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- 18 May, 2020 2 commits
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Jordan Niethe authored
For powerpc64, redefine the ppc_inst type so both word and prefixed instructions can be represented. On powerpc32 the type will remain the same. Update places which had assumed instructions to be 4 bytes long. Signed-off-by:
Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Alistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au> [mpe: Rework the get_user_inst() macros to be parameterised, and don't assign to the dest if an error occurred. Use CONFIG_PPC64 not __powerpc64__ in a few places. Address other comments from Christophe. Fix some sparse complaints.] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-24-jniethe5@gmail.com
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Jordan Niethe authored
Define specialised get_user_instr(), __get_user_instr() and __get_user_instr_inatomic() macros for reading instructions from user and/or kernel space. Signed-off-by:
Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Alistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au> [mpe: Squash in addition of get_user_instr() & __user annotations] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-17-jniethe5@gmail.com
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- 28 Jan, 2020 3 commits
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Christophe Leroy authored
Implement user_access_save() and user_access_restore() On 8xx and radix: - On save, get the value of the associated special register then prevent user access. - On restore, set back the saved value to the associated special register. On book3s/32: - On save, get the value stored in current->thread.kuap and prevent user access. - On restore, regenerate address range from the stored value and reopen read/write access for that range. Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/54f2f74938006b33c55a416674807b42ef222068.1579866752.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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Christophe Leroy authored
Today, when a function like strncpy_from_user() is called, the userspace access protection is de-activated and re-activated for every word read. By implementing user_access_begin and friends, the protection is de-activated at the beginning of the copy and re-activated at the end. Implement user_access_begin(), user_access_end() and unsafe_get_user(), unsafe_put_user() and unsafe_copy_to_user() For the time being, we keep user_access_save() and user_access_restore() as nops. Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/36d4fbf9e56a75994aca4ee2214c77b26a5a8d35.1579866752.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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Christophe Leroy authored
__builtin_constant_p() always return 0 for pointers, so on RADIX we always end up opening both direction (by writing 0 in SPR29): 0000000000000170 <._copy_to_user>: ... 1b0: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1b4: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 1b8: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 1bc: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1c0: 48 00 00 01 bl 1c0 <._copy_to_user+0x50> 1c0: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... 0000000000000220 <._copy_from_user>: ... 2ac: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2b0: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 2b4: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 2b8: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2bc: 7f c5 f3 78 mr r5,r30 2c0: 7f 83 e3 78 mr r3,r28 2c4: 48 00 00 01 bl 2c4 <._copy_from_user+0xa4> 2c4: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... Use an explicit parameter for direction selection, so that GCC is able to see it is a constant: 00000000000001b0 <._copy_to_user>: ... 1f0: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1f4: 3d 20 40 00 lis r9,16384 1f8: 79 29 07 c6 rldicr r9,r9,32,31 1fc: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 200: 4c 00 01 2c isync 204: 48 00 00 01 bl 204 <._copy_to_user+0x54> 204: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... 0000000000000260 <._copy_from_user>: ... 2ec: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2f0: 39 20 ff ff li r9,-1 2f4: 79 29 00 04 rldicr r9,r9,0,0 2f8: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 2fc: 4c 00 01 2c isync 300: 7f c5 f3 78 mr r5,r30 304: 7f 83 e3 78 mr r3,r28 308: 48 00 00 01 bl 308 <._copy_from_user+0xa8> 308: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> [mpe: Spell out the directions, s/KUAP_R/KUAP_READ/ etc.] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f4e88ec4941d5facb35ce75026b0112f980086c3.1579866752.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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- 16 Dec, 2019 1 commit
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Andrew Donnellan authored
The KUAP implementation adds calls in clear_user() to enable and disable access to userspace memory. However, it doesn't add these to __clear_user(), which is used in the ptrace regset code. As there's only one direct user of __clear_user() (the regset code), and the time taken to set the AMR for KUAP purposes is going to dominate the cost of a quick access_ok(), there's not much point having a separate path. Rename __clear_user() to __arch_clear_user(), and make __clear_user() just call clear_user(). Reported-by: syzbot+f25ecf4b2982d8c7a640@syzkaller-ppc64.appspotmail.com Reported-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Suggested-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Fixes: de78a9c4 ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection") Signed-off-by:
Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> [mpe: Use __arch_clear_user() for the asm version like arm64 & nds32] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209132221.15328-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
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- 21 Aug, 2019 1 commit
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Santosh Sivaraj authored
Use memcpy_mcsafe() implementation to define copy_to_user_mcsafe() Signed-off-by:
Santosh Sivaraj <santosh@fossix.org> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820081352.8641-8-santosh@fossix.org
