- 11 Jan, 2018 8 commits
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David Woodhouse authored
Convert all indirect jumps in ftrace assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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David Woodhouse authored
Convert indirect jumps in core 32/64bit entry assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Don't use CALL_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath because the return address after the 'call' instruction must be *precisely* at the .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath label for stub_ptregs_64 to work, and the use of alternatives will mess that up unless we play horrid games to prepend with NOPs and make the variants the same length. It's not worth it; in the case where we ALTERNATIVE out the retpoline, the first instruction at __x86.indirect_thunk.rax is going to be a bare jmp *%rax anyway. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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David Woodhouse authored
Convert all indirect jumps in crypto assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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David Woodhouse authored
Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect branch speculation vulnerability. Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms. This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features. The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature. [ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS integration becomes simple ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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David Woodhouse authored
Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
Getting objtool to understand retpolines is going to be a bit of a challenge. For now, take advantage of the fact that retpolines are patched in with alternatives. Just read the original (sane) non-alternative instruction, and ignore the patched-in retpoline. This allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the retpoline, even if it can't yet follow what's inside. This means the ORC unwinder will fail to unwind from inside a retpoline, but will work fine otherwise. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
A direct jump to a retpoline thunk is really an indirect jump in disguise. Change the objtool instruction type accordingly. Objtool needs to know where indirect branches are so it can detect switch statement jump tables. This fixes a bunch of warnings with CONFIG_RETPOLINE like: arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_nhmex.o: warning: objtool: nhmex_rbox_msr_enable_event()+0x44: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame kernel/signal.o: warning: objtool: copy_siginfo_to_user()+0x91: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame ... Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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Dave Hansen authored
The inital fix for trusted boot and PTI potentially misses the pgd clearing if pud_alloc() sets a PGD. It probably works in *practice* because for two adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first will clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear). The second call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit. Defer the NX clearing to a point after it is known that all top-level allocations have occurred. Add a comment to clarify why. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Fixes: 262b6b30 ("x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled") Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: "Tim Chen" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: ning.sun@intel.com Cc: tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: andi@firstfloor.org Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: law@redhat.com Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org Cc: dwmw@amazon.co.uk Cc: nickc@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110224939.2695CD47@viggo.jf.intel.com
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- 10 Jan, 2018 1 commit
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Borislav Petkov authored
The alternatives code checks only the first byte whether it is a NOP, but with NOPs in front of the payload and having actual instructions after it breaks the "optimized' test. Make sure to scan all bytes before deciding to optimize the NOPs in there. Reported-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110112815.mgciyf5acwacphkq@pd.tnic
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- 09 Jan, 2018 3 commits
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David Woodhouse authored
Fixes: 87590ce6 ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Tom Lendacky authored
With LFENCE now a serializing instruction, use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC. However, since the kernel could be running under a hypervisor that does not support writing that MSR, read the MSR back and verify that the bit has been set successfully. If the MSR can be read and the bit is set, then set the LFENCE_RDTSC feature, otherwise set the MFENCE_RDTSC feature. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108220932.12580.52458.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
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Tom Lendacky authored
To aid in speculation control, make LFENCE a serializing instruction since it has less overhead than MFENCE. This is done by setting bit 1 of MSR 0xc0011029 (DE_CFG). Some families that support LFENCE do not have this MSR. For these families, the LFENCE instruction is already serializing. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108220921.12580.71694.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
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- 08 Jan, 2018 4 commits
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Jike Song authored
