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  1. 22 Oct, 2017 1 commit
  3. 21 Oct, 2017 32 commits
  5. 20 Oct, 2017 7 commits
    • David S. Miller's avatar
      Merge branch 'bpf-lsm-hooks' · 7f9ad2ac
      David S. Miller authored 
      Chenbo Feng says:

====================
bpf: security: New file mode and LSM hooks for eBPF object permission control

Much like files and sockets, eBPF objects are accessed, controlled, and
shared via a file descriptor (FD). Unlike files and sockets, the
existing mechanism for eBPF object access control is very limited.
Currently there are two options for granting accessing to eBPF
operations: grant access to all processes, or only CAP_SYS_ADMIN
processes. The CAP_SYS_ADMIN-only mode is not ideal because most users
do not have this capability and granting a user CAP_SYS_ADMIN grants too
many other security-sensitive permissions. It also unnecessarily allows
all CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes access to eBPF functionality. Allowing all
processes to access to eBPF objects is also undesirable since it has
potential to allow unprivileged processes to consume kernel memory, and
opens up attack surface to the kernel.

Adding LSM hooks maintains the status quo for systems which do not use
an LSM, preserving compatibility with userspace, while allowing security
modules to choose how best to handle permissions on eBPF objects. Here
is a possible use case for the lsm hooks with selinux module:

The network-control daemon (netd) creates and loads an eBPF object for
network packet filtering and analysis. It passes the object FD to an
unprivileged network monitor app (netmonitor), which is not allowed to
create, modify or load eBPF objects, but is allowed to read the traffic
stats from the map.

Selinux could use these hooks to grant the following permissions:
allow netd self:bpf_map { create read write};
allow netmonitor netd:fd use;
allow netmonitor netd:bpf_map read;

In this patch series, A file mode is added to bpf map to store the
accessing mode. With this file mode flags, the map can be obtained read
only, write only or read and write. With the help of this file mode,
several security hooks can be added to the eBPF syscall implementations
to do permissions checks. These LSM hooks are mainly focused on checking
the process privileges before it obtains the fd for a specific bpf
object. No matter from a file location or from a eBPF id. Besides that,
a general check hook is also implemented at the start of bpf syscalls so
that each security module can have their own implementation on the reset
of bpf object related functionalities.

In order to store the ownership and security information about eBPF
maps, a security field pointer is added to the struct bpf_map. And the
last two patch set are implementation of selinux check on these hooks
introduced, plus an additional check when eBPF object is passed between
processes using unix socket as well as binder IPC.

Change since V1:

 - Whitelist the new bpf flags in the map allocate check.
 - Added bpf selftest for the new flags.
 - Added two new security hooks for copying the security information from
   the bpf object security struct to file security struct
 - Simplified the checking action when bpf fd is passed between processes.

 Change since V2:

 - Fixed the line break problem for map flags check
 - Fixed the typo in selinux check of file mode.
 - Merge bpf_map and bpf_prog into one selinux class
 - Added bpf_type and bpf_sid into file security struct to store the
   security information when generate fd.
 - Add the hook to bpf_map_new_fd and bpf_prog_new_fd.

 Change since V3:

 - Return the actual error from security check instead of -EPERM
 - Move the hooks into anon_inode_getfd() to avoid get file again after
   bpf object file is installed with fd.
 - Removed the bpf_sid field inside file_scerity_struct to reduce the
   cache size.

 Change since V4:

 - Rename bpf av prog_use to prog_run to distinguish from fd_use.
 - Remove the bpf_type field inside file_scerity_struct and use bpf fops
   to indentify bpf object instead.

 Change since v5:

 - Fixed the incorrect selinux class name for SECCLASS_BPF

 Change since v7:

 - Fixed the build error caused by xt_bpf module.
 - Add flags check for bpf_obj_get() and bpf_map_get_fd_by_id() to make it
   uapi-wise.
 - Add the flags field to the bpf_obj_get_user function when BPF_SYSCALL
   is not configured.
====================
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7f9ad2ac
    • Chenbo Feng's avatar
      selinux: bpf: Add addtional check for bpf object file receive · f66e448c
      Chenbo Feng authored 
      Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files
through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the receiving
process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf program.
This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a
anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking the
files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly on
eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is configured.
Signed-off-by: default avatarChenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f66e448c
    • Chenbo Feng's avatar
      selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations · ec27c356
      Chenbo Feng authored 
      Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
Signed-off-by: default avatarChenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ec27c356
    • Chenbo Feng's avatar
      security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall · afdb09c7
      Chenbo Feng authored 
      Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the
userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps.
The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection
for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can
read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides
that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf
syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The
actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and
how the cmd should be checked.
Signed-off-by: default avatarChenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      afdb09c7
    • Chenbo Feng's avatar
      bpf: Add tests for eBPF file mode · e043325b
      Chenbo Feng authored 
      Two related tests are added into bpf selftest to test read only map and
write only map. The tests verified the read only and write only flags
are working on hash maps.
Signed-off-by: default avatarChenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e043325b
    • Chenbo Feng's avatar
      bpf: Add file mode configuration into bpf maps · 6e71b04a
      Chenbo Feng authored 
      Introduce the map read/write flags to the eBPF syscalls that returns the
map fd. The flags is used to set up the file mode when construct a new
file descriptor for bpf maps. To not break the backward capability, the
f_flags is set to O_RDWR if the flag passed by syscall is 0. Otherwise
it should be O_RDONLY or O_WRONLY. When the userspace want to modify or
read the map content, it will check the file mode to see if it is
allowed to make the change.
Signed-off-by: default avatarChenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6e71b04a
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      net-tun: fix panics at dismantle time · aec72f33
      Eric Dumazet authored 
      syzkaller got crashes at dismantle time [1]

It is not correct to test (tun->flags & IFF_NAPI) in tun_napi_disable()
and tun_napi_del() : Each tun_file can have different mode, depending
on how they were created.

Similarly I have changed tun_get_user() and tun_poll_controller()
to use the new tfile->napi_enabled boolean.

[  154.331360] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[  154.339220] IP: [<ffffffff9634cad6>] hrtimer_active+0x26/0x60
[  154.344983] PGD 0
[  154.347009] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  154.350680] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03
[  154.379572] task: ffff994719150dc0 ti: ffff99475c0ae000 task.ti: ffff99475c0ae000
[  154.387043] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff9634cad6>]  [<ffffffff9634cad6>] hrtimer_active+0x26/0x60
[  154.395232] RSP: 0018:ffff99475c0afce8  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  154.400542] RAX: ffff994754850ac0 RBX: ffff994753e65408 RCX: ffff994753e65388
[  154.407666] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff994753e65408
[  154.414790] RBP: ffff99475c0afce8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  154.421921] R10: ffff99475f6f5910 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[  154.429044] R13: ffff99417deab668 R14: ffff99417deaa780 R15: ffff99475f45dde0
[  154.436174] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff994767a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  154.444249] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  154.449986] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000005a8a0e000 CR4: 0000000000022670
[  154.457110] Stack:
[  154.459120]  ffff99475c0afd28 ffffffff9634d614 1000000000000000 0000000000000000
[  154.466598]  ffffe54240000000 ffff994753e65408 ffff994753e653a8 ffff99417deab668
[  154.474067]  ffff99475c0afd48 ffffffff9634d6fd ffff99474c2be678 ffff994753e65398
[  154.481537] Call Trace:
[  154.483985]  [<ffffffff9634d614>] hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x24/0xf0
[  154.490074]  [<ffffffff9634d6fd>] hrtimer_cancel+0x1d/0x30
[  154.495563]  [<ffffffff96860b3c>] napi_disable+0x3c/0x70
[  154.500875]  [<ffffffff9678ae62>] __tun_detach+0xd2/0x360
[  154.506272]  [<ffffffff9678b117>] tun_chr_close+0x27/0x40
[  154.511669]  [<ffffffff9646ebe6>] __fput+0xd6/0x1e0
[  154.516548]  [<ffffffff9646ed3e>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[  154.521429]  [<ffffffff963035a2>] task_work_run+0x72/0x90
[  154.526827]  [<ffffffff962e9407>] do_exit+0x317/0xb60
[  154.531879]  [<ffffffff962e9c8f>] do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0
[  154.537275]  [<ffffffff962e9d07>] SyS_exit_group+0x17/0x20
[  154.542769]  [<ffffffff969784be>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17

Fixes: 94317099 ("net-tun: enable NAPI for TUN/TAP driver")
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      aec72f33
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