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- 03 Jul, 2019 1 commit
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Suraj Jitindar Singh authored
Commit ddf35cf3 ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()") Added barrier_nospec before loading from user-controlled pointers. The intention was to order the load from the potentially user-controlled pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar. In order to achieve the same result, add a barrier_nospec to the raw_copy_in_user() function before loading from such a user-controlled pointer. Fixes: ddf35cf3 ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()") Signed-off-by:
Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 21 Apr, 2019 1 commit
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Christophe Leroy authored
This patch implements a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection. Then subarches will have the possibility to provide their own implementation by providing setup_kuap() and allow/prevent_user_access(). Some platforms will need to know the area accessed and whether it is accessed from read, write or both. Therefore source, destination and size and handed over to the two functions. mpe: Rename to allow/prevent rather than unlock/lock, and add read/write wrappers. Drop the 32-bit code for now until we have an implementation for it. Add kuap to pt_regs for 64-bit as well as 32-bit. Don't split strings, use pr_crit_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by:
Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 04 Mar, 2019 1 commit
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Linus Torvalds authored
Every in-kernel use of this function defined it to KERNEL_DS (either as an actual define, or as an inline function). It's an entirely historical artifact, and long long long ago used to actually read the segment selector valueof '%ds' on x86. Which in the kernel is always KERNEL_DS. Inspired by a patch from Jann Horn that just did this for a very small subset of users (the ones in fs/), along with Al who suggested a script. I then just took it to the logical extreme and removed all the remaining gunk. Roughly scripted with git grep -l '(get_ds())' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i 's/(get_ds())/(KERNEL_DS)/' git grep -lw 'get_ds' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i '/^#define get_ds()/d' plus manual fixups to remove a few unusual usage patterns, the couple of inline function cases and to fix up a comment that had become stale. The 'get_ds()' function remains in an x86 kvm selftest, since in user space it actually does something relevant. Inspired-by:
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Inspired-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 04 Jan, 2019 3 commits
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Linus Torvalds authored
These two architectures actually had an intentional use of the 'type' argument to access_ok() just to avoid warnings. I had actually noticed the powerpc one, but forgot to then fix it up. And I missed the sparc32 case entirely. This is hopefully all of it. Reported-by:
Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Reported-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Fixes: 96d4f267 ("Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function") Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Mathieu Malaterre authored
In commit 05a4ab82 ("powerpc/uaccess: fix warning/error with access_ok()") an attempt was made to remove a warning by referencing the variable `type`. However in commit 96d4f267 ("Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function") the variable `type` has been removed, breaking the build: arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:66:32: error: ‘type’ undeclared (first use in this function) This essentially reverts commit 05a4ab82 ("powerpc/uaccess: fix warning/error with access_ok()") to fix the error. Fixes: 96d4f267 ("Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function") Signed-off-by:
Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> [mpe: Reword change log slightly.] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Linus Torvalds authored
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 19 Dec, 2018 1 commit
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Christophe Leroy authored
With the following piece of code, the following compilation warning is encountered: if (_IOC_DIR(ioc) != _IOC_NONE) { int verify = _IOC_DIR(ioc) & _IOC_READ ? VERIFY_WRITE : VERIFY_READ; if (!access_ok(verify, ioarg, _IOC_SIZE(ioc))) { drivers/platform/test/dev.c: In function 'my_ioctl': drivers/platform/test/dev.c:219:7: warning: unused variable 'verify' [-Wunused-variable] int verify = _IOC_DIR(ioc) & _IOC_READ ? VERIFY_WRITE : VERIFY_READ; This patch fixes it by referencing 'type' in the macro allthough doing nothing with it. Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 19 Sep, 2018 1 commit
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Anton Blanchard authored
This re-applies commit b91c1e3e ("powerpc: Fix duplicate const clang warning in user access code") (Jun 2015) which was undone in commits: f2ca8090 ("powerpc/sparse: Constify the address pointer in __get_user_nosleep()") (Feb 2017) d466f6c5 ("powerpc/sparse: Constify the address pointer in __get_user_nocheck()") (Feb 2017) f84ed59a ("powerpc/sparse: Constify the address pointer in __get_user_check()") (Feb 2017) We see a large number of duplicate const errors in the user access code when building with llvm/clang: include/linux/pagemap.h:576:8: warning: duplicate 'const' declaration specifier [-Wduplicate-decl-specifier] ret = __get_user(c, uaddr); The problem is we are doing const __typeof__(*(ptr)), which will hit the warning if ptr is marked const. Removing const does not seem to have any effect on GCC code generation. Signed-off-by:
Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Reviewed-by:
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 10 Aug, 2018 1 commit
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Michael Ellerman authored
