Commit f931d5e4 authored by David Engraf's avatar David Engraf Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

hrtimer: Fix ktime_add_ns() overflow on 32bit architectures

commit 51fd36f3 upstream.

One can trigger an overflow when using ktime_add_ns() on a 32bit
architecture not supporting CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR.

When passing a very high value for u64 nsec, e.g. 7881299347898368000
the do_div() function converts this value to seconds (7881299347) which
is still to high to pass to the ktime_set() function as long. The result
in is a negative value.

The problem on my system occurs in the tick-sched.c,
tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() when time_delta is set to
timekeeping_max_deferment(). The check for time_delta < KTIME_MAX is
valid, thus ktime_add_ns() is called with a too large value resulting in
a negative expire value. This leads to an endless loop in the ticker code:

time_delta: 7881299347898368000
expires = ktime_add_ns(last_update, time_delta)
expires: negative value

This fix caps the value to KTIME_MAX.

This error doesn't occurs on 64bit or architectures supporting
CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR (e.g. ARM, x86-32).
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Engraf <david.engraf@sysgo.com>
[jstultz: Minor tweaks to commit message & header]
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent bee59d68
......@@ -276,6 +276,10 @@ ktime_t ktime_add_ns(const ktime_t kt, u64 nsec)
} else {
unsigned long rem = do_div(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC);
/* Make sure nsec fits into long */
if (unlikely(nsec > KTIME_SEC_MAX))
return (ktime_t){ .tv64 = KTIME_MAX };
tmp = ktime_set((long)nsec, rem);
}
......
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