1. 18 Jul, 2017 24 commits
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/boot: Use memremap() to map the MPF and MPC data · 5997efb9
      Tom Lendacky authored
      The SMP MP-table is built by UEFI and placed in memory in a decrypted
      state. These tables are accessed using a mix of early_memremap(),
      early_memunmap(), phys_to_virt() and virt_to_phys(). Change all accesses
      to use early_memremap()/early_memunmap(). This allows for proper setting
      of the encryption mask so that the data can be successfully accessed when
      SME is active.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d9464b0d7c861021ed8f494e4a40d6cd10f1eddd.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      5997efb9
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear · 8f716c9b
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is
      booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access
      this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted.
      
      Update early_memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to modify the
      pagetable protection attributes before they are applied to the new
      mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask for boot related data.
      
      Update memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to determine if RAM
      remapping is allowed.  RAM remapping will cause an encrypted mapping to be
      generated. By preventing RAM remapping, ioremap_cache() will be used
      instead, which will provide a decrypted mapping of the boot related data.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/81fb6b4117a5df6b9f2eda342f81bbef4b23d2e5.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8f716c9b
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME · 38eecccd
      Tom Lendacky authored
      When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the
      encryption mask set as necessary.
      
      When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So,
      update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption
      mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping
      as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted.
      All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.).
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      38eecccd
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 · f99afd08
      Tom Lendacky authored
      The efi_mem_type() function currently returns a 0, which maps to
      EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, if the function is unable to find a memmap entry for
      the supplied physical address. Returning EFI_RESERVED_TYPE implies that
      a memmap entry exists, when it doesn't.  Instead of returning 0, change
      the function to return a negative error value when no memmap entry is
      found.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7fbf40a9dc414d5da849e1ddcd7f7c1285e4e181.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f99afd08
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      efi: Add an EFI table address match function · a19d66c5
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Add a function that will determine if a supplied physical address matches
      the address of an EFI table.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e1e06441d80f44776df391e0e4cb485b345b7518.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      a19d66c5
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address · d68baa3f
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Add a function that will return the E820 type associated with an address
      range.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b797aaa588803bf33263d5dd8c32377668fa931a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      d68baa3f
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly · b9d05200
      Tom Lendacky authored
      The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
      state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
      support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
      them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.
      
      For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
      the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
      properly.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb0d430b41efefd45ee515aaf0979dcfda8b6a44.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      b9d05200
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory · 7f8b7e7f
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
      the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
      encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
      an encrypted or decrypted memory area is in the proper state (for example
      the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
      encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f9968e9432cd6c4b57ef245729be04ff18852225.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7f8b7e7f
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs · f88a68fa
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and
      decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
      write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
      write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
      stores. This implies that the hardware will never give the core a
      dirty line with this memtype.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/479b5832c30fae3efa7932e48f81794e86397229.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f88a68fa
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() · eef9c4ab
      Tom Lendacky authored
      The CR3 register entry can contain the SME encryption mask that indicates
      the PGD is encrypted.  The encryption mask should not be used when
      creating a virtual address from the CR3 register, so remove the SME
      encryption mask in the read_cr3_pa() function.
      
      During early boot SME will need to use a native version of read_cr3_pa(),
      so create native_read_cr3_pa().
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/767b085c384a46f67f451f8589903a462c7ff68a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      eef9c4ab
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption · 21729f81
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
      be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
      macros.  Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
      pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
      _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
      without the encryption mask before SME becomes active.  Two new pgprot()
      macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.
      
      The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO.  SME does
      not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
      mask from the page attribute.
      
      Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
      creating a physical address with the encryption mask.  These are used when
      working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
      __va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
      of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
      virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
      for that physical location or not.
      
      Also, an early initialization function is added for SME.  If SME is active,
      this function:
      
       - Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
         with the encryption mask.
      
       - Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.
      
       - Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
         that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
         applied.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      21729f81
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros · fd7e3159
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[4um]d_pfn() macros and then
      use the p[g4um]d_pfn() macros in the p[g4um]d_page() macros instead of
      duplicating the code.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e61eb533a6d0aac941db2723d8aa63ef6b882dee.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      fd7e3159
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing · 5868f365
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
      Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
      the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
      encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
      
      The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
      stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      5868f365
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() · 33c2b803
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
      range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
      perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable
      mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The
      resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping
      that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
      intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
      bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.
      
      Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and
      usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the
      remaining ioremap() path.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/88ada7b09c6568c61cd696351eb59fb15a82ce1a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      33c2b803
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support · 7744ccdb
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
      provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
      defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
      patches to mark pages as encrypted.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7744ccdb
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/cpu/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size · 9af9b940
      Tom Lendacky authored
      When System Memory Encryption (SME) is enabled, the physical address
      space is reduced. Adjust the x86_phys_bits value to reflect this
      reduction.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/593c037a3cad85ba92f3d061ffa7462e9ce3531d.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      9af9b940
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/cpu/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature · 872cbefd
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
      Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature.  SME is identified by CPUID
      0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
      MSR_K8_SYSCFG).  Only show the SME feature as available if reported by
      CPUID, enabled by BIOS and not configured as CONFIG_X86_32=y.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/85c17ff450721abccddc95e611ae8df3f4d9718b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      872cbefd
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap() for RAM mappings · f7750a79
      Tom Lendacky authored
      The ioremap() function is intended for mapping MMIO. For RAM, the
      memremap() function should be used. Convert calls from ioremap() to
      memremap() when re-mapping RAM.
      
      This will be used later by SME to control how the encryption mask is
      applied to memory mappings, with certain memory locations being mapped
      decrypted vs encrypted.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b13fccb9abbd547a7eef7b1fdfc223431b211c88.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f7750a79
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support · aac7b79e
      Tom Lendacky authored
      For processors that support PAT, set the write-protect cache mode
      (_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP) entry to the actual write-protect value (x05).
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ade53b63d4dbffbfc3cb08fb62024647059c8688.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      aac7b79e
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/cpu/AMD: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) · c262f3b9
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Memory
      Encryption (SME) feature and add documentation for the mem_encrypt=
      kernel parameter.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ca0a0c13b055fd804cfc92cbaca8acd68057eed0.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      c262f3b9
    • Ingo Molnar's avatar
      Merge branch 'x86/boot' into x86/mm, to pick up interacting changes · 1ed7d327
      Ingo Molnar authored
      The SME patches we are about to apply add some E820 logic, so merge in
      pending E820 code changes first, to have a single code base.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      1ed7d327
    • Baoquan He's avatar
      x86/boot/KASLR: Rename process_e820_entry() into process_mem_region() · 27aac205
      Baoquan He authored
      Now process_e820_entry() is not limited to e820 entry processing, rename
      it to process_mem_region(). And adjust the code comment accordingly.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
      Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
      Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
      Cc: thgarnie@google.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-4-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      27aac205
    • Baoquan He's avatar
      x86/boot/KASLR: Switch to pass struct mem_vector to process_e820_entry() · 87891b01
      Baoquan He authored
      This makes process_e820_entry() be able to process any kind of memory
      region.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
      Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
      Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
      Cc: thgarnie@google.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      87891b01
    • Baoquan He's avatar
      x86/boot/KASLR: Wrap e820 entries walking code into new function process_e820_entries() · f62995c9
      Baoquan He authored
      The original function process_e820_entry() only takes care of each
      e820 entry passed.
      
      And move the E820_TYPE_RAM checking logic into process_e820_entries().
      