The following code contains dead logic: 162 if (pgd_none(*pgd)) { 163 unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp); 164 if (!new_p4d_page) 165 return NULL; 166 167 if (pgd_none(*pgd)) { 168 set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page))); 169 new_p4d_page = 0; 170 } 171 if (new_p4d_page) 172 free_page(new_p4d_page); 173 } There can't be any difference between two pgd_none(*pgd) at L162 and L167, so it's always false at L171. Dave Hansen explained: Yes, the double-test was part of an optimization where we attempted to avoid using a global spinlock in the fork() path. We would check for unallocated mid-level page tables without the lock. The lock was only taken when we needed to *make* an entry to avoid collisions. Now that it is all single-threaded, there is no chance of a collision, no need for a lock, and no need for the re-check. As all these functions are only called during init, mark them __init as well. Fixes: 03f4424f ("x86/mm/pti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs") Signed-off-by: Jike Song <albcamus@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108160341.3461-1-albcamus@gmail.com
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Dave Hansen authored
This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it. PTI mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace. Undo the poison to allow execution. Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig") Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108102805.GK25546@redhat.com
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de
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Thomas Gleixner authored
As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the mitigation should be common as well. Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Allow architectures to override the show function. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de
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- 06 Jan, 2018 3 commits
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David Woodhouse authored
Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all cpus. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515239374-23361-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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Dave Hansen authored
Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides are, and how to debug it when things go wrong. Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com
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Jiri Kosina authored
EFI_OLD_MEMMAP's efi_call_phys_prolog() calls set_pgd() with swapper PGD that has PAGE_USER set, which makes PTI set NX on it, and therefore EFI can't execute it's code. Fix that by forcefully clearing _PAGE_NX from the PGD (this can't be done by the pgprot API). _PAGE_NX will be automatically reintroduced in efi_call_phys_epilog(), as _set_pgd() will again notice that this is _PAGE_USER, and set _PAGE_NX on it. Tested-by: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1801052215460.11852@cbobk.fhfr.pm
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- 05 Jan, 2018 2 commits
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table isolation for mitigation. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
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David Woodhouse authored
Where an ALTERNATIVE is used in the middle of an inline asm block, this would otherwise lead to the following instruction being appended directly to the trailing ".popsection", and a failed compile. Fixes: 9cebed42 ("x86, alternative: Use .pushsection/.popsection") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180104143710.8961-8-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
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- 04 Jan, 2018 5 commits
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Thomas Gleixner authored
The recent changes for PTI touch cpu_tlbstate from various tlb_flush inlines. cpu_tlbstate is exported as GPL symbol, so this causes a regression when building out of tree drivers for certain graphics cards. Aside of that the export was wrong since it was introduced as it should have been EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(). Use the correct PER_CPU export and drop the _GPL to restore the previous state which allows users to utilize the cards they payed for. As always I'm really thrilled to make this kind of change to support the #friends (or however the hot hashtag of today is spelled) from that closet sauce graphics corp. Fixes: 1e02ce4c ("x86: Store a per-cpu shadow copy of CR4") Fixes: 6fd166aa ("x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches") Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Thomas reported the following warning: BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: ovsdb-server/4498 caller is native_flush_tlb_single+0x57/0xc0 native_flush_tlb_single+0x57/0xc0 __set_pte_vaddr+0x2d/0x40 set_pte_vaddr+0x2f/0x40 cea_set_pte+0x30/0x40 ds_update_cea.constprop.4+0x4d/0x70 reserve_ds_buffers+0x159/0x410 x86_reserve_hardware+0x150/0x160 x86_pmu_event_init+0x3e/0x1f0 perf_try_init_event+0x69/0x80 perf_event_alloc+0x652/0x740 SyS_perf_event_open+0x3f6/0xd60 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x190 set_pte_vaddr is used to map the ds buffers into the cpu entry area, but there are two problems with that: 1) The resulting flush is not supposed to be called in preemptible context 2) The cpu entry area is supposed to be per CPU, but the debug store buffers are mapped for all CPUs so these mappings need to be flushed globally. Add the necessary preemption protection across the mapping code and flush TLBs globally. Fixes: c1961a46 ("x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in cpu_entry_area") Reported-by: Thomas Zeitlhofer <thomas.zeitlhofer+lkml@ze-it.at> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Thomas Zeitlhofer <thomas.zeitlhofer+lkml@ze-it.at> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180104170712.GB3040@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
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Thomas Gleixner authored
