Spectre-v2 can be mitigated on Falkor CPUs either by calling into
firmware or by issuing a magic, CPU-specific sequence of branches.
Although the latter is faster, the size of the code sequence means that
it cannot be used in the EL2 vectors, and so there is a need for both
mitigations to co-exist in order to achieve optimal performance.

Change the mitigation selection logic for Spectre-v2 so that the
CPU-specific mitigation is used only when the firmware mitigation is
also available, rather than when a firmware mitigation is unavailable.

Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

With CONFIG_EXPERT=y, CONFIG_KASAN=y, CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n,
CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=n, we observe the following failure when trying to
link the kernel image with LD=ld.lld:

error: section: .exit.data is not contiguous with other relro sections

ld.lld defaults to -z relro while ld.bfd defaults to -z norelro. This
was previously fixed, but only for CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y.

Fixes: 3bbd3db8 ("arm64: relocatable: fix inconsistencies in linker script and options")
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201016175339.2429280-1-ndesaulniers@google.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

I was going to copy this but I didn't want to chase around the build
system stuff so I did it a different way.
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201017002637.503579-1-palmer@dabbelt.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

HAVE_MOVE_PMD enables remapping pages at the PMD level if both the
source and destination addresses are PMD-aligned.

HAVE_MOVE_PMD is already enabled on x86. The original patch [1] that
introduced this config did not enable it on arm64 at the time because
of performance issues with flushing the TLB on every PMD move. These
issues have since been addressed in more recent releases with
improvements to the arm64 TLB invalidation and core mmu_gather code as
Will Deacon mentioned in [2].

>From the data below, it can be inferred that there is approximately
8x improvement in performance when HAVE_MOVE_PMD is enabled on arm64.

--------- Test Results ----------

The following results were obtained on an arm64 device running a 5.4
kernel, by remapping a PMD-aligned, 1GB sized region to a PMD-aligned
destination. The results from 10 iterations of the test are given below.
All times are in nanoseconds.

Control    HAVE_MOVE_PMD

9220833    1247761
9002552    1219896
9254115    1094792
8725885    1227760
9308646    1043698
9001667    1101771
8793385    1159896
8774636    1143594
9553125    1025833
9374010    1078125

9100885.4  1134312.6    <-- Mean Time in nanoseconds

Total mremap time for a 1GB sized PMD-aligned region drops from
~9.1 milliseconds to ~1.1 milliseconds. (~8x speedup).

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20181108181201.88826-3-joelaf@google.com
[2] https://www.mail-archive.com/linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org/msg140837.htmlSigned-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201014005320.2233162-3-kaleshsingh@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/20181029102840.GC13965@arm.com/Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

On arm64, the global variable memstart_addr represents the physical
address of PAGE_OFFSET, and so physical to virtual translations or
vice versa used to come down to simple additions or subtractions
involving the values of PAGE_OFFSET and memstart_addr.

When support for 52-bit virtual addressing was introduced, we had to
deal with PAGE_OFFSET potentially being outside of the region that
can be covered by the virtual range (as the 52-bit VA capable build
needs to be able to run on systems that are only 48-bit VA capable),
and for this reason, another translation was introduced, and recorded
in the global variable physvirt_offset.

However, if we go back to the original definition of memstart_addr,
i.e., the physical address of PAGE_OFFSET, it turns out that there is
no need for two separate translations: instead, we can simply subtract
the size of the unaddressable VA space from memstart_addr to make the
available physical memory appear in the 48-bit addressable VA region.

This simplifies things, but also fixes a bug on KASLR builds, which
may update memstart_addr later on in arm64_memblock_init(), but fails
to update vmemmap and physvirt_offset accordingly.

Fixes: 5383cc6e ("arm64: mm: Introduce vabits_actual")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201008153602.9467-2-ardb@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

It doesn't make sense to issue prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS) on a
compat task because the 32-bit instruction set does not offer PAuth
instructions. For consistency with other 64-bit only prctls such as
{SET,GET}_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, reject the prctl on compat tasks.

Although this is a userspace-visible change, maybe it isn't too late
to make this change given that the hardware isn't available yet and
it's very unlikely that anyone has 32-bit software that actually
depends on this succeeding.
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ie885a1ff84ab498cc9f62d6451e9f2cfd4b1d06a
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201014052430.11630-1-pcc@google.com
[will: Do the same for the SVE prctl()s]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

This reverts commit 353e228e.

Qian Cai reports that TX2 no longer boots with his .config as it appears
that task_cpu() gets instrumented and used before KASAN has been
initialised.

Although Mark has a proposed fix, let's take the safe option of reverting
this for now and sorting it out properly later.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/711bc57a314d8d646b41307008db2845b7537b3d.camel@redhat.comReported-by: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Late patches for 5.10: MTE selftests, minor KCSAN preparation and removal
of some unused prototypes.

(Amit Daniel Kachhap and others)
* for-next/late-arrivals:
  arm64: random: Remove no longer needed prototypes
  arm64: initialize per-cpu offsets earlier
  kselftest/arm64: Check mte tagged user address in kernel
  kselftest/arm64: Verify KSM page merge for MTE pages
  kselftest/arm64: Verify all different mmap MTE options
  kselftest/arm64: Check forked child mte memory accessibility
  kselftest/arm64: Verify mte tag inclusion via prctl
  kselftest/arm64: Add utilities and a test to validate mte memory

Commit 9bceb80b ("arm64: kaslr: Use standard early random
function") removed the direct calls of the __arm64_rndr() and
__early_cpu_has_rndr() functions, but left the dummy prototypes in the
 #else branch of the #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM guard.

Remove the redundant prototypes, as they have no users outside of
this header file.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201006194453.36519-1-andre.przywara@arm.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The current initialization of the per-cpu offset register is difficult
to follow and this initialization is not always early enough for
upcoming instrumentation with KCSAN, where the instrumentation callbacks
use the per-cpu offset.

To make it possible to support KCSAN, and to simplify reasoning about
early bringup code, let's initialize the per-cpu offset earlier, before
we run any C code that may consume it. To do so, this patch adds a new
init_this_cpu_offset() helper that's called before the usual
primary/secondary start functions. For consistency, this is also used to
re-initialize the per-cpu offset after the runtime per-cpu areas have
been allocated (which can change CPU0's offset).

So that init_this_cpu_offset() isn't subject to any instrumentation that
might consume the per-cpu offset, it is marked with noinstr, preventing
instrumentation.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201005164303.21389-1-mark.rutland@arm.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Add a testcase to check that user address with valid/invalid
mte tag works in kernel mode. This test verifies that the kernel
API's __arch_copy_from_user/__arch_copy_to_user works by considering
if the user pointer has valid/invalid allocation tags.

In MTE sync mode, file memory read/write and other similar interfaces
fails if a user memory with invalid tag is accessed in kernel. In async
mode no such failure occurs.
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Tested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002115630.24683-7-amit.kachhap@arm.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Add a testcase to check that KSM should not merge pages containing
same data with same/different MTE tag values.

This testcase has one positive tests and passes if page merging
happens according to the above rule. It also saves and restores
any modified ksm sysfs entries.
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Tested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002115630.24683-6-amit.kachhap@arm.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

This testcase checks the different unsupported/supported options for mmap
if used with PROT_MTE memory protection flag. These checks are,

* Either pstate.tco enable or prctl PR_MTE_TCF_NONE option should not cause
  any tag mismatch faults.
* Different combinations of anonymous/file memory mmap, mprotect,
  sync/async error mode and private/shared mappings should work.
* mprotect should not be able to clear the PROT_MTE page property.
Co-developed-by: Gabor Kertesz <gabor.kertesz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabor Kertesz <gabor.kertesz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Tested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002115630.24683-5-amit.kachhap@arm.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

This test covers the mte memory behaviour of the forked process with
different mapping properties and flags. It checks that all bytes of
forked child memory are accessible with the same tag as that of the
parent and memory accessed outside the tag range causes fault to
occur.
Co-developed-by: Gabor Kertesz <gabor.kertesz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabor Kertesz <gabor.kertesz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Tested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002115630.24683-4-amit.kachhap@arm.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

This testcase verifies that the tag generated with "irg" instruction
contains only included tags. This is done via prtcl call.

This test covers 4 scenarios,
* At least one included tag.
* More than one included tags.
* All included.
* None included.
Co-developed-by: Gabor Kertesz <gabor.kertesz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabor Kertesz <gabor.kertesz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Tested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002115630.24683-3-amit.kachhap@arm.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

This test checks that the memory tag is present after mte allocation and
the memory is accessible with those tags. This testcase verifies all
sync, async and none mte error reporting mode. The allocated mte buffers
are verified for Allocated range (no error expected while accessing
buffer), Underflow range, and Overflow range.

