Upstream commit e5ce5e72 ] There are various reasons, such as benchmarking, to disable spectrev2 mitigation on a machine. Provide a command-line option to do so. Signed-off-by:
-
Jeremy Linton authored
[ Upstream commit d42281b6 ] Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected by SSB, so that we can later advertise this to userspace. Signed-off-by:
-
Mian Yousaf Kaukab authored
[ Upstream commit 61ae1321 ] Enable CPU vulnerabilty show functions for spectre_v1, spectre_v2, meltdown and store-bypass. Signed-off-by:
Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Jeremy Linton authored
[ Upstream commit 1b3ccf4b ] We implement page table isolation as a mitigation for meltdown. Report this to userspace via sysfs. Signed-off-by:
-
Mian Yousaf Kaukab authored
[ Upstream commit 3891ebcc ] spectre-v1 has been mitigated and the mitigation is always active. Report this to userspace via sysfs Signed-off-by:
-
Mark Rutland authored
[ Upstream commit f54dada8 ] In valid_user_regs() we treat SSBS as a RES0 bit, and consequently it is unexpectedly cleared when we restore a sigframe or fiddle with GPRs via ptrace. This patch fixes valid_user_regs() to account for this, updating the function to refer to the latest ARM ARM (ARM DDI 0487D.a). For AArch32 tasks, SSBS appears in bit 23 of SPSR_EL1, matching its position in the AArch32-native PSR format, and we don't need to translate it as we have to for DIT. There are no other bit assignments that we need to account for today. As the recent documentation describes the DIT bit, we can drop our comment regarding DIT. While removing SSBS from the RES0 masks, existing inconsistent whitespace is corrected. Fixes: d71be2b6 ("arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace") Signed-off-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Will Deacon authored
[ Upstream commit ee911761 ] We advertise the MRS/MSR instructions for toggling SSBS at EL0 using an HWCAP, so document it along with the others. Signed-off-by:
-
Will Deacon authored
[ Upstream commit 7c36447a ] When running without VHE, it is necessary to set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD has been forcefully disabled on the kernel command-line. Acked-by:
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Will Deacon authored
[ Upstream commit 8f04e8e6 ] On CPUs with support for PSTATE.SSBS, the kernel can toggle the SSBD state without needing to call into firmware. This patch hooks into the existing SSBD infrastructure so that SSBS is used on CPUs that support it, but it's all made horribly complicated by the very real possibility of big/little systems that don't uniformly provide the new capability. Signed-off-by:
-
Vincent Chen authored
[ Upstream commit c82dd6d0 ] When the handle_exception function addresses an exception, the interrupts will be unconditionally enabled after finishing the context save. However, It may erroneously enable the interrupts if the interrupts are disabled before entering the handle_exception. For example, one of the WARN_ON() condition is satisfied in the scheduling where the interrupt is disabled and rq.lock is locked. The WARN_ON will trigger a break exception and the handle_exception function will enable the interrupts before entering do_trap_break function. During the procedure, if a timer interrupt is pending, it will be taken when interrupts are enabled. In this case, it may cause a deadlock problem if the rq.lock is locked again in the timer ISR. Hence, the handle_exception() can only enable interrupts when the state of sstatus.SPIE is 1. This patch is tested on HiFive Unleashed board. Signed-off-by:
Vincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com> Reviewed-by:
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> [paul.walmsley@sifive.com: updated to apply] Fixes: bcae803a ("RISC-V: Enable IRQ during exception handling") Cc: David Abdurachmanov <david.abdurachmanov@sifive.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-
Srikar Dronamraju authored
[ Upstream commit b63fd11c ] When using 'perf stat' with repeat and interval option, it shows wrong values for events. The wrong values will be shown for the first interval on the second and subsequent repetitions. Without the fix: # perf stat -r 3 -I 2000 -e faults -e sched:sched_switch -a sleep 5 2.000282489 53 faults 2.000282489 513 sched:sched_switch 4.005478208 3,721 faults 4.005478208 2,666 sched:sched_switch 5.025470933 395 faults 5.025470933 1,307 sched:sched_switch 2.009602825 1,84,46,74,40,73,70,95,47,520 faults <------ 2.009602825 1,84,46,74,40,73,70,95,49,568 sched:sched_switch <------ 4.019612206 4,730 faults 4.019612206 2,746 sched:sched_switch 5.039615484 3,953 faults 5.039615484 1,496 sched:sched_switch 2.000274620 1,84,46,74,40,73,70,95,47,520 faults <------ 2.000274620 1,84,46,74,40,73,70,95,47,520 sched:sched_switch <------ 4.000480342 4,282 faults 4.000480342 2,303 sched:sched_switch 5.000916811 1,322 faults 5.000916811 1,064 sched:sched_switch # prev_raw_counts is allocated when using intervals. This is used when calculating the difference in the counts of events when using interval. The current counts are stored in prev_raw_counts to calculate the differences in the next iteration. On the first interval of the second and subsequent repetitions, prev_raw_counts would be the values stored in the last interval of the previous repetitions, while the current counts will only be for the first interval of the current repetition. Hence there is a possibility of events showing up as big number. Fix this by resetting prev_raw_counts whenever perf stat repeats the command. With the fix: # perf stat -r 3 -I 2000 -e faults -e sched:sched_switch -a sleep 5 2.019349347 2,597 faults 2.019349347 2,753 sched:sched_switch 4.019577372 3,098 faults 4.019577372 2,532 sched:sched_switch 5.019415481 1,879 faults 5.019415481 1,356 sched:sched_switch 2.000178813 8,468 faults 2.000178813 2,254 sched:sched_switch 4.000404621 7,440 faults 4.000404621 1,266 sched:sched_switch 5.040196079 2,458 faults 5.040196079 556 sched:sched_switch 2.000191939 6,870 faults 2.000191939 1,170 sched:sched_switch 4.000414103 541 faults 4.000414103 902 sched:sched_switch 5.000809863 450 faults 5.000809863 364 sched:sched_switch # Committer notes: This was broken since the cset introducing the --interval feature, i.e. --repeat + --interval wasn't tested at that point, add the Fixes tag so that automatic scripts can pick this up. Fixes: 13370a9b ("perf stat: Add interval printing") Signed-off-by:
Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Tested-by:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Tested-by:
Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+ Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190904094738.9558-2-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com [ Fixed up conflicts with libperf, i.e. some perf_{evsel,evlist} lost the 'perf' prefix ] Signed-off-by:
-
Jiri Olsa authored
[ Upstream commit 0216234c ] We release wrong pointer on error path in cpu_cache_level__read function, leading to segfault: (gdb) r record ls Starting program: /root/perf/tools/perf/perf record ls ... [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] double free or corruption (out) Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. 0x00007ffff7463798 in raise () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7463798 in raise () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff7443bac in abort () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007ffff74af8bc in __libc_message () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #3 0x00007ffff74b92b8 in malloc_printerr () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #4 0x00007ffff74bb874 in _int_free () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #5 0x0000000010271260 in __zfree (ptr=0x7fffffffa0b0) at ../../lib/zalloc.. #6 0x0000000010139340 in cpu_cache_level__read (cache=0x7fffffffa090, cac.. #7 0x0000000010143c90 in build_caches (cntp=0x7fffffffa118, size=<optimiz.. ... Releasing the proper pointer. Fixes: 720e98b5 ("perf tools: Add perf data cache feature") Signed-off-by:
-
Balasubramani Vivekanandan authored
[ Upstream commit b9023b91 ] When a cpu requests broadcasting, before starting the tick broadcast hrtimer, bc_set_next() checks if the timer callback (bc_handler) is active using hrtimer_try_to_cancel(). But hrtimer_try_to_cancel() does not provide the required synchronization when the callback is active on other core. The callback could have already executed tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast() and could have also returned. But still there is a small time window where the hrtimer_try_to_cancel() returns -1. In that case bc_set_next() returns without doing anything, but the next_event of the tick broadcast clock device is already set to a timeout value. In the race condition diagram below, CPU #1 is running the timer callback and CPU #2 is entering idle state and so calls bc_set_next(). In the worst case, the next_event will contain an expiry time, but the hrtimer will not be started which happens when the racing callback returns HRTIMER_NORESTART. The hrtimer might never recover if all further requests from the CPUs to subscribe