      And remove the redundent local variable 'addr' definition in
      find_random_phys_addr().
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
      Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
      Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
      Cc: thgarnie@google.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f62995c9
  2. 17 Jul, 2017 7 commits
  3. 16 Jul, 2017 3 commits
  4. 15 Jul, 2017 6 commits
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux v4.13-rc1 · 5771a8c0
      Linus Torvalds authored
      5771a8c0
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'standardize-docs' of git://git.lwn.net/linux · 486088bc
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull documentation format standardization from Jonathan Corbet:
       "This series converts a number of top-level documents to the RST format
        without incorporating them into the Sphinx tree. The hope is to bring
        some uniformity to kernel documentation and, perhaps more importantly,
        have our existing docs serve as an example of the desired formatting
        for those that will be added later.
      
        Mauro has gone through and fixed up a lot of top-level documentation
        files to make them conform to the RST format, but without moving or
        renaming them in any way. This will help when we incorporate the ones
        we want to keep into the Sphinx doctree, but the real purpose is to
        bring a bit of uniformity to our documentation and let the top-level
        docs serve as examples for those writing new ones"
      
      * tag 'standardize-docs' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (84 commits)
        docs: kprobes.txt: Fix whitespacing
        tee.txt: standardize document format
        cgroup-v2.txt: standardize document format
        dell_rbu.txt: standardize document format
        zorro.txt: standardize document format
        xz.txt: standardize document format
        xillybus.txt: standardize document format
        vfio.txt: standardize document format
        vfio-mediated-device.txt: standardize document format
        unaligned-memory-access.txt: standardize document format
        this_cpu_ops.txt: standardize document format
        svga.txt: standardize document format
        static-keys.txt: standardize document format
        smsc_ece1099.txt: standardize document format
        SM501.txt: standardize document format
        siphash.txt: standardize document format
        sgi-ioc4.txt: standardize document format
        SAK.txt: standardize document format
        rpmsg.txt: standardize document format
        robust-futexes.txt: standardize document format
        ...
      486088bc
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random · 52f6c588
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
       "Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that
        callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
        CRNG is initialized.
      
        Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
        initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
        per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
        warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
        bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
        architecture types, so it is not enabled by default"
      
      * tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
        random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
        random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
        random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
        net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
        net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
        rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
        ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
        iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
        cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
        random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
        random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
      52f6c588
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs · 78dcf734
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull ->s_options removal from Al Viro:
       "Preparations for fsmount/fsopen stuff (coming next cycle). Everything
        gets moved to explicit ->show_options(), killing ->s_options off +
        some cosmetic bits around fs/namespace.c and friends. Basically, the
        stuff needed to work with fsmount series with minimum of conflicts
        with other work.
      
        It's not strictly required for this merge window, but it would reduce
        the PITA during the coming cycle, so it would be nice to have those
        bits and pieces out of the way"
      
      * 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
        isofs: Fix isofs_show_options()
        VFS: Kill off s_options and helpers
        orangefs: Implement show_options
        9p: Implement show_options
        isofs: Implement show_options
        afs: Implement show_options
        affs: Implement show_options
        befs: Implement show_options
        spufs: Implement show_options
        bpf: Implement show_options
        ramfs: Implement show_options
        pstore: Implement show_options
        omfs: Implement show_options
        hugetlbfs: Implement show_options
        VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options
        VFS: Provide empty name qstr
        VFS: Make get_filesystem() return the affected filesystem
        VFS: Clean up whitespace in fs/namespace.c and fs/super.c
        Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data
      78dcf734
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge branch 'work.__copy_to_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs · 93ff8185
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull more __copy_.._user elimination from Al Viro.
      
      * 'work.__copy_to_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
        drm_dp_aux_dev: switch to read_iter/write_iter
      93ff8185
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge branch 'work.uaccess-unaligned' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs · 89cbec71
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull uacess-unaligned removal from Al Viro:
       "That stuff had just one user, and an exotic one, at that - binfmt_flat
        on arm and m68k"
      
      * 'work.uaccess-unaligned' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
        kill {__,}{get,put}_user_unaligned()
        binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail
      89cbec71