Different test scenarios covered here are,
* Verify that mte memory are accessible at byte/block level.
* Force underflow and overflow to occur and check the data consistency.
* Check to/from between tagged and untagged memory.
* Check that initial allocated memory to have 0 tag.

This change also creates the necessary infrastructure to add mte test
cases. MTE kselftests can use the several utility functions provided here
to add wide variety of mte test scenarios.

GCC compiler need flag '-march=armv8.5-a+memtag' so those flags are
verified before compilation.

The mte testcases can be launched with kselftest framework as,

make TARGETS=arm64 ARM64_SUBTARGETS=mte kselftest

or compiled as,

make -C tools/testing/selftests TARGETS=arm64 ARM64_SUBTARGETS=mte CC='compiler'
Co-developed-by: Gabor Kertesz <gabor.kertesz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabor Kertesz <gabor.kertesz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Tested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002115630.24683-2-amit.kachhap@arm.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Add userspace support for the Memory Tagging Extension introduced by
Armv8.5.

(Catalin Marinas and others)
* for-next/mte: (30 commits)
  arm64: mte: Fix typo in memory tagging ABI documentation
  arm64: mte: Add Memory Tagging Extension documentation
  arm64: mte: Kconfig entry
  arm64: mte: Save tags when hibernating
  arm64: mte: Enable swap of tagged pages
  mm: Add arch hooks for saving/restoring tags
  fs: Handle intra-page faults in copy_mount_options()
  arm64: mte: ptrace: Add NT_ARM_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL regset
  arm64: mte: ptrace: Add PTRACE_{PEEK,POKE}MTETAGS support
  arm64: mte: Allow {set,get}_tagged_addr_ctrl() on non-current tasks
  arm64: mte: Restore the GCR_EL1 register after a suspend
  arm64: mte: Allow user control of the generated random tags via prctl()
  arm64: mte: Allow user control of the tag check mode via prctl()
  mm: Allow arm64 mmap(PROT_MTE) on RAM-based files
  arm64: mte: Validate the PROT_MTE request via arch_validate_flags()
  mm: Introduce arch_validate_flags()
  arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()
  mm: Introduce arch_calc_vm_flag_bits()
  arm64: mte: Tags-aware aware memcmp_pages() implementation
  arm64: Avoid unnecessary clear_user_page() indirection
  ...

Fix and subsequently rewrite Spectre mitigations, including the addition
of support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC.

(Will Deacon and Marc Zyngier)
* for-next/ghostbusters: (22 commits)
  arm64: Add support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC prctl() option
  arm64: Pull in task_stack_page() to Spectre-v4 mitigation code
  KVM: arm64: Allow patching EL2 vectors even with KASLR is not enabled
  arm64: Get rid of arm64_ssbd_state
  KVM: arm64: Convert ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 to arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()
  KVM: arm64: Get rid of kvm_arm_have_ssbd()
  KVM: arm64: Simplify handling of ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
  arm64: Rewrite Spectre-v4 mitigation code
  arm64: Move SSBD prctl() handler alongside other spectre mitigation code
  arm64: Rename ARM64_SSBD to ARM64_SPECTRE_V4
  arm64: Treat SSBS as a non-strict system feature
  arm64: Group start_thread() functions together
  KVM: arm64: Set CSV2 for guests on hardware unaffected by Spectre-v2
  arm64: Rewrite Spectre-v2 mitigation code
  arm64: Introduce separate file for spectre mitigations and reporting
  arm64: Rename ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR to ARM64_SPECTRE_V2
  KVM: arm64: Simplify install_bp_hardening_cb()
  KVM: arm64: Replace CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
  arm64: Remove Spectre-related CONFIG_* options
  arm64: Run ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 enabling code on all CPUs
  ...