to tick broadcast have timeout greater than the next_event of tick broadcast clock device. This leads to cascading of failures and finally noticed as rcu stall warnings Here is a depiction of the race condition CPU #1 (Running timer callback) CPU #2 (Enter idle and subscribe to tick broadcast) --------------------- --------------------- __run_hrtimer() tick_broadcast_enter() bc_handler() __tick_broadcast_oneshot_control() tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast() raw_spin_lock(&tick_broadcast_lock); dev->next_event = KTIME_MAX; //wait for tick_broadcast_lock //next_event for tick broadcast clock set to KTIME_MAX since no other cores subscribed to tick broadcasting raw_spin_unlock(&tick_broadcast_lock); if (dev->next_event == KTIME_MAX) return HRTIMER_NORESTART // callback function exits without restarting the hrtimer //tick_broadcast_lock acquired raw_spin_lock(&tick_broadcast_lock); tick_broadcast_set_event() clockevents_program_event() dev->next_event = expires; bc_set_next() hrtimer_try_to_cancel() //returns -1 since the timer callback is active. Exits without restarting the timer cpu_base->running = NULL; The comment that hrtimer cannot be armed from within the callback is wrong. It is fine to start the hrtimer from within the callback. Also it is safe to start the hrtimer from the enter/exit idle code while the broadcast handler is active. The enter/exit idle code and the broadcast handler are synchronized using tick_broadcast_lock. So there is no need for the existing try to cancel logic. All this can be removed which will eliminate the race condition as well. Fixes: 5d1638ac ("tick: Introduce hrtimer based broadcast") Originally-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Balasubramani Vivekanandan <balasubramani_vivekanandan@mentor.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Steven Rostedt (VMware) authored
[ Upstream commit e0d2615856b2046c2e8d5bfd6933f37f69703b0b ] If the re-allocation of tep->cmdlines succeeds, then the previous allocation of tep->cmdlines will be freed. If we later fail in add_new_comm(), we must not free cmdlines, and also should assign tep->cmdlines to the new allocation. Otherwise when freeing tep, the tep->cmdlines will be pointing to garbage. Fixes: a6d2a61a ("tools lib traceevent: Remove some die() calls") Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: linux-trace-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190828191819.970121417@goodmis.orgSigned-off-by:
-
Aneesh Kumar K.V authored
commit 09ce98ca upstream. Rename the #define to indicate this is related to store vs tlbie ordering issue. In the next patch, we will be adding another feature flag that is used to handles ERAT flush vs tlbie ordering issue. Fixes: a5d4b589 ("powerpc/mm: Fixup tlbie vs store ordering issue on POWER9") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+ Signed-off-by:
Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190924035254.24612-2-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by:
-
Gautham R. Shenoy authored
[ Upstream commit c784be43 ] The calls to arch_add_memory()/arch_remove_memory() are always made with the read-side cpu_hotplug_lock acquired via memory_hotplug_begin(). On pSeries, arch_add_memory()/arch_remove_memory() eventually call resize_hpt() which in turn calls stop_machine() which acquires the read-side cpu_hotplug_lock again, thereby resulting in the recursive acquisition of this lock. In the absence of CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, we hadn't observed a system lockup during a memory hotplug operation because cpus_read_lock() is a per-cpu rwsem read, which, in the fast-path (in the absence of the writer, which in our case is a CPU-hotplug operation) simply increments the read_count on the semaphore. Thus a recursive read in the fast-path doesn't cause any problems. However, we can hit this problem in practice if there is a concurrent CPU-Hotplug operation in progress which is waiting to acquire the write-side of the lock. This will cause the second recursive read to block until the writer finishes. While the writer is blocked since the first read holds the lock. Thus both the reader as well as the writers fail to make any progress thereby blocking both CPU-Hotplug as well as Memory Hotplug operations. Memory-Hotplug CPU-Hotplug CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ 1. down_read(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [memory_hotplug_begin] 2. down_write(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [cpu_up/cpu_down] 3. down_read(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [stop_machine()] Lockdep