Currently if you build a 32-bit powerpc kernel and use get_user() to load a u64 value it will fail to build with eg: kernel/rseq.o: In function `rseq_get_rseq_cs': kernel/rseq.c:123: undefined reference to `__get_user_bad' This is hitting the check in __get_user_size() that makes sure the size we're copying doesn't exceed the size of the destination: #define __get_user_size(x, ptr, size, retval) do { retval = 0; __chk_user_ptr(ptr); if (size > sizeof(x)) (x) = __get_user_bad(); Which doesn't immediately make sense because the size of the destination is u64, but it's not really, because __get_user_check() etc. internally create an unsigned long and copy into that: #define __get_user_check(x, ptr, size) ({ long __gu_err = -EFAULT; unsigned long __gu_val = 0; The problem being that on 32-bit unsigned long is not big enough to hold a u64. We can fix this with a trick from hpa in the x86 code, we statically check the type of x and set the type of __gu_val to either unsigned long or unsigned long long. Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 30 Jul, 2018 1 commit
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Christophe Leroy authored
This patch moves ASM_CONST() and stringify_in_c() into dedicated asm-const.h, then cleans all related inclusions. Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> [mpe: asm-compat.h should include asm-const.h] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 03 Jun, 2018 3 commits
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Michael Ellerman authored
Based on the x86 commit doing the same. See commit 304ec1b0 ("x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec") and b3bbfb3f ("x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec") for more detail. In all cases we are ordering the load from the potentially user-controlled pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar. Base on a patch from Michal Suchanek. Signed-off-by:
Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Michael Ellerman authored
set_fs() sets the addr_limit, which is used in access_ok() to determine if an address is a user or kernel address. Some code paths use set_fs() to temporarily elevate the addr_limit so that kernel code can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory. That is fine as long as the code can't ever return to userspace with the addr_limit still elevated. If that did happen, then userspace can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory, eg. just with write(2). In case it's not clear, that is very bad. It has also happened in the past due to bugs. Commit 5ea0727b ("x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return") added a mechanism to check the addr_limit value before returning to userspace. Any call to set_fs() sets a thread flag, TIF_FSCHECK, and if we see that on the return to userspace we go out of line to check that the addr_limit value is not elevated. For further info see the above commit, as well as: https://lwn.net/Articles/722267/ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Verified to work on 64-bit Book3S using a POC that objdumps the system call handler, and a modified lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS() that doesn't kill the caller. Before: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck ... 0000000000000000 <.data>: 0: e1 f7 8a 79 rldicl. r10,r12,30,63 4: 80 03 82 40 bne 0x384 8: 00 40 8a 71 andi. r10,r12,16384 c: 78 0b 2a 7c mr r10,r1 10: 10 fd 21 38 addi r1,r1,-752 14: 08 00 c2 41 beq- 0x1c 18: 58 09 2d e8 ld r1,2392(r13) 1c: 00 00 41 f9 std r10,0(r1) 20: 70 01 61 f9 std r11,368(r1) 24: 78 01 81 f9 std r12,376(r1) 28: 70 00 01 f8 std r0,112(r1) 2c: 78 00 41 f9 std r10,120(r1) 30: 20 00 82 41 beq 0x50 34: a6 42 4c 7d mftb r10 After: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck Killed And in dmesg: Invalid address limit on user-mode return WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3689 at ../include/linux/syscalls.h:260 do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 ... NIP [c00000000001ee50] do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 LR [c00000000001ee4c] do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 Call Trace: do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 (unreliable) ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Performance overhead is essentially zero in the usual case, because the bit is checked as part of the existing _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK check. Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Michael Ellerman authored
It's called 'fs' for historical reasons, it's named after the x86 'FS' register. But we don't have to use that name for the member of thread_struct, and in fact arch/x86 doesn't even call it 'fs' anymore. So rename it to 'addr_limit', which better reflects what it's used for, and is also the name used on other arches. Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 13 Mar, 2018 1 commit
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Mathieu Malaterre authored
Rewrite function-like macro into regular static inline function to avoid a warning during macro expansion. Fix warning (treated as error in W=1): ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:52:35: error: comparison of unsigned expression >= 0 is always true (((size) == 0) || (((size) - 1) <= ((segment).seg - (addr))))) ^ Suggested-by:
Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Reviewed-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 12 Nov, 2017 1 commit
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Oliver O'Halloran authored
Implement the architecture specific portitions of the UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE API. This provides functions for the copy_user_flushcache iterator that ensure that when the copy is finished the destination buffer contains a copy of the original and that the destination buffer is clean in the processor caches. Signed-off-by:
Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 02 Nov, 2017 1 commit
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by:
Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by:
Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 26 Sep, 2017 1 commit
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Michael Neuling authored
POWER9 DD2.1 and earlier has an issue where some cache inhibited vector load will return bad data. The workaround is two part, one firmware/microcode part triggers HMI interrupts when hitting such loads, the other part is this patch which then emulates the instructions in Linux. The affected instructions are limited to lxvd2x, lxvw4x, lxvb16x and lxvh8x. When an instruction triggers the HMI, all threads in the core will be sent to the HMI handler, not just the one running the vector load. In general, these spurious HMIs are detected by the emulation code and we just return back to the running process. Unfortunately, if a spurious interrupt occurs on a vector load that's to normal memory we have no way to detect that it's spurious (unless we walk the page tables, which is very expensive). In this case we emulate the load but we need do so using a vector load itself to ensure 128bit atomicity is preserved. Some additional debugfs emulated instruction counters are added also. Signed-off-by:
Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by:
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [mpe: Switch CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 to CONFIG_VSX to unbreak the build] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 03 Jul, 2017 1 commit
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Al Viro authored
no users left Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 26 Jun, 2017 1 commit
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Michael Ellerman authored
Larry Finger reported that his Powerbook G4 was no longer booting with v4.12-rc, userspace was up but giving weird errors such as: udevd[64]: starting version 175 udevd[64]: Unable to receive ctrl message: Bad address. modprobe: chdir(4.12-rc1): No such file or directory He bisected the problem to commit 3448890c ("powerpc: get rid of zeroing, switch to RAW_COPY_USER"). Al identified that the problem is actually a miscompilation by GCC 4.6.3, which is exposed by the above commit. Al also pointed out that inlining copy_to/from_user() is probably of little or no benefit, which is correct. Using Anton's copy_to_user benchmark, with a pathological single byte copy, we see a small increase in performance by *removing* inlining: Before (inlined): # time ./copy_to_user -w -l 1 -i 10000000 ( x 3 ) real 0m22.063s real 0m22.059s real 0m22.076s After: # time ./copy_to_user -w -l 1 -i 10000000 ( x 3 ) real 0m21.325s real 0m21.299s real 0m21.364s So as a small performance improvement and to avoid the miscompilation, drop inlining copy_to/from_user() on 32-bit. Fixes: 3448890c ("powerpc: get rid of zeroing, switch to RAW_COPY_USER") Reported-by:
Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Suggested-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 16 May, 2017 1 commit
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Al Viro authored
no callers, no consistent semantics, no sane way to use it... Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 06 Apr, 2017 1 commit
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Al Viro authored
Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 28 Mar, 2017 1 commit
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Al Viro authored
Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 06 Mar, 2017 3 commits
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Al Viro authored
None of those file is ever included from uapi stuff, so __KERNEL__ is always defined. None of them is ever included from assembler (they are only pulled from linux/uaccess.h, which _can't_ be included from assembler), so __ASSEMBLY__ is never defined. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Al Viro authored
Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Al Viro authored
Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 02 Feb, 2017 3 commits
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Daniel Axtens authored
In __get_user_nosleep, we create an intermediate pointer for the user address we're about to fetch. We currently don't tag this pointer as const. Make it const, as we are simply dereferencing it, and it's scope is limited to the __get_user_nosleep macro. Signed-off-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Daniel Axtens authored
In __get_user_nocheck, we create an intermediate pointer for the user address we're about to fetch. We currently don't tag this pointer as const. Make it const, as we are simply dereferencing it, and it's scope is limited to the __get_user_nocheck macro. Signed-off-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Daniel Axtens authored
In __get_user_check, we create an intermediate pointer for the user address we're about to fetch. We currently don't tag this pointer as const. Make it const, as we are simply dereferencing it, and it's scope is limited to the __get_user_check macro. Signed-off-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 14 Nov, 2016 2 commits
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Nicholas Piggin authored
This halves the exception table size on 64-bit builds, and it allows build-time sorting of exception tables to work on relocated kernels. Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> [mpe: Minor asm fixups and bits to keep the selftests working] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Nicholas Piggin authored
This macro is taken from s390, and allows more flexibility in changing exception table format. mpe: Put it in ppc_asm.h and only define one version using stringinfy_in_c(). Add some empty definitions and headers to keep the selftests happy. Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 13 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Al Viro authored
should clear on access_ok() failures. Also remove the useless range truncation logics. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 06 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Kees Cook authored
Instead of having each caller of check_object_size() need to remember to check for a const size parameter, move the check into check_object_size() itself. This actually matches the original implementation in PaX, though this commit cleans up the now-redundant builtin_const() calls in the various architectures. Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 26 Jul, 2016 1 commit
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Kees Cook authored
Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on powerpc. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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