- 24 Mar, 2011 40 commits
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
Changelog: Feb 15: Don't set new ipc->user_ns if we didn't create a new ipc_ns. Feb 23: Move extern declaration to ipc_namespace.h, and group fwd declarations at top. Signed-off-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by:
Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
This allows setuid/setgid in containers. It also fixes some corner cases where kernel logic foregoes capability checks when uids are equivalent. The latter will need to be done throughout the whole kernel. Changelog: Jan 11: Use nsown_capable() as suggested by Bastian Blank. Jan 11: Fix logic errors in uid checks pointed out by Bastian. Feb 15: allow prlimit to current (was regression in previous version) Feb 23: remove debugging printks, uninline set_one_prio_perm and make it bool, and document its return value. Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
So we can let type safety keep things sane, and as a bonus we can remove the declaration of init_user_ns in capability.h. Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
ptrace is allowed to tasks in the same user namespace according to the usual rules (i.e. the same rules as for two tasks in the init user namespace). ptrace is also allowed to a user namespace to which the current task the has CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability. Changelog: Dec 31: Address feedback by Eric: . Correct ptrace uid check . Rename may_ptrace_ns to ptrace_capable . Also fix the cap_ptrace checks. Jan 1: Use const cred struct Jan 11: use task_ns_capable() in place of ptrace_capable(). Feb 23: same_or_ancestore_user_ns() was not an appropriate check to constrain cap_issubset. Rather, cap_issubset() only is meaningful when both capsets are in the same user_ns. Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
Changelog: Dec 8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by Eric Biederman. Dec 13: Apply Eric's suggestion to pass target task into kill_ok_by_cred() for clarity Dec 31: address comment by Eric Biederman: don't need cred/tcred in check_kill_permission. Jan 1: use const cred struct. Jan 11: Per Bastian Blank's advice, clean up kill_ok_by_cred(). Feb 16: kill_ok_by_cred: fix bad parentheses Feb 23: per akpm, let compiler inline kill_ok_by_cred Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
Changelog: Feb 23: let clone_uts_ns() handle setting uts->user_ns To do so we need to pass in the task_struct who'll get the utsname, so we can get its user_ns. Feb 23: As per Oleg's coment, just pass in tsk, instead of two of its members. Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
The expected course of development for user namespaces targeted capabilities is laid out at https://wiki.ubuntu.com/UserNamespace. Goals: - Make it safe for an unprivileged user to unshare namespaces. They will be privileged with respect to the new namespace, but this should only include resources which the unprivileged user already owns. - Provide separate limits and accounting for userids in different namespaces. Status: Currently (as of 2.6.38) you can clone with the CLONE_NEWUSER flag to get a new user namespace if you have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SETUID, and CAP_SETGID capabilities. What this gets you is a whole new set of userids, meaning that user 500 will have a different 'struct user' in your namespace than in other namespaces. So any accounting information stored in struct user will be unique to your namespace. However, throughout the kernel there are checks which - simply check for a capability. Since root in a child namespace has all capabilities, this means that a child namespace is not constrained. - simply compare uid1 == uid2. Since these are the integer uids, uid 500 in namespace 1 will be said to be equal to uid 500 in namespace 2. As a result, the lxc implementation at lxc.sf.net does not use user namespaces. This is actually helpful because it leaves us free to develop user namespaces in such a way that, for some time, user namespaces may be unuseful. Bugs aside, this patchset is supposed to not at all affect systems which are not actively using user namespaces, and only restrict what tasks in child user namespace can do. They begin to limit privilege to a user namespace, so that root in a container cannot kill or ptrace tasks in the parent user namespace, and can only get world access rights to files. Since all files currently belong to the initila user namespace, that means that child user namespaces can only get world access rights to *all* files. While this temporarily makes user namespaces bad for system containers, it starts to get useful for some sandboxing. I've run the 'runltplite.sh' with and without this patchset and found no difference. This patch: copy_process() handles CLONE_NEWUSER before the rest of the namespaces. So in the case of clone(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWUTS) the new uts namespace will have the new user namespace as its owner. That is what we want, since we want root in that new userns to be able to have privilege over it. Changelog: Feb 15: don't set uts_ns->user_ns if we didn't create a new uts_ns. Feb 23: Move extern init_user_ns declaration from init/version.c to utsname.h. Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
After the previous cleanup in proc_get_sb() the global proc_mnt has no reasons to exists, kill it. Signed-off-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
Reorganize proc_get_sb() so it can be called before the struct pid of the first process is allocated. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
This patchset is a cleanup and a preparation to unshare the pid namespace. These prerequisites prepare for Eric's patchset to give a file descriptor to a namespace and join an existing namespace. This patch: It turns out that the existing assignment in copy_process of the child_reaper can handle the initial assignment of child_reaper we just need to generalize the test in kernel/fork.c Signed-off-by:
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Richard Weinberger authored
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset dmesg_restrict to 0. This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection. With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Signed-off-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Acked-by:
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Acked-by:
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Petr Holasek authored
Add boundaries of allowed input ranges for: dirty_expire_centisecs, drop_caches, overcommit_memory, page-cluster and panic_on_oom. Signed-off-by:
Petr Holasek <pholasek@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Denis Kirjanov authored
Drop dead code. Signed-off-by:
Denis Kirjanov <dkirjanov@kernel.org> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
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Denis Kirjanov authored
Since the for loop checks for the table->procname drop useless table->procname checks inside the loop body Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
If rio is not a switch then "rswitch" is null. Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Cc: Matt Porter <mporter@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
Alexandre Bounine <alexandre.bounine@idt.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Bounine authored
Removes resource reservation from the common sybsystem initialization code and make it part of mport driver initialization. This resolves conflict with resource reservation by device specific mport drivers. Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Bounine authored
Changes mport ID and host destination ID assignment to implement unified method common to all mport drivers. Makes "riohdid=" kernel command line parameter common for all architectures with support for more that one host destination ID assignment. Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Bounine authored
Subsystem initialization sequence modified to support presence of multiple RapidIO controllers in the system. The new sequence is compatible with initialization of PCI devices. Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Bounine authored
1. Add an option to include RapidIO support if the PCI is available. 2. Add FSL_RIO configuration option to enable controller selection. 3. Add RapidIO support option into x86 and MIPS architectures. Signed-off-by:
Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Matt Porter <mporter@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Li Yang <leoli@freescale.com> Cc: Thomas Moll <thomas.moll@sysgo.com> Cc: Micha Nelissen <micha@neli.hopto.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Bounine authored
This set of patches eliminates RapidIO dependency on PowerPC architecture and makes it available to other architectures (x86 and MIPS). It also enables support of new platform independent RapidIO controllers such as PCI-to-SRIO and PCI Express-to-SRIO. This patch: Extend number of mport callback functions to eliminate direct linking of architecture specific mport operations. Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Bounine authored
Add RapidIO documentation files as it was discussed earlier (see thread http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=129202338918062&w=2) Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Bounine authored
Add new sysfs attributes. 1. Routing information required to to reach the RIO device: destid - device destination ID (real for for endpoint, route for switch) hopcount - hopcount for maintenance requests (switches only) 2. device linking information: lprev - name of device that precedes the given device in the enumeration or discovery order (displayed along with of the port to which it is attached). lnext - names of devices (with corresponding port numbers) that are attached to the given device as next in the enumeration or discovery order (switches only) Signed-off-by: -
Changli Gao authored
Reduce the lines of code and simplify the logic. Signed-off-by:
Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Julia Lawall authored
Convert calls to func_enter on leaving a function to func_exit. The semantic patch that fixes this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // <smpl> @@ @@ - func_enter(); + func_exit(); return...; // </smpl> Signed-off-by:
Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> Cc: Roger Wolff <R.E.Wolff@BitWizard.nl> Signed-off-by:
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Julia Lawall authored
put_tty_driver calls tty_driver_kref_put on its argument, and then tty_driver_kref_put calls kref_put on the address of a field of this argument. kref_put checks for NULL, but in this case the field is likely to have some offset and so the result of taking its address will not be NULL. Labels are added to be able to skip over the call to put_tty_driver when the argument will be NULL. The semantic match that finds this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // <smpl> @@ expression *x; @@ *if (x == NULL) { ... * put_tty_driver(x); ... return ...; } // </smpl> Signed-off-by:
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Niranjana Vishwanathapura authored
Add smd_pkt driver which provides device interface to smd packet ports. Signed-off-by:
Niranjana Vishwanathapura <nvishwan@codeaurora.org> Cc: Brian Swetland <swetland@google.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@suse.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: David Brown <davidb@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Sergey Senozhatsky authored
commit d2478521 ("char/ipmi: fix OOPS caused by pnp_unregister_driver on unregistered driver") introduced a section mismatch by calling __exit cleanup_ipmi_si from __devinit init_ipmi_si. Remove __exit annotation from cleanup_ipmi_si. Signed-off-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit f83ce3e6 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR. Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since "ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to Brad Spengler for pointing this out. Addresses CVE-2011-0726 Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
1. namelen is declared "unsigned short" which hints for "maybe space savings". Indeed in 2.4 struct proc_dir_entry looked like: struct proc_dir_entry { unsigned short low_ino; unsigned short namelen; Now, low_ino is "unsigned int", all savings were gone for a long time. "struct proc_dir_entry" is not that countless to worry about it's size, anyway. 2. converting from unsigned short to int/unsigned int can only create problems, we better play it safe. Space is not really conserved, because of natural alignment for the next field. sizeof(struct proc_dir_entry) remains the same. Signed-off-by:Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jovi Zhang authored
[root@wei 1]# cat /proc/1/mem cat: /proc/1/mem: No such process error code -ESRCH is wrong in this situation. Return -EPERM instead. Signed-off-by:
Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Aaro Koskinen authored