complains as follows in these code-paths. swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: stop_machine+0x2c/0x60 but task is already holding lock: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x20/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: (____ptrval____) (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __driver_attach+0x12c/0x1b0 #1: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x20/0x50 #2: (____ptrval____) (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: percpu_down_write+0x54/0x1a0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc5-58373-gbc99402235f3-dirty #166 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x164 (unreliable) __lock_acquire+0x1110/0x1c70 lock_acquire+0x240/0x290 cpus_read_lock+0x64/0xf0 stop_machine+0x2c/0x60 pseries_lpar_resize_hpt+0x19c/0x2c0 resize_hpt_for_hotplug+0x70/0xd0 arch_add_memory+0x58/0xfc devm_memremap_pages+0x5e8/0x8f0 pmem_attach_disk+0x764/0x830 nvdimm_bus_probe+0x118/0x240 really_probe+0x230/0x4b0 driver_probe_device+0x16c/0x1e0 __driver_attach+0x148/0x1b0 bus_for_each_dev+0x90/0x130 driver_attach+0x34/0x50 bus_add_driver+0x1a8/0x360 driver_register+0x108/0x170 __nd_driver_register+0xd0/0xf0 nd_pmem_driver_init+0x34/0x48 do_one_initcall+0x1e0/0x45c kernel_init_freeable+0x540/0x64c kernel_init+0x2c/0x160 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x68 Fix this issue by 1) Requiring all the calls to pseries_lpar_resize_hpt() be made with cpu_hotplug_lock held. 2) In pseries_lpar_resize_hpt() invoke stop_machine_cpuslocked() as a consequence of 1) 3) To satisfy 1), in hpt_order_set(), call mmu_hash_ops.resize_hpt() with cpu_hotplug_lock held. Fixes: dbcf929c ("powerpc/pseries: Add support for hash table resizing") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+ Reported-by:
Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Xiubo Li authored
[ Upstream commit 553768d1 ] This will allow the blksize to be set zero and then use 1024 as default. Reviewed-by:
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by:
Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> [fix to use goto out instead of return in genl_connect] Signed-off-by:
Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
-
Sean Christopherson authored
[ Upstream commit 567926cc ] Current versions of Intel's SDM incorrectly state that "bits 31:15 of the VM-Entry exception error-code field" must be zero. In reality, bits 31:16 must be zero, i.e. error codes are 16-bit values. The bogus error code check manifests as an unexpected VM-Entry failure due to an invalid code field (error number 7) in L1, e.g. when injecting a #GP with error_code=0x9f00. Nadav previously reported the bug[*], both to KVM and Intel, and fixed the associated kvm-unit-test. [*] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11124749/Reported-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Cédric Le Goater authored
[ Upstream commit 237aed48 ] When a vCPU is brought done, the XIVE VP (Virtual Processor) is first disabled and then the event notification queues are freed. When freeing the queues, we check for possible escalation interrupts and free them also. But when a XIVE VP is disabled, the underlying XIVE ENDs also are disabled in OPAL. When an END (Event Notification Descriptor) is disabled, its ESB pages (ESn and ESe) are disabled and loads return all 1s. Which means that any access on the ESB page of the escalation interrupt will return invalid values. When an interrupt is freed, the shutdown handler computes a 'saved_p' field from the value returned by a load in xive_do_source_set_mask(). This value is incorrect for escalation interrupts for the reason described above. This has no impact on Linux/KVM today because we don't make use of it but we will introduce in future changes a xive_get_irqchip_state() handler. This handler will use the 'saved_p' field to return the state of an interrupt and 'saved_p' being incorrect, softlockup will occur. Fix the vCPU cleanup sequence by first freeing the escalation interrupts if any, then disable the XIVE VP and last free the queues. Fixes: 90c73795 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add a new KVM device for the XIVE native exploitation mode") Fixes: 5af50993 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by:
Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Hans de Goede authored
[ Upstream commit 9dbc88d0 ] Bail from the pci_driver probe function instead of from the drm_driver load function. This avoid /dev/dri/card0 temporarily getting registered and then unregistered again, sending unwanted add / remove udev events to userspace. Specifically this avoids triggering the (userspace) bug fixed by this plymouth merge-request: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/plymouth/plymouth/merge_requests/59 Note that despite that being an userspace bug, not sending unnecessary udev events is a good idea in general. BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1490490Reviewed-by:
Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Navid Emamdoost authored
[ Upstream commit 8ce39eb5 ] In nfp_flower_spawn_vnic_reprs in the loop if initialization or the allocations fail memory is leaked. Appropriate releases are added. Fixes: b9452452 ("nfp: flower: add per repr private data for LAG offload") Signed-off-by:
Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
-
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo authored
[ Upstream commit 26acf400 ] Naresh Kamboju reported, that on the i386 build pr_err() doesn't get defined properly due to header ordering: perf-in.o: In function `libunwind__x86_reg_id': tools/perf/util/libunwind/../../arch/x86/util/unwind-libunwind.c:109: undefined reference to `pr_err' Reported-by:
Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Valdis Kletnieks authored
[ Upstream commit 0f749140 ] When building with W=1, gcc properly complains that there's no prototypes: CC kernel/elfcore.o kernel/elfcore.c:7:17: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_extra_phdrs' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 7 | Elf_Half __weak elf_core_extra_phdrs(void) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ kernel/elfcore.c:12:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_write_extra_phdrs' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 12 | int __weak elf_core_write_extra_phdrs(struct coredump_params *cprm, loff_t offset) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ kernel/elfcore.c:17:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_write_extra_data' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 17 | int __weak elf_core_write_extra_data(struct coredump_params *cprm) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ kernel/elfcore.c:22:15: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_extra_data_size' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 22 | size_t __weak elf_core_extra_data_size(void) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Provide the include file so gcc is happy, and we don't have potential code drift Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/29875.1565224705@turing-policeSigned-off-by:
Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Thomas Richter authored
[ Upstream commit 815c1560 ] With Java 11 there is no seperate JRE anymore. Details: https://coderanch.com/t/701603/java/JRE-JDK Therefore the detection of the JRE needs to be adapted. This change works for s390 and x86. I have not tested other platforms. Committer testing: Continues to work with the OpenJDK 8: $ rm -f ~acme/lib64/libperf-jvmti.so $ rpm -qa | grep jdk-devel java-1.8.0-openjdk-devel-1.8.0.222.b10-0.fc30.x86_64 $ git log --oneline -1 a51937170f33 (HEAD -> perf/core) perf build: Add detection of java-11-openjdk-devel package $ rm -rf /tmp/build/perf ; mkdir -p /tmp/build/perf ; make -C tools/perf O=/tmp/build/perf install > /dev/null 2>1 $ ls -la ~acme/lib64/libperf-jvmti.so -rwxr-xr-x. 1 acme acme 230744 Sep 24 16:46 /home/acme/lib64/libperf-jvmti.so $ Suggested-by:
Andreas Krebbel <krebbel@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by:
-
KeMeng Shi authored
[ Upstream commit 714e501e ] An oops can be triggered in the scheduler when running qemu on arm64: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008effe40 Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP Process migration/0 (pid: 12, stack limit = 0x00000000084e3736) pstate: 20000085 (nzCv daIf -PAN -UAO) pc : __ll_sc___cmpxchg_case_acq_4+0x4/0x20 lr : move_queued_task.isra.21+0x124/0x298 ... Call trace: __ll_sc___cmpxchg_case_acq_4+0x4/0x20 __migrate_task+0xc8/0xe0 migration_cpu_stop+0x170/0x180 cpu_stopper_thread+0xec/0x178 smpboot_thread_fn+0x1ac/0x1e8 kthread+0x134/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 __set_cpus_allowed_ptr() will choose an active dest_cpu in affinity mask to migrage the process if process is not currently running on any one of the CPUs specified in affinity mask. __set_cpus_allowed_ptr() will choose an invalid dest_cpu (dest_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids, 1024 in my virtual machine) if CPUS in an affinity mask are deactived by cpu_down after cpumask_intersects check. cpumask_test_cpu() of dest_cpu afterwards is overflown and may pass if corresponding bit is coincidentally set. As a consequence, kernel will access an invalid rq address associate with the invalid CPU in migration_cpu_stop->__migrate_task->move_queued_task and the Oops occurs. The reproduce the crash: 1) A process repeatedly binds itself to cpu0 and cpu1 in turn by calling sched_setaffinity. 2) A shell script repeatedly does "echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online" and "echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online" in turn. 3) Oops appears if the invalid CPU is set in memory after tested cpumask. Signed-off-by:
KeMeng Shi <shikemeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by:
Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1568616808-16808-1-git-send-email-shikemeng@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
-
Mathieu Desnoyers authored
[ Upstream commit fc0d7738 ] Fix a logic flaw in the way membarrier_register_private_expedited() handles ready state checks for private expedited sync core and private expedited registrations. If a private expedited membarrier registration is first performed, and then a private expedited sync_core registration is performed, the ready state check will skip the second registration when it really should not. Signed-off-by:
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Mathieu Desnoyers authored
[ Upstream commit 2840cf02 ] When the prev and next task's mm change, switch_mm() provides the core serializing guarantees before returning to usermode. The only case where an explicit core serialization is needed is when the scheduler keeps the same mm for prev and next. Suggested-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Nathan Chancellor authored
[ Upstream commit 59f08896 ] After commit 62974fc3 ("libnvdimm: Enable unit test infrastructure compile checks"), clang warns: In file included from ../drivers/nvdimm/../../tools/testing/nvdimm/test/iomap.c:15: ../drivers/nvdimm/../../tools/testing/nvdimm/test/nfit_test.h:206:15: warning: redefinition of typedef 'acpi_handle' is a C11 feature [-Wtypedef-redefinition] typedef void *acpi_handle; ^ ../include/acpi/actypes.h:424:15: note: previous definition is here typedef void *acpi_handle; /* Actually a ptr to a NS Node */ ^ 1 warning generated. The include chain: iomap.c -> linux/acpi.h -> acpi/acpi.h -> acpi/actypes.h nfit_test.h Avoid this by including linux/acpi.h in nfit_test.h, which allows us to remove both the typedef and the forward declaration of acpi_object. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/660Signed-off-by:
Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190918042148.77553-1-natechancellor@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
zhengbin authored
[ Upstream commit 9ad09b19 ] If cuse_send_init fails, need to fuse_conn_put cc->fc. cuse_channel_open->fuse_conn_init->refcount_set(&fc->count, 1) ->fuse_dev_alloc->fuse_conn_get ->fuse_dev_free->fuse_conn_put Fixes: cc080e9e ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure") Reported-by:
Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Aneesh Kumar K.V authored
[ Upstream commit c42adf87 ] We do check for a bad block during namespace init and that use region bad block list. We need to initialize the bad block for volatile regions for this to work. We also observe a lockdep warning as below because the lock is not initialized correctly since we skip bad block init for volatile regions. INFO: trying to register non-static key. the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation. turning off the locking correctness validator. CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1-15699-g3dee241c937e #149 Call Trace: [c0000000f95cb250] [c00000000147dd84] dump_stack+0xe8/0x164 (unreliable) [c0000000f95cb2a0] [c00000000022ccd8] register_lock_class+0x308/0xa60 [c0000000f95cb3a0] [c000000000229cc0] __lock_acquire+0x170/0x1ff0 [c0000000f95cb4c0] [c00000000022c740] lock_acquire+0x220/0x270 [c0000000f95cb580] [c000000000a93230] badblocks_check+0xc0/0x290 [c0000000f95cb5f0] [c000000000d97540] nd_pfn_validate+0x5c0/0x7f0 [c0000000f95cb6d0] [c000000000d98300] nd_dax_probe+0xd0/0x1f0 [c0000000f95cb760] [c000000000d9b66c] nd_pmem_probe+0x10c/0x160 [c0000000f95cb790] [c000000000d7f5ec] nvdimm_bus_probe+0x10c/0x240 [c0000000f95cb820] [c000000000d0f844] really_probe+0x254/0x4e0 [c0000000f95cb8b0] [c000000000d0fdfc] driver_probe_device+0x16c/0x1e0 [c0000000f95cb930] [c000000000d10238] device_driver_attach+0x68/0xa0 [c0000000f95cb970] [c000000000d1040c] __driver_attach+0x19c/0x1c0 [c0000000f95cb9f0] [c000000000d0c4c4] bus_for_each_dev+0x94/0x130 [c0000000f95cba50] [c000000000d0f014] driver_attach+0x34/0x50 [c0000000f95cba70] [c000000000d0e208] bus_add_driver+0x178/0x2f0 [c0000000f95cbb00] [c000000000d117c8] driver_register+0x108/0x170 [c0000000f95cbb70] [c000000000d7edb0] __nd_driver_register+0xe0/0x100 [c0000000f95cbbd0] [c000000001a6baa4] nd_pmem_driver_init+0x34/0x48 [c0000000f95cbbf0] [c0000000000106f4] do_one_initcall+0x1d4/0x4b0 [c0000000f95cbcd0] [c0000000019f499c] kernel_init_freeable+0x544/0x65c [c0000000f95cbdb0] [c000000000010d6c] kernel_init+0x2c/0x180 [c0000000f95cbe20] [c00000000000b954] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x68 Signed-off-by:
-
Stefan Mavrodiev authored
[ Upstream commit 8c7aa184 ] When calling thermal_add_hwmon_sysfs(), the device type is sanitized by replacing '-' with '_'. However tz->type remains unsanitized. Thus calling thermal_hwmon_lookup_by_type() returns no device. And if there is no device, thermal_remove_hwmon_sysfs() fails with "hwmon device lookup failed!". The result is unregisted hwmon devices in the sysfs. Fixes: 409ef0ba ("thermal_hwmon: Sanitize attribute name passed to hwmon") Signed-off-by:
Stefan Mavrodiev <stefan@olimex.com> Signed-off-by:
Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Ido Schimmel authored
[ Upstream commit 1851799e ] thermal_zone_device_unregister() cancels the delayed work that polls the thermal zone, but it does not wait for it to finish. This is racy with respect to the freeing of the thermal zone device, which can result in a use-after-free [1]. Fix this by waiting for the delayed work to finish before freeing the thermal zone device. Note that thermal_zone_device_set_polling() is never invoked from an atomic context, so it is safe to call cancel_delayed_work_sync() that can block. [1] [ +0.002221] ================================================================== [ +0.000064] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x1076/0x11c0 [ +0.000016] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881e48e0450 by task kworker/1:0/17 [ +0.000023] CPU: 1 PID: 17 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-custom-02495-g8e73ca3be4af #1701 [ +0.000010] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN2100-CB2FO/SA001017, BIOS 5.6.5 06/07/2016 [ +0.000016] Workqueue: events_freezable_power_ thermal_zone_device_check [ +0.000012] Call Trace: [ +0.000021] dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e [ +0.000020] print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x25e [ +0.000018] __kasan_report.cold.3+0x78/0x9d [ +0.000016] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 [ +0.000016] __mutex_lock+0x1076/0x11c0 [ +0.000014] step_wise_throttle+0x72/0x150 [ +0.000018] handle_thermal_trip+0x167/0x760 [ +0.000019] thermal_zone_device_update+0x19e/0x5f0 [ +0.000019] process_one_work+0x969/0x16f0 [ +0.000017] worker_thread+0x91/0xc40 [ +0.000014] kthread+0x33d/0x400 [ +0.000015] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ +0.000020] Allocated by task 1: [ +0.000015] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ +0.000015] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.4+0xc1/0xd0 [ +0.000014] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x152/0x320 [ +0.000015] thermal_zone_device_register+0x1b4/0x13a0 [ +0.000015] mlxsw_thermal_init+0xc92/0x23d0 [ +0.000014] __mlxsw_core_bus_device_register+0x659/0x11b0 [ +0.000013] mlxsw_core_bus_device_register+0x3d/0x90 [ +0.000013] mlxsw_pci_probe+0x355/0x4b0 [ +0.000014] local_pci_probe+0xc3/0x150 [ +0.000013] pci_device_probe+0x280/0x410 [ +0.000013] really_probe+0x26a/0xbb0 [ +0.000013] driver_probe_device+0x208/0x2e0 [ +0.000013] device_driver_attach+0xfe/0x140 [ +0.000013] __driver_attach+0x110/0x310 [ +0.000013] bus_for_each_dev+0x14b/0x1d0 [ +0.000013] driver_register+0x1c0/0x400 [ +0.000015] mlxsw_sp_module_init+0x5d/0xd3 [ +0.000014] do_one_initcall+0x239/0x4dd [ +0.000013] kernel_init_freeable+0x42b/0x4e8 [ +0.000012] kernel_init+0x11/0x18b [ +0.000013] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ +0.000015] Freed by task 581: [ +0.000013] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ +0.000014] __kasan_slab_free+0x125/0x170 [ +0.000013] kfree+0xf3/0x310 [ +0.000013] thermal_release+0xc7/0xf0 [ +0.000014] device_release+0x77/0x200 [ +0.000014] kobject_put+0x1a8/0x4c0 [ +0.000014] device_unregister+0x38/0xc0 [ +0.000014] thermal_zone_device_unregister+0x54e/0x6a0 [ +0.000014] mlxsw_thermal_fini+0x184/0x35a [ +0.000014] mlxsw_core_bus_device_unregister+0x10a/0x640 [ +0.000013] mlxsw_devlink_core_bus_device_reload+0x92/0x210 [ +0.000015] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0x113/0x1f0 [ +0.000014] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x700/0xee0 [ +0.000013] genl_rcv_msg+0xca/0x170 [ +0.000013] netlink_rcv_skb+0x137/0x3a0 [ +0.000012] genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 [ +0.000013] netlink_unicast+0x49b/0x660 [ +0.000013] netlink_sendmsg+0x755/0xc90 [ +0.000013] __sys_sendto+0x3de/0x430 [ +0.000013] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe2/0x1b0 [ +0.000013] do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x4d0 [ +0.000013] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ +0.000017] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881e48e0008 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 [ +0.000012] The buggy address is located 1096 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff8881e48e0008, ffff8881e48e0808) [ +0.000007] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ +0.000012] page:ffffea0007923800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88823680d0c0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ +0.000020] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head) [ +0.000019] raw: 0200000000010200 ffffea0007682008 ffffea00076ab808 ffff88823680d0c0 [ +0.000016] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000d000d 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ +0.000007] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ +0.000012] Memory state around the buggy address: [ +0.000012] ffff8881e48e0300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000012] ffff8881e48e0380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000012] >ffff8881e48e0400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000008] ^ [ +0.000012] ffff8881e48e0480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000012] ffff8881e48e0500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000007] ================================================================== Fixes: b1569e99 ("ACPI: move thermal trip handling to generic thermal layer") Reported-by:
Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Acked-by:
-
Sanjay R Mehta authored
[ Upstream commit ae89339b ] second parameter of ntb_peer_mw_get_addr is pointing to wrong memory window index by passing "peer gidx" instead of "local gidx". For ex, "local gidx" value is '0' and "peer gidx" value is '1', then on peer side ntb_mw_set_trans() api is used as below with gidx pointing to local side gidx which is '0', so memroy window '0' is chosen and XLAT '0' will be programmed by peer side. ntb_mw_set_trans(perf->ntb, peer->pidx, peer->gidx, peer->inbuf_xlat, peer->inbuf_size); Now, on local side ntb_peer_mw_get_addr() is been used as below with gidx pointing to "peer gidx" which is '1', so pointing to memory window '1' instead of memory window '0'. ntb_peer_mw_get_addr(perf->ntb, peer->gidx, &phys_addr, &peer->outbuf_size); So this patch pass "local gidx" as parameter to ntb_peer_mw_get_addr(). Signed-off-by:
Sanjay R Mehta <sanju.mehta@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us> Signed-off-by:
-
Arvind Sankar authored
[ Upstream commit ca14c996 ] Since commit: b059f801 ("x86/purgatory: Use CFLAGS_REMOVE rather than reset KBUILD_CFLAGS") kexec breaks if GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y is enabled, as the purgatory contains undefined references to stackleak_track_stack. Attempting to load a kexec kernel results in this failure: kexec: Undefined symbol: stackleak_track_stack kexec-bzImage64: Loading purgatory failed Fix this by disabling the stackleak plugin for the purgatory. Signed-off-by:
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Reviewed-by:
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: b059f801 ("x86/purgatory: Use CFLAGS_REMOVE rather than reset KBUILD_CFLAGS") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190923171753.GA2252517@rani.riverdale.lanSigned-off-by:
-
Fabrice Gasnier authored
[ Upstream commit c91e3234 ] LPTimer can use a 32KHz clock for counting. It depends on clock tree configuration. In such a case, PWM output frequency range is limited. Although unlikely, nothing prevents user from requesting a PWM frequency above counting clock (32KHz for instance): - This causes (prd - 1) = 0xffff to be written in ARR register later in the apply() routine. This results in badly configured PWM period (and also duty_cycle). Add a check to report an error is such a case. Signed-off-by:
Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com> Reviewed-by:
Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
