Commit 26acfb66 authored by Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Committed by Thomas Gleixner

x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present

If the L1TF CPU bug is present we allow the KVM module to be loaded as the
major of users that use Linux and KVM have trusted guests and do not want a
broken setup.

Cloud vendors are the ones that are uncomfortable with CVE 2018-3620 and as
such they are the ones that should set nosmt to one.

Setting 'nosmt' means that the system administrator also needs to disable
SMT (Hyper-threading) in the BIOS, or via the 'nosmt' command line
parameter, or via the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control. See commit
05736e4a ("cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT").

Other mitigations are to use task affinity, cpu sets, interrupt binding,
etc - anything to make sure that _only_ the same guests vCPUs are running
on sibling threads.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
parent 0cc3cd21
...@@ -1946,6 +1946,12 @@ ...@@ -1946,6 +1946,12 @@
[KVM,ARM] Allow use of GICv4 for direct injection of [KVM,ARM] Allow use of GICv4 for direct injection of
LPIs. LPIs.
kvm-intel.nosmt=[KVM,Intel] If the L1TF CPU bug is present (CVE-2018-3620)
and the system has SMT (aka Hyper-Threading) enabled then
don't allow guests to be created.
Default is 0 (allow guests to be created).
kvm-intel.ept= [KVM,Intel] Disable extended page tables kvm-intel.ept= [KVM,Intel] Disable extended page tables
(virtualized MMU) support on capable Intel chips. (virtualized MMU) support on capable Intel chips.
Default is 1 (enabled) Default is 1 (enabled)
......
...@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = { ...@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
}; };
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id); MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id);
static bool __read_mostly nosmt;
module_param(nosmt, bool, S_IRUGO);
static bool __read_mostly enable_vpid = 1; static bool __read_mostly enable_vpid = 1;
module_param_named(vpid, enable_vpid, bool, 0444); module_param_named(vpid, enable_vpid, bool, 0444);
...@@ -10370,10 +10373,20 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) ...@@ -10370,10 +10373,20 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
return ERR_PTR(err); return ERR_PTR(err);
} }
#define L1TF_MSG "SMT enabled with L1TF CPU bug present. Refer to CVE-2018-3620 for details.\n"
static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{ {
if (!ple_gap) if (!ple_gap)
kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true; kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED) {
if (nosmt) {
pr_err(L1TF_MSG);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
pr_warn(L1TF_MSG);
}
return 0; return 0;
} }
......
...@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_hotplug_enable); ...@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_hotplug_enable);
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED; enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control);
static int __init smt_cmdline_disable(char *str) static int __init smt_cmdline_disable(char *str)
{ {
......
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