The current code fails to print the "[heap]" marking if the heap is split into multiple mappings. Fix the check so that the marking is displayed in all possible cases: 1. vma matches exactly the heap 2. the heap vma is merged e.g. with bss 3. the heap vma is splitted e.g. due to locked pages Test cases. In all cases, the process should have mapping(s) with [heap] marking: (1) vma matches exactly the heap #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> int main (void) { if (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) { printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid()); while (1) sleep(1); } return 0; } # ./test1 check /proc/553/maps [1] + Stopped ./test1 # cat /proc/553/maps | head -4 00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3113640 /test1 00010000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3113640 /test1 00011000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 4006f000-40070000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 (2) the heap vma is merged #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> char foo[4096] = "foo"; char bar[4096]; int main (void) { if (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) { printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid()); while (1) sleep(1); } return 0; } # ./test2 check /proc/556/maps [2] + Stopped ./test2 # cat /proc/556/maps | head -4 00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3116312 /test2 00010000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3116312 /test2 00012000-00014000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 4004a000-4004b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 (3) the heap vma is splitted (this fails without the patch) #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> int main (void) { if ((sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) && !mlockall(MCL_FUTURE) && (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1)) { printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid()); while (1) sleep(1); } return 0; } # ./test3 check /proc/559/maps [1] + Stopped ./test3 # cat /proc/559/maps|head -4 00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3119108 /test3 00010000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3119108 /test3 00011000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 00012000-00013000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] It looks like the bug has been there forever, and since it only results in some information missing from a procfile, it does not fulfil the -stable "critical issue" criteria. Signed-off-by:Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Reviewed-by:
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Konstantin Khlebnikov authored
This file is readable for the task owner. Hide kernel addresses from unprivileged users, leave them function names and offsets. Signed-off-by:
Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Acked-by:
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Li Zefan authored
Chaning cpuset->mems/cpuset->cpus should be protected under callback_mutex. cpuset_clone() doesn't follow this rule. It's ok because it's called when creating and initializing a cgroup, but we'd better hold the lock to avoid subtil break in the future. Signed-off-by:
Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by:
Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Acked-by:
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
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Li Zefan authored
Those functions that use NODEMASK_ALLOC() can't propagate errno to users, but will fail silently. Fix it by using a static nodemask_t variable for each function, and those variables are protected by cgroup_mutex; [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment spelling, strengthen cgroup_lock comment] Signed-off-by:
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Li Zefan authored
oldcs->mems_allowed is not modified during cpuset_attach(), so we don't have to copy it to a buffer allocated by NODEMASK_ALLOC(). Just pass it to cpuset_migrate_mm(). Signed-off-by:
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Li Zefan authored
It's not necessary to copy cpuset->mems_allowed to a buffer allocated by NODEMASK_ALLOC(). Just pass it to nodelist_scnprintf(). As spotted by Paul, a side effect is we fix a bug that the function can return -ENOMEM but the caller doesn't expect negative return value. Therefore change the return value of cpuset_sprintf_cpulist() and cpuset_sprintf_memlist() from int to size_t. Signed-off-by:
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David Rientjes authored
When a memcg is oom and current has already received a SIGKILL, then give it access to memory reserves with a higher scheduling priority so that it may quickly exit and free its memory. This is identical to the global oom killer and is done even before checking for panic_on_oom: a pending SIGKILL here while panic_on_oom is selected is guaranteed to have come from userspace; the thread only needs access to memory reserves to exit and thus we don't unnecessarily panic the machine until the kernel has no last resort to free memory. Signed-off-by:
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
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KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki authored
fs/fuse/dev.c::fuse_try_move_page() does (1) remove a page by ->steal() (2) re-add the page to page cache (3) link the page to LRU if it was not on LRU at (1) This implies the page is _on_ LRU when it's added to radix-tree. So, the page is added to memory cgroup while it's on LRU. because LRU is lazy and no one flushs it. This is the same behavior as SwapCache and needs special care as - remove page from LRU before overwrite pc->mem_cgroup. - add page to LRU after overwrite pc->mem_cgroup. And we need to taking care of pagevec. If PageLRU(page) is set before we add PCG_USED bit, the page will not be added to memcg's LRU (in short period). So, regardlress of PageLRU(page) value before commit_charge(), we need to check PageLRU(page) after commit_charge(). Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=30432Signed-off-by:
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by:
Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Reported-by:
Daniel Poelzleithner <poelzi@poelzi.org> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki noted that free_pages_cgroup doesn't have to check for PageReserved because we never store the array on reserved pages (neither alloc_pages_exact nor vmalloc use those pages). So we can replace the check by a BUG_ON. Signed-off-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by:
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