Merge branches 'for-next/acpi', 'for-next/boot', 'for-next/bpf', 'for-next/cpuinfo', 'for-next/fpsimd', 'for-next/misc', 'for-next/mm', 'for-next/pci', 'for-next/perf', 'for-next/ptrauth', 'for-next/sdei', 'for-next/selftests', 'for-next/stacktrace', 'for-next/svm', 'for-next/topology', 'for-next/tpyos' and 'for-next/vdso' into for-next/core

Remove unused functions and parameters from ACPI IORT code.
(Zenghui Yu via Lorenzo Pieralisi)
* for-next/acpi:
  ACPI/IORT: Remove the unused inline functions
  ACPI/IORT: Drop the unused @ops of iort_add_device_replay()

Remove redundant code and fix documentation of caching behaviour for the
HVC_SOFT_RESTART hypercall.
(Pingfan Liu)
* for-next/boot:
  Documentation/kvm/arm: improve description of HVC_SOFT_RESTART
  arm64/relocate_kernel: remove redundant code

Improve reporting of unexpected kernel traps due to BPF JIT failure.
(Will Deacon)
* for-next/bpf:
  arm64: Improve diagnostics when trapping BRK with FAULT_BRK_IMM

Improve robustness of user-visible HWCAP strings and their corresponding
numerical constants.
(Anshuman Khandual)
* for-next/cpuinfo:
  arm64/cpuinfo: Define HWCAP name arrays per their actual bit definitions

Cleanups to handling of SVE and FPSIMD register state in preparation
for potential future optimisation of handling across syscalls.
(Julien Grall)
* for-next/fpsimd:
  arm64/sve: Implement a helper to load SVE registers from FPSIMD state
  arm64/sve: Implement a helper to flush SVE registers
  arm64/fpsimdmacros: Allow the macro "for" to be used in more cases
  arm64/fpsimdmacros: Introduce a macro to update ZCR_EL1.LEN
  arm64/signal: Update the comment in preserve_sve_context
  arm64/fpsimd: Update documentation of do_sve_acc

Miscellaneous changes.
(Tian Tao and others)
* for-next/misc:
  arm64/mm: return cpu_all_mask when node is NUMA_NO_NODE
  arm64: mm: Fix missing-prototypes in pageattr.c
  arm64/fpsimd: Fix missing-prototypes in fpsimd.c
  arm64: hibernate: Remove unused including <linux/version.h>
  arm64/mm: Refactor {pgd, pud, pmd, pte}_ERROR()
  arm64: Remove the unused include statements
  arm64: get rid of TEXT_OFFSET
  arm64: traps: Add str of description to panic() in die()

Memory management updates and cleanups.
(Anshuman Khandual and others)
* for-next/mm:
  arm64: dbm: Invalidate local TLB when setting TCR_EL1.HD
  arm64: mm: Make flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault() a no-op
  arm64/mm: Unify CONT_PMD_SHIFT
  arm64/mm: Unify CONT_PTE_SHIFT
  arm64/mm: Remove CONT_RANGE_OFFSET
  arm64/mm: Enable THP migration
  arm64/mm: Change THP helpers to comply with generic MM semantics
  arm64/mm/ptdump: Add address markers for BPF regions

Allow prefetchable PCI BARs to be exposed to userspace using normal
non-cacheable mappings.
(Clint Sbisa)
* for-next/pci:
  arm64: Enable PCI write-combine resources under sysfs

Perf/PMU driver updates.
(Julien Thierry and others)
* for-next/perf:
  perf: arm-cmn: Fix conversion specifiers for node type
  perf: arm-cmn: Fix unsigned comparison to less than zero
  arm_pmu: arm64: Use NMIs for PMU
  arm_pmu: Introduce pmu_irq_ops
  KVM: arm64: pmu: Make overflow handler NMI safe
  arm64: perf: Defer irq_work to IPI_IRQ_WORK
  arm64: perf: Remove PMU locking
  arm64: perf: Avoid PMXEV* indirection
  arm64: perf: Add missing ISB in armv8pmu_enable_counter()
  perf: Add Arm CMN-600 PMU driver
  perf: Add Arm CMN-600 DT binding
  arm64: perf: Add support caps under sysfs
  drivers/perf: thunderx2_pmu: Fix memory resource error handling
  drivers/perf: xgene_pmu: Fix uninitialized resource struct
  perf: arm_dsu: Support DSU ACPI devices
  arm64: perf: Remove unnecessary event_idx check
  drivers/perf: hisi: Add missing include of linux/module.h
  arm64: perf: Add general hardware LLC events for PMUv3

Support for the Armv8.3 Pointer Authentication enhancements.
(By Amit Daniel Kachhap)
* for-next/ptrauth:
  arm64: kprobe: clarify the comment of steppable hint instructions
  arm64: kprobe: disable probe of fault prone ptrauth instruction
  arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
  arm64: ptrauth: Introduce Armv8.3 pointer authentication enhancements
  arm64: traps: Allow force_signal_inject to pass esr error code
  arm64: kprobe: add checks for ARMv8.3-PAuth combined instructions

Tonnes of cleanup to the SDEI driver.
(Gavin Shan)
* for-next/sdei:
  firmware: arm_sdei: Remove _sdei_event_unregister()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Remove _sdei_event_register()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Introduce sdei_do_local_call()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Cleanup on cross call function
  firmware: arm_sdei: Remove while loop in sdei_event_unregister()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Remove while loop in sdei_event_register()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Remove redundant error message in sdei_probe()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Remove duplicate check in sdei_get_conduit()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Unregister driver on error in sdei_init()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Avoid nested statements in sdei_init()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Retrieve event number from event instance
  firmware: arm_sdei: Common block for failing path in sdei_event_create()
  firmware: arm_sdei: Remove sdei_is_err()

Selftests for Pointer Authentication and FPSIMD/SVE context-switching.
(Mark Brown and Boyan Karatotev)
* for-next/selftests:
  selftests: arm64: Add build and documentation for FP tests
  selftests: arm64: Add wrapper scripts for stress tests
  selftests: arm64: Add utility to set SVE vector lengths
  selftests: arm64: Add stress tests for FPSMID and SVE context switching
  selftests: arm64: Add test for the SVE ptrace interface
  selftests: arm64: Test case for enumeration of SVE vector lengths
  kselftests/arm64: add PAuth tests for single threaded consistency and differently initialized keys
  kselftests/arm64: add PAuth test for whether exec() changes keys
  kselftests/arm64: add nop checks for PAuth tests
  kselftests/arm64: add a basic Pointer Authentication test

Implementation of ARCH_STACKWALK for unwinding.
(Mark Brown)
* for-next/stacktrace:
  arm64: Move console stack display code to stacktrace.c
  arm64: stacktrace: Convert to ARCH_STACKWALK
  arm64: stacktrace: Make stack walk callback consistent with generic code
  stacktrace: Remove reliable argument from arch_stack_walk() callback

Support for ASID pinning, which is required when sharing page-tables with
the SMMU.
(Jean-Philippe Brucker)
* for-next/svm:
  arm64: cpufeature: Export symbol read_sanitised_ftr_reg()
  arm64: mm: Pin down ASIDs for sharing mm with devices

Rely on firmware tables for establishing CPU topology.
(Valentin Schneider)
* for-next/topology:
  arm64: topology: Stop using MPIDR for topology information

Spelling fixes.
(Xiaoming Ni and Yanfei Xu)
* for-next/tpyos:
  arm64/numa: Fix a typo in comment of arm64_numa_init
  arm64: fix some spelling mistakes in the comments by codespell

vDSO cleanups.
(Will Deacon)
* for-next/vdso:
  arm64: vdso: Fix unusual formatting in *setup_additional_pages()
  arm64: vdso32: Remove a bunch of #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO guards

The node type field is an enum type, so print it as a 32-bit quantity
rather than as an unsigned short.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202009302350.QIzfkx62-lkp@intel.comReported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Ensure that the 'irq' field of 'struct arm_cmn_dtc' is a signed int
so that it can be compared '< 0'.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200929170835.GA15956@embeddedor
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1497488 ("Unsigned compared against 0")
Fixes: 0ba64770 ("perf: Add Arm CMN-600 PMU driver")
Reported-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

TCR_EL1.HD is permitted to be cached in a TLB, so invalidate the local
TLB after setting the bit when detected support for the feature. Although
this isn't strictly necessary, since we can happily operate with the bit
effectively clear, the current code uses an ISB in a half-hearted attempt
to make the change effective, so let's just fix that up.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201001110405.18617-1-will@kernel.orgReviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Our use of broadcast TLB maintenance means that spurious page-faults
that have been handled already by another CPU do not require additional
TLB maintenance.

Make flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault() a no-op and rely on the existing TLB
invalidation instead. Add an explicit flush_tlb_page() when making a page
dirty, as the TLB is permitted to cache the old read-only entry.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200728092220.GA21800@willie-the-truckSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC option to the PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS prctl()
allows the SSB mitigation to be enabled only until the next execve(),
at which point the state will revert back to PR_SPEC_ENABLE and the
mitigation will be disabled.

Add support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC on arm64.
Reported-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The kbuild robot reports that we're relying on an implicit inclusion to
get a definition of task_stack_page() in the Spectre-v4 mitigation code,
which is not always in place for some configurations:

  | arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c:329:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'task_stack_page' [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
  |         task_pt_regs(task)->pstate |= val;
  |         ^
  | arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h:268:36: note: expanded from macro 'task_pt_regs'
  |         ((struct pt_regs *)(THREAD_SIZE + task_stack_page(p)) - 1)
  |                                           ^
  | arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c:329:2: note: did you mean 'task_spread_page'?

Add the missing include to fix the build error.

Fixes: a44acf477220 ("arm64: Move SSBD prctl() handler alongside other spectre mitigation code")
Reported-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202009260013.Ul7AD29w%lkp@intel.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Patching the EL2 exception vectors is integral to the Spectre-v2
workaround, where it can be necessary to execute CPU-specific sequences
to nobble the branch predictor before running the hypervisor text proper.

Remove the dependency on CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE and allow the EL2 vectors
to be patched even when KASLR is not enabled.

Fixes: 7a132017e7a5 ("KVM: arm64: Replace CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202009221053.Jv1XsQUZ%lkp@intel.comSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Out with the old ghost, in with the new...
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Convert the KVM WA2 code to using the Spectre infrastructure,
making the code much more readable. It also allows us to
take SSBS into account for the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

kvm_arm_have_ssbd() is now completely unused, get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Owing to the fact that the host kernel is always mitigated, we can
drastically simplify the WA2 handling by keeping the mitigation
state ON when entering the guest. This means the guest is either
unaffected or not mitigated.

This results in a nice simplification of the mitigation space,
and the removal of a lot of code that was never really used anyway.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Rewrite the Spectre-v4 mitigation handling code to follow the same
approach as that taken by Spectre-v2.

For now, report to KVM that the system is vulnerable (by forcing
'ssbd_state' to ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN), as this will be cleared up in
subsequent steps.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

As part of the spectre consolidation effort to shift all of the ghosts
into their own proton pack, move all of the horrible SSBD prctl() code
out of its own 'ssbd.c' file.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

In a similar manner to the renaming of ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
to ARM64_SPECTRE_V2, rename ARM64_SSBD to ARM64_SPECTRE_V4. This isn't
_entirely_ accurate, as we also need to take into account the interaction
with SSBS, but that will be taken care of in subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

If all CPUs discovered during boot have SSBS, then spectre-v4 will be
considered to be "mitigated". However, we still allow late CPUs without
SSBS to be onlined, albeit with a "SANITY CHECK" warning. This is
problematic for userspace because it means that the system can quietly
transition to "Vulnerable" at runtime.

Avoid this by treating SSBS as a non-strict system feature: if all of
the CPUs discovered during boot have SSBS, then late arriving secondaries
better have it as well.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The is_ttbrX_addr() functions have somehow ended up in the middle of
the start_thread() functions, so move them out of the way to keep the
code readable.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

If the system is not affected by Spectre-v2, then advertise to the KVM
guest that it is not affected, without the need for a safelist in the
guest.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The Spectre-v2 mitigation code is pretty unwieldy and hard to maintain.
This is largely due to it being written hastily, without much clue as to
how things would pan out, and also because it ends up mixing policy and
state in such a way that it is very difficult to figure out what's going
on.

Rewrite the Spectre-v2 mitigation so that it clearly separates state from
policy and follows a more structured approach to handling the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The spectre mitigation code is spread over a few different files, which
makes it both hard to follow, but also hard to remove it should we want
to do that in future.

Introduce a new file for housing the spectre mitigations, and populate
it with the spectre-v1 reporting code to start with.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

For better or worse, the world knows about "Spectre" and not about
"Branch predictor hardening". Rename ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR to
ARM64_SPECTRE_V2 as part of moving all of the Spectre mitigations into
their own little corner.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Use is_hyp_mode_available() to detect whether or not we need to patch
the KVM vectors for branch hardening, which avoids the need to take the
vector pointers as parameters.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>