vaddr_end for KASLR is only documented in the KASLR code itself and is adjusted depending on config options. So it's not surprising that a change of the memory layout causes KASLR to have the wrong vaddr_end. This can map arbitrary stuff into other areas causing hard to understand problems. Remove the whole ifdef magic and define the start of the cpu_entry_area to be the end of the KASLR vaddr range. Add documentation to that effect. Fixes: 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap") Reported-by: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>, Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801041320360.1771@nanos
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Thomas Gleixner authored
There is no reason for 4 and 5 level pagetables to have a different layout. It just makes determining vaddr_end for KASLR harder than necessary. Fixes: 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>, Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801041320360.1771@nanos
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Andrey Ryabinin authored
Since f06bdd40 ("x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on fixmap section size") kasan_mem_to_shadow(MODULES_END) could be not aligned to a page boundary. So passing page unaligned address to kasan_populate_zero_shadow() have two possible effects: 1) It may leave one page hole in supposed to be populated area. After commit 21506525 ("x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area") that hole happens to be in the shadow covering fixmap area and leads to crash: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbffffe8ee04 RIP: 0010:check_memory_region+0x5c/0x190 Call Trace: <NMI> memcpy+0x1f/0x50 ghes_copy_tofrom_phys+0xab/0x180 ghes_read_estatus+0xfb/0x280 ghes_notify_nmi+0x2b2/0x410 nmi_handle+0x115/0x2c0 default_do_nmi+0x57/0x110 do_nmi+0xf8/0x150 end_repeat_nmi+0x1a/0x1e Note, the crash likely disappeared after commit 92a0f81d, which changed kasan_populate_zero_shadow() call the way it was before commit 21506525. 2) Attempt to load module near MODULES_END will fail, because __vmalloc_node_range() called from kasan_module_alloc() will hit the WARN_ON(!pte_none(*pte)) in the vmap_pte_range() and bail out with error. To fix this we need to make kasan_mem_to_shadow(MODULES_END) page aligned which means that MODULES_END should be 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned. The whole point of commit f06bdd40 was to move MODULES_END down if NR_CPUS is big, so the cpu_entry_area takes a lot of space. But since 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap") the cpu_entry_area is no longer in fixmap, so we could just set MODULES_END to a fixed 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned address. Fixes: f06bdd40 ("x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on fixmap section size") Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kubakici@wp.pl> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171228160620.23818-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
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- 03 Jan, 2018 7 commits
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Nick Desaulniers authored
cpu_tss_rw is declared with DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED but then defined with DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED leading to section mismatch warnings. Use DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED consistently. This is necessary because it's mapped to the cpu entry area and must be page aligned. [ tglx: Massaged changelog a bit ] Fixes: 1a935bc3 ("x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct") Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: tklauser@distanz.ch Cc: minipli@googlemail.com Cc: me@kylehuey.com Cc: namit@vmware.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: jpoimboe@redhat.com Cc: tj@kernel.org Cc: cl@linux.com Cc: bp@suse.de Cc: thgarnie@google.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180103203954.183360-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
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Thomas Gleixner authored
The preparation for PTI which added CR3 switching to the entry code misplaced the CR3 switch in entry_SYSCALL_compat(). With PTI enabled the entry code tries to access a per cpu variable after switching to kernel GS. This fails because that variable is not mapped to user space. This results in a double fault and in the worst case a kernel crash. Move the switch ahead of the access and clobber RSP which has been saved already. Fixes: 8a09317b ("x86/mm/pti: Prepare the x86/entry assembly code for entry/exit CR3 switching") Reported-by: Lars Wendler <wendler.lars@web.de> Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, , Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>, Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801031949200.1957@nanos
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
In the stack dump code, if the frame after the starting pt_regs is also a regs frame, the registers don't get printed. Fix that. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Tested-by: Alexander Tsoy <alexander@tsoy.me> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3b3fa11b ("x86/dumpstack: Print any pt_regs found on the stack") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/396f84491d2f0ef64eda4217a2165f5712f6a115.1514736742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
The show_regs_safe() logic is wrong. When there's an iret stack frame, it prints the entire pt_regs -- most of which is random stack data -- instead of just the five registers at the end. show_regs_safe() is also poorly named: the on_stack() checks aren't for safety. Rename the function to show_regs_if_on_stack() and add a comment to explain why the checks are needed. These issues were introduced with the "partial register dump" feature of the following commit: b02fcf9b ("x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully") That patch had gone through a few iterations of development, and the above issues were artifacts from a previous iteration of the patch where 'regs' pointed directly to the iret frame rather than to the (partially empty) pt_regs. Tested-by: Alexander Tsoy <alexander@tsoy.me> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b02fcf9b ("x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5b05b8b344f59db2d3d50dbdeba92d60f2304c54.1514736742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Meelis reported that his K8 Athlon64 emits MCE warnings when PTI is enabled: [Hardware Error]: Error Addr: 0x0000ffff81e000e0 [Hardware Error]: MC1 Error: L1 TLB multimatch. [Hardware Error]: cache level: L1, tx: INSN The address is in the entry area, which is mapped into kernel _AND_ user space. That's special because we switch CR3 while we are executing there. User mapping: 0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff82000000 2M ro PSE GLB x pmd Kernel mapping: 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff82000000 16M ro PSE x pmd So the K8 is complaining that the TLB entries differ. They differ in the GLB bit. Drop the GLB bit when installing the user shared mapping. Fixes: 6dc72c3c ("x86/mm/pti: Share entry text PMD") Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801031407180.1957@nanos
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Tom Lendacky authored
AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel page table isolation feature protects against. The AMD microarchitecture does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode when that access would result in a page fault. Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI is set. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
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Thomas Gleixner authored
This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 31 Dec, 2017 4 commits
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Andy prefers to be paranoid about the pagetable free in the error path of write_ldt(). Make it conditional and warn whenever the installment of a secondary LDT fails. Requested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
The error path in write_ldt() tries to free 'old_ldt' instead of the newly allocated 'new_ldt', resulting in a memory leak. It also misses to clean up a half populated LDT pagetable, which is not a leak as it gets cleaned up when the process exits. Free both the potentially half populated LDT pagetable and the newly allocated LDT struct. This can be done unconditionally because once an LDT is mapped subsequent maps will succeed, because the PTE page is already populated and the two LDTs fit into that single page. Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Fixes: f55f0501 ("x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1712311121340.1899@nanosSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
The preempt_disable/enable() pair in __native_flush_tlb() was added in commit: 5cf0791d ("x86/mm: Disable preemption during CR3 read+write") ... to protect the UP variant of flush_tlb_mm_range(). That preempt_disable/enable() pair should have been added to the UP variant of flush_tlb_mm_range() instead. The UP variant was removed with commit: ce4a4e56 ("x86/mm: Remove the UP asm/tlbflush.h code, always use the (formerly) SMP code") ... but the preempt_disable/enable() pair stayed around. The latest change to __native_flush_tlb() in commit: 6fd166aa ("x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches") ... added an access to a per CPU variable outside the preempt disabled regions, which makes no sense at all. __native_flush_tlb() must always be called with at least preemption disabled. Remove the preempt_disable/enable() pair and add a WARN_ON_ONCE() to catch bad callers independent of the smp_processor_id() debugging. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171230211829.679325424@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
smpboot_setup_warm_reset_vector() and smpboot_restore_warm_reset_vector() invoke local_flush_tlb() for no obvious reason. Digging in history revealed that the original code in the 2.1 era added those because the code manipulated a swapper_pg_dir pagetable entry. The pagetable manipulation was removed long ago in the 2.3 timeframe, but the TLB flush invocations stayed around forever. Remove them along with the pointless pr_debug()s which come from the same 2.1 change. Reported-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171230211829.586548655@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 23 Dec, 2017 3 commits
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Now that the LDT mapping is in a known area when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is enabled its a primary target for attacks, if a user space interface fails to validate a write address correctly. That can never happen, right? The SDM states: If the segment descriptors in the GDT or an LDT are placed in ROM, the processor can enter an indefinite loop if software or the processor attempts to update (write to) the ROM-based segment descriptors. To prevent this problem, set the accessed bits for all segment descriptors placed in a ROM. Also, remove operating-system or executive code that attempts to modify segment descriptors located in ROM. So its a valid approach to set the ACCESS bit when setting up the LDT entry and to map the table RO. Fixup the selftest so it can handle that new mode. Remove the manual ACCESS bit setter in set_tls_desc() as this is now pointless. Folded the patch from Peter Ziljstra. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Add two debugfs files which allow to dump the pagetable of the current task. current_kernel dumps the regular page table. This is the page table which is normally shared between kernel and user space. If kernel page table isolation is enabled this is the kernel space mapping. If kernel page table isolation is enabled the second file, current_user, dumps the user space page table. These files allow to verify the resulting page tables for page table isolation, but even in the normal case its useful to be able to inspect user space page tables of current for debugging purposes. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx() checks the kernel page table for WX pages, but does not check the PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION user space page table. Restructure the code so that dmesg output is selected by an explicit argument and not implicit via checking the pgd argument for !NULL. Add the check for the user space page table. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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