Commit e50928d7 authored by Andy Lutomirski's avatar Andy Lutomirski Committed by Ingo Molnar

x86/fault: Fix SMAP #PF handling buglet for implicit supervisor accesses

Currently, if a user program somehow triggers an implicit supervisor
access to a user address (e.g. if the kernel somehow sets LDTR to a
user address), it will be incorrectly detected as a SMAP violation
if AC is clear and SMAP is enabled.  This is incorrect -- the error
has nothing to do with SMAP.  Fix the condition so that only
accesses with the hardware USER bit set are diagnosed as SMAP
violations.

With the logic fixed, an implicit supervisor access to a user address
will hit the code lower in the function that is intended to handle it
even if SMAP is enabled.  That logic is still a bit buggy, and later
patches will clean it up.

I *think* this code is still correct for WRUSS, and I've added a
comment to that effect.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d1d1b2e66ef31f884dba172084486ea9423ddcdb.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
parent a15781b5
......@@ -1235,12 +1235,15 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
pgtable_bad(regs, hw_error_code, address);
/*
* If SMAP is on, check for invalid kernel (supervisor)
* access to user pages in the user address space.
* If SMAP is on, check for invalid kernel (supervisor) access to user
* pages in the user address space. The odd case here is WRUSS,
* which, according to the preliminary documentation, does not respect
* SMAP and will have the USER bit set so, in all cases, SMAP
* enforcement appears to be consistent with the USER bit.
*/
if (unlikely(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) &&
!(hw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) &&
(user_mode(regs) || !(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC))))
!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC)))
{
bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, hw_error_code, address);
return;
......
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