- 05 Sep, 2014 40 commits
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Alexander Usyskin authored
commit 8e8248b1 upstream. NFC will leak buffer if send failed. Use single exit point that does the freeing Signed-off-by:
Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Alexander Usyskin authored
commit 73ab4232 upstream. If connect request is queued (e.g. device in pg) set client state to initializing, thus avoid preliminary exit in wait if current state is disconnected. This is regression from: commit e4d8270e Author: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com> mei: set connecting state just upon connection request is sent to the fw Signed-off-by:
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Liu Bo authored
commit 9e0af237 upstream. This has been reported and discussed for a long time, and this hang occurs in both 3.15 and 3.16. Btrfs now migrates to use kernel workqueue, but it introduces this hang problem. Btrfs has a kind of work queued as an ordered way, which means that its ordered_func() must be processed in the way of FIFO, so it usually looks like -- normal_work_helper(arg) work = container_of(arg, struct btrfs_work, normal_work); work->func() <---- (we name it work X) for ordered_work in wq->ordered_list ordered_work->ordered_func() ordered_work->ordered_free() The hang is a rare case, first when we find free space, we get an uncached block group, then we go to read its free space cache inode for free space information, so it will file a readahead request btrfs_readpages() for page that is not in page cache __do_readpage() submit_extent_page() btrfs_submit_bio_hook() btrfs_bio_wq_end_io() submit_bio() end_workqueue_bio() <--(ret by the 1st endio) queue a work(named work Y) for the 2nd also the real endio() So the hang occurs when work Y's work_struct and work X's work_struct happens to share the same address. A bit more explanation, A,B,C -- struct btrfs_work arg -- struct work_struct kthread: worker_thread() pick up a work_struct from @worklist process_one_work(arg) worker->current_work = arg; <-- arg is A->normal_work worker->current_func(arg) normal_work_helper(arg) A = container_of(arg, struct btrfs_work, normal_work); A->func() A->ordered_func() A->ordered_free() <-- A gets freed B->ordered_func() submit_compressed_extents() find_free_extent() load_free_space_inode() ... <-- (the above readhead stack) end_workqueue_bio() btrfs_queue_work(work C) B->ordered_free() As if work A has a high priority in wq->ordered_list and there are more ordered works queued after it, such as B->ordered_func(), its memory could have been freed before normal_work_helper() returns, which means that kernel workqueue code worker_thread() still has worker->current_work pointer to be work A->normal_work's, ie. arg's address. Meanwhile, work C is allocated after work A is freed, work C->normal_work and work A->normal_work are likely to share the same address(I confirmed this with ftrace output, so I'm not just guessing, it's rare though). When another kthread picks up work C->normal_work to process, and finds our kthread is processing it(see find_worker_executing_work()), it'll think work C as a collision and skip then, which ends up nobody processing work C. So the situation is that our kthread is waiting forever on work C. Besides, there're other cases that can lead to deadlock, but the real problem is that all btrfs workqueue shares one work->func, -- normal_work_helper, so this makes each workqueue to have its own helper function, but only a wraper pf normal_work_helper. With this patch, I no long hit the above hang. Signed-off-by:
Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Chris Mason authored
commit f6dc45c7 upstream. We should only be flushing on close if the file was flagged as needing it during truncate. I broke this with my ordered data vs transaction commit deadlock fix. Thanks to Miao Xie for catching this. Signed-off-by:
Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Reported-by:
Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Liu Bo authored
commit 38c1c2e4 upstream. The crash is ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2124! [...] Workqueue: btrfs-endio normal_work_helper [btrfs] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa02d6055>] [<ffffffffa02d6055>] end_bio_extent_readpage+0xb45/0xcd0 [btrfs] This is in fact a regression. It is because we forgot to increase @offset properly in reading corrupted block, so that the @offset remains, and this leads to checksum errors while reading left blocks queued up in the same bio, and then ends up with hiting the above BUG_ON. Reported-by:
Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com> Signed-off-by:
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Chris Mason authored
commit 8d875f95 upstream. Truncates and renames are often used to replace old versions of a file with new versions. Applications often expect this to be an atomic replacement, even if they haven't done anything to make sure the new version is fully on disk. Btrfs has strict flushing in place to make sure that renaming over an old file with a new file will fully flush out the new file before allowing the transaction commit with the rename to complete. This ordering means the commit code needs to be able to lock file pages, and there are a few paths in the filesystem where we will try to end a transaction with the page lock held. It's rare, but these things can deadlock. This patch removes the ordered flushes and switches to a best effort filemap_flush like ext4 uses. It's not perfect, but it should fix the deadlocks. Signed-off-by:
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Liu Bo authored
commit ce62003f upstream. When failing to allocate space for the whole compressed extent, we'll fallback to uncompressed IO, but we've forgotten to redirty the pages which belong to this compressed extent, and these 'clean' pages will simply skip 'submit' part and go to endio directly, at last we got data corruption as we write nothing. Signed-off-by:
Martin Steigerwald <martin@lichtvoll.de> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 6f7ff6d7 upstream. Before processing the extent buffer, acquire a read lock on it, so that we're safe against concurrent updates on the extent buffer. Signed-off-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 27b9a812 upstream. Under rare circumstances we can end up leaving 2 versions of a checksum for the same file extent range. The reason for this is that after calling btrfs_next_leaf we process slot 0 of the leaf it returns, instead of processing the slot set in path->slots[0]. Most of the time (by far) path->slots[0] is 0, but after btrfs_next_leaf() releases the path and before it searches for the next leaf, another task might cause a split of the next leaf, which migrates some of its keys to the leaf we were processing before calling btrfs_next_leaf(). In this case btrfs_next_leaf() returns again the same leaf but with path->slots[0] having a slot number corresponding to the first new key it got, that is, a slot number that didn't exist before calling btrfs_next_leaf(), as the leaf now has more keys than it had before. So we must really process the returned leaf starting at path->slots[0] always, as it isn't always 0, and the key at slot 0 can have an offset much lower than our search offset/bytenr. For example, consider the following scenario, where we have: sums->bytenr: 40157184, sums->len: 16384, sums end: 40173568 four 4kb file data blocks with offsets 40157184, 40161280, 40165376, 40169472 Leaf N: slot = 0 slot = btrfs_header_nritems() - 1 |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | [(CSUM CSