- 03 Jun, 2024 1 commit
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Michael Roth authored
Currently there's a consistent pattern of always calling host_rmp_make_shared() immediately after snp_page_reclaim(), so go ahead and handle it automatically as part of snp_page_reclaim(). Also rename it to kvm_rmp_make_shared() to more easily distinguish it as a KVM-specific variant of the more generic rmp_make_shared() helper. Suggested-by:
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 12 May, 2024 24 commits
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Brijesh Singh authored
Add a module parameter than can be used to enable or disable the SEV-SNP feature. Now that KVM contains the support for the SNP set the GHCB hypervisor feature flag to indicate that SNP is supported. Signed-off-by:
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-18-michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ashish Kalra authored
With SNP/guest_memfd, private/encrypted memory should not be mappable, and MMU notifications for HVA-mapped memory will only be relevant to unencrypted guest memory. Therefore, the rationale behind issuing a wbinvd_on_all_cpus() in sev_guest_memory_reclaimed() should not apply for SNP guests and can be ignored. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
In the case of SEV-SNP, whether or not a 2MB page can be mapped via a 2MB mapping in the guest's nested page table depends on whether or not any subpages within the range have already been initialized as private in the RMP table. The existing mixed-attribute tracking in KVM is insufficient here, for instance: - gmem allocates 2MB page - guest issues PVALIDATE on 2MB page - guest later converts a subpage to shared - SNP host code issues PSMASH to split 2MB RMP mapping to 4K - KVM MMU splits NPT mapping to 4K - guest later converts that shared page back to private At this point there are no mixed attributes, and KVM would normally allow for 2MB NPT mappings again, but this is actually not allowed because the RMP table mappings are 4K and cannot be promoted on the hypervisor side, so the NPT mappings must still be limited to 4K to match this. Implement a kvm_x86_ops.private_max_mapping_level() hook for SEV that checks for this condition and adjusts the mapping level accordingly. Reviewed-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Implement a platform hook to do the work of restoring the direct map entries of gmem-managed pages and transitioning the corresponding RMP table entries back to the default shared/hypervisor-owned state. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
This will handle the RMP table updates needed to put a page into a private state before mapping it into an SEV-SNP guest. Reviewed-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
Add support for the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event. This allows SEV-SNP guests to alter the register state of the APs on their own. This allows the guest a way of simulating INIT-SIPI. A new event, KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, is created and used so as to avoid updating the VMSA pointer while the vCPU is running. For CREATE The guest supplies the GPA of the VMSA to be used for the vCPU with the specified APIC ID. The GPA is saved in the svm struct of the target vCPU, the KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event is added to the vCPU and then the vCPU is kicked. For CREATE_ON_INIT: The guest supplies the GPA of the VMSA to be used for the vCPU with the specified APIC ID the next time an INIT is performed. The GPA is saved in the svm struct of the target vCPU. For DESTROY: The guest indicates it wishes to stop the vCPU. The GPA is cleared from the svm struct, the KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event is added to vCPU and then the vCPU is kicked. The KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event handler will be invoked as a result of the event or as a result of an INIT. If a new VMSA is to be installed, the VMSA guest page is set as the VMSA in the vCPU VMCB and the vCPU state is set to KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE. If a new VMSA is not to be installed, the VMSA is cleared in the vCPU VMCB and the vCPU state is set to KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED to prevent it from being run. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Co-developed-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
When SEV-SNP is enabled in the guest, the hardware places restrictions on all memory accesses based on the contents of the RMP table. When hardware encounters RMP check failure caused by the guest memory access it raises the #NPF. The error code contains additional information on the access type. See the APM volume 2 for additional information. When using gmem, RMP faults resulting from mismatches between the state in the RMP table vs. what the guest expects via its page table result in KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULTs being forwarded to userspace to handle. This means the only expected case that needs to be handled in the kernel is when the page size of the entry in the RMP table is larger than the mapping in the nested page table, in which case a PSMASH instruction needs to be issued to split the large RMP entry into individual 4K entries so that subsequent accesses can succeed. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
SEV-SNP VMs can ask the hypervisor to change the page state in the RMP table to be private or shared using the Page State Change NAE event as defined in the GHCB specification version 2. Forward these requests to userspace as KVM_EXIT_VMGEXITs, similar to how it is done for requests that don't use a GHCB page. As with the MSR-based page-state changes, use the existing KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall format to deliver these requests to userspace via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
SEV-SNP VMs can ask the hypervisor to change the page state in the RMP table to be private or shared using the Page State Change MSR protocol as defined in the GHCB specification. When using gmem, private/shared memory is allocated through separate pools, and KVM relies on userspace issuing a KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES KVM ioctl to tell the KVM MMU whether or not a particular GFN should be backed by private memory or not. Forward these page state change requests to userspace so that it can issue the expected KVM ioctls. The KVM MMU will handle updating the RMP entries when it is ready to map a private page into a guest. Use the existing KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall format to deliver these requests to userspace via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
SEV-SNP guests are required to perform a GHCB GPA registration. Before using a GHCB GPA for a vCPU the first time, a guest must register the vCPU GHCB GPA. If hypervisor can work with the guest requested GPA then it must respond back with the same GPA otherwise return -1. On VMEXIT, verify that the GHCB GPA matches with the registered value. If a mismatch is detected, then abort the guest. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Add a KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command to finalize the cryptographic launch digest which stores the measurement of the guest at launch time. Also extend the existing SNP firmware data structures to support disabling the use of Versioned Chip Endorsement Keys (VCEK) by guests as part of this command. While finalizing the launch flow, the code also issues the LAUNCH_UPDATE SNP firmware commands to encrypt/measure the initial VMSA pages for each configured vCPU, which requires setting the RMP entries for those pages to private, so also add handling to clean up the RMP entries for these pages whening freeing vCPUs during shutdown. Signed-off-by:
Harald Hoyer <harald@profian.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
A key aspect of a launching an SNP guest is initializing it with a known/measured payload which is then encrypted into guest memory as pre-validated private pages and then measured into the cryptographic launch context created with KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START so that the guest can attest itself after booting. Since all private pages are provided by guest_memfd, make use of the kvm_gmem_populate() interface to handle this. The general flow is that guest_memfd will handle allocating the pages associated with the GPA ranges being initialized by each particular call of KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, copying data from userspace into those pages, and then the post_populate callback will do the work of setting the RMP entries for these pages to private and issuing the SNP firmware calls to encrypt/measure them. For more information see the SEV-SNP specification. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START begins the launch process for an SEV-SNP guest. The command initializes a cryptographic digest context used to construct the measurement of the guest. Other commands can then at that point be used to load/encrypt data into the guest's initial launch image. For more information see the SEV-SNP specification. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware-based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory encryption and integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and more, to create an isolated execution environment. Define a new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type which makes use of these capabilities and extend the KVM_SEV_INIT2 ioctl to support it. Also add a basic helper to check whether SNP is enabled and set PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS for private #NPFs so they are handled appropriately by KVM MMU. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
SEV-SNP relies on private memory support to run guests, so make sure to enable that support via the CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM config option. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
For hardware-protected VMs like SEV-SNP guests, certain conditions like attempting to perform a write to a page which is not in the state that the guest expects it to be in can result in a nested/extended #PF which can only be satisfied by the host performing an implicit page state change to transition the page into the expected shared/private state. This is generally handled by generating a KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT event that gets forwarded to userspace to handle via KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES. However, the fast_page_fault() code might misconstrue this situation as being the result of a write-protected access, and treat it as a spurious case when it sees that writes are already allowed for the sPTE. This results in the KVM MMU trying to resume the guest rather than taking any action to satisfy the real source of the #PF such as generating a KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT, resulting in the guest spinning on nested #PFs. Check for this condition and bail out of the fast path if it is detected. Suggested-by:
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Common patches for the target-independent functionality and hooks that are needed by SEV-SNP and TDX.
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https://github.com/kvm-x86/linuxPaolo Bonzini authored
KVM x86 misc changes for 6.10: - Advertise the max mappable GPA in the "guest MAXPHYADDR" CPUID field, which is unused by hardware, so that KVM can communicate its inability to map GPAs that set bits 51:48 due to lack of 5-level paging. Guest firmware is expected to use the information to safely remap BARs in the uppermost GPA space, i.e to avoid placing a BAR at a legal, but unmappable, GPA. - Use vfree() instead of kvfree() for allocations that always use vcalloc() or __vcalloc(). - Don't completely ignore same-value writes to immutable feature MSRs, as doing so results in KVM failing to reject accesses to MSR that aren't supposed to exist given the vCPU model and/or KVM configuration. - Don't mark APICv as being inhibited due to ABSENT if APICv is disabled KVM-wide to avoid confusing debuggers (KVM will never bother clearing the ABSENT inhibit, even if userspace enables in-kernel local APIC).
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https://github.com/kvm-x86/linuxPaolo Bonzini authored
KVM x86 MMU changes for 6.10: - Process TDP MMU SPTEs that are are zapped while holding mmu_lock for read after replacing REMOVED_SPTE with '0' and flushing remote TLBs, which allows vCPU tasks to repopulate the zapped region while the zapper finishes tearing down the old, defunct page tables. - Fix a longstanding, likely benign-in-practice race where KVM could fail to detect a write from kvm_mmu_track_write() to a shadowed GPTE if the GPTE is first page table being shadowed.
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https://github.com/kvm-x86/linuxPaolo Bonzini authored
KVM selftests treewide updates for 6.10: - Define _GNU_SOURCE for all selftests to fix a warning that was introduced by a change to kselftest_harness.h late in the 6.9 cycle, and because forcing every test to #define _GNU_SOURCE is painful. - Provide a global psuedo-RNG instance for all tests, so that library code can generate random, but determinstic numbers. - Use the global pRNG to randomly force emulation of select writes from guest code on x86, e.g. to help validate KVM's emulation of locked accesses. - Rename kvm_util_base.h back to kvm_util.h, as the weird layer of indirection was added purely to avoid manually #including ucall_common.h in a handful of locations. - Allocate and initialize x86's GDT, IDT, TSS, segments, and default exception handlers at VM creation, instead of forcing tests to manually trigger the related setup.
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https://github.com/kvm-x86/linuxPaolo Bonzini authored
KVM VMX changes for 6.10: - Clear vmcs.EXIT_QUALIFICATION when synthesizing an EPT Misconfig VM-Exit to L1, as per the SDM. - Move kvm_vcpu_arch's exit_qualification into x86_exception, as the field is used only when synthesizing nested EPT violation, i.e. it's not the vCPU's "real" exit_qualification, which is tracked elsewhere. - Add a sanity check to assert that EPT Violations are the only sources of nested PML Full VM-Exits.
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https://github.com/kvm-x86/linuxPaolo Bonzini authored
KVM selftests cleanups and fixes for 6.10: - Enhance the demand paging test to allow for better reporting and stressing of UFFD performance. - Convert the steal time test to generate TAP-friendly output. - Fix a flaky false positive in the xen_shinfo_test due to comparing elapsed time across two different clock domains. - Skip the MONITOR/MWAIT test if the host doesn't actually support MWAIT. - Avoid unnecessary use of "sudo" in the NX hugepage test to play nice with running in a minimal userspace environment. - Allow skipping the RSEQ test's sanity check that the vCPU was able to complete a reasonable number of KVM_RUNs, as the assert can fail on a completely valid setup. If the test is run on a large-ish system that is otherwise idle, and the test isn't affined to a low-ish number of CPUs, the vCPU task can be repeatedly migrated to CPUs that are in deep sleep states, which results in the vCPU having very little net runtime before the next migration due to high wakeup latencies.
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https://github.com/kvm-x86/linuxPaolo Bonzini authored
KVM cleanups for 6.10: - Misc cleanups extracted from the "exit on missing userspace mapping" series, which has been put on hold in anticipation of a "KVM Userfault" approach, which should provide a superset of functionality. - Remove kvm_make_all_cpus_request_except(), which got added to hack around an AVIC bug, and then became dead code when a more robust fix came along. - Fix a goof in the KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD documentation.
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarmPaolo Bonzini authored
KVM/arm64 updates for Linux 6.10 - Move a lot of state that was previously stored on a per vcpu basis into a per-CPU area, because it is only pertinent to the host while the vcpu is loaded. This results in better state tracking, and a smaller vcpu structure. - Add full handling of the ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB instructions in nested virtualisation. The last two instructions also require emulating part of the pointer authentication extension. As a result, the trap handling of pointer authentication has been greattly simplified. - Turn the global (and not very scalable) LPI translation cache into a per-ITS, scalable cache, making non directly injected LPIs much cheaper to make visible to the vcpu. - A batch of pKVM patches, mostly fixes and cleanups, as the upstreaming process seems to be resuming. Fingers crossed! - Allocate PPIs and SGIs outside of the vcpu structure, allowing for smaller EL2 mapping and some flexibility in implementing more or less than 32 private IRQs. - Purge stale mpidr_data if a vcpu is created after the MPIDR map has been created. - Preserve vcpu-specific ID registers across a vcpu reset. - Various minor cleanups and improvements.
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- 10 May, 2024 13 commits
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Merge tag 'loongarch-kvm-6.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson into HEAD LoongArch KVM changes for v6.10 1. Add ParaVirt IPI support. 2. Add software breakpoint support. 3. Add mmio trace events support.
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Paolo Bonzini authored
While the main additions from GHCB protocol version 1 to version 2 revolve mostly around SEV-SNP support, there are a number of changes applicable to SEV-ES guests as well. Pluck a handful patches from the SNP hypervisor patchset for GHCB-related changes that are also applicable to SEV-ES. A KVM_SEV_INIT2 field lets userspace can control the maximum GHCB protocol version advertised to guests and manage compatibility across kernels/versions.
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Paolo Bonzini authored
A combination of prep work for TDX and SNP, and a clean up of the page fault path to (hopefully) make it easier to follow the rules for private memory, noslot faults, writes to read-only slots, etc.
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Allow a non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE, so that TDX can set the "suppress VE" bit.
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Michael Roth authored
In the case of SEV-SNP, whether or not a 2MB page can be mapped via a 2MB mapping in the guest's nested page table depends on whether or not any subpages within the range have already been initialized as private in the RMP table. The existing mixed-attribute tracking in KVM is insufficient here, for instance: - gmem allocates 2MB page - guest issues PVALIDATE on 2MB page - guest later converts a subpage to shared - SNP host code issues PSMASH to split 2MB RMP mapping to 4K - KVM MMU splits NPT mapping to 4K - guest later converts that shared page back to private At this point there are no mixed attributes, and KVM would normally allow for 2MB NPT mappings again, but this is actually not allowed because the RMP table mappings are 4K and cannot be promoted on the hypervisor side, so the NPT mappings must still be limited to 4K to match this. Add a hook to determine the max NPT mapping size in situations like this. Suggested-by:
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Michael Roth authored
In some cases, like with SEV-SNP, guest memory needs to be updated in a platform-specific manner before it can be safely freed back to the host. Wire up arch-defined hooks to the .free_folio kvm_gmem_aops callback to allow for special handling of this sort when freeing memory in response to FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE operations and when releasing the inode, and go ahead and define an arch-specific hook for x86 since it will be needed for handling memory used for SEV-SNP guests. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
During guest run-time, kvm_arch_gmem_prepare() is issued as needed to prepare newly-allocated gmem pages prior to mapping them into the guest. In the case of SEV-SNP, this mainly involves setting the pages to private in the RMP table. However, for the GPA ranges comprising the initial guest payload, which are encrypted/measured prior to starting the guest, the gmem pages need to be accessed prior to setting them to private in the RMP table so they can be initialized with the userspace-provided data. Additionally, an SNP firmware call is needed afterward to encrypt them in-place and measure the contents into the guest's launch digest. While it is possible to bypass the kvm_arch_gmem_prepare() hooks so that this handling can be done in an open-coded/vendor-specific manner, this may expose more gmem-internal state/dependencies to external callers than necessary. Try to avoid this by implementing an interface that tries to handle as much of the common functionality inside gmem as possible, while also making it generic enough to potentially be usable/extensible for TDX as well. Suggested-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
In preparation for adding a function that walks a set of pages provided by userspace and populates them in a guest_memfd, add a version of kvm_gmem_get_pfn() that has a "bool prepare" argument and passes it down to kvm_gmem_get_folio(). Populating guest memory has to call repeatedly __kvm_gmem_get_pfn() on the same file, so make the new function take struct file*. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
guest_memfd pages are generally expected to be in some arch-defined initial state prior to using them for guest memory. For SEV-SNP this initial state is 'private', or 'guest-owned', and requires additional operations to move these pages into a 'private' state by updating the corresponding entries the RMP table. Allow for an arch-defined hook to handle updates of this sort, and go ahead and implement one for x86 so KVM implementations like AMD SVM can register a kvm_x86_ops callback to handle these updates for SEV-SNP guests. The preparation callback is always called when allocating/grabbing folios via gmem, and it is up to the architecture to keep track of whether or not the pages are already in the expected state (e.g. the RMP table in the case of SEV-SNP). In some cases, it is necessary to defer the preparation of the pages to handle things like in-place encryption of initial guest memory payloads before marking these pages as 'private'/'guest-owned'. Add an argument (always true for now) to kvm_gmem_get_folio() that allows for the preparation callback to be bypassed. To detect possible issues in the way userspace initializes memory, it is only possible to add an unprepared page if it is not already included in the filemap. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZLqVdvsF11Ddo7Dq@google.com/Co-developed-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Because kvm_gmem_get_pfn() is called from the page fault path without any of the slots_lock, filemap lock or mmu_lock taken, it is possible for it to race with kvm_gmem_unbind(). This is not a problem, as any PTE that is installed temporarily will be zapped before the guest has the occasion to run. However, it is not possible to have a complete unbind+bind racing with the page fault, because deleting the memslot will call synchronize_srcu_expedited() and wait for the page fault to be resolved. Thus, we can still warn if the file is there and is not the one we expect. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
Some SNP ioctls will require the page not to be in the pagecache, and as such they will want to return EEXIST to userspace. Start by passing the error up from filemap_grab_folio. Signed-off-by: -
Michael Roth authored
truncate_inode_pages_range() may attempt to zero pages before truncating them, and this will occur before arch-specific invalidations can be triggered via .invalidate_folio/.free_folio hooks via kvm_gmem_aops. For AMD SEV-SNP this would result in an RMP #PF being generated by the hardware, which is currently treated as fatal (and even if specifically allowed for, would not result in anything other than garbage being written to guest pages due to encryption). On Intel TDX this would also result in undesirable behavior. Set the AS_INACCESSIBLE flag to prevent the MM from attempting unexpected accesses of this sort during operations like truncation. This may also in some cases yield a decent performance improvement for guest_memfd userspace implementations that hole-punch ranges immediately after private->shared conversions via KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, since the current implementation of truncate_inode_pages_range() always ends up zero'ing an entire 4K range if it is backing by a 2M folio. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZR9LYhpxTaTk6PJX@google.com/Suggested-by:
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
filemap users like guest_memfd may use page cache pages to allocate/manage memory that is only intended to be accessed by guests via hardware protections like encryption. Writes to memory of this sort in common paths like truncation may cause unexpected behavior such as writing garbage instead of zeros when attempting to zero pages, or worse, triggering hardware protections that are considered fatal as far as the kernel is concerned. Introduce a new address_space flag, AS_INACCESSIBLE, and use this initially to prevent zero'ing of pages during truncation, with the understanding that it is up to the owner of the mapping to handle this specially if needed. This is admittedly a rather blunt solution, but it seems like there are no other places that should take into account the flag to keep its promise. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZR9LYhpxTaTk6PJX@google.com/ Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Suggested-by:
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- 09 May, 2024 2 commits
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Marc Zyngier authored
* kvm-arm64/mpidr-reset: : . : Fixes for CLIDR_EL1 and MPIDR_EL1 being accidentally mutable across : a vcpu reset, courtesy of Oliver. From the cover letter: : : "For VM-wide feature ID registers we ensure they get initialized once for : the lifetime of a VM. On the other hand, vCPU-local feature ID registers : get re-initialized on every vCPU reset, potentially clobbering the : values userspace set up. : : MPIDR_EL1 and CLIDR_EL1 are the only registers in this space that we : allow userspace to modify for now. Clobbering the value of MPIDR_EL1 has : some disastrous side effects as the compressed index used by the : MPIDR-to-vCPU lookup table assumes MPIDR_EL1 is immutable after KVM_RUN. : : Series + reproducer test case to address the problem of KVM wiping out : userspace changes to these registers. Note that there are still some : differences between VM and vCPU scoped feature ID registers from the : perspective of userspace. We do not allow the value of VM-scope : registers to change after KVM_RUN, but vCPU registers remain mutable." : . KVM: selftests: arm64: Test vCPU-scoped feature ID registers KVM: selftests: arm64: Test that feature ID regs survive a reset KVM: selftests: arm64: Store expected register value in set_id_regs KVM: selftests: arm64: Rename helper in set_id_regs to imply VM scope KVM: arm64: Only reset vCPU-scoped feature ID regs once KVM: arm64: Reset VM feature ID regs from kvm_reset_sys_regs() KVM: arm64: Rename is_id_reg() to imply VM scope Signed-off-by:Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Oliver Upton authored
Test that CLIDR_EL1 and MPIDR_EL1 are modifiable from userspace and that the values are preserved across a vCPU reset like the other feature ID registers. Signed-off-by:
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502233529.1958459-8-oliver.upton@linux.devSigned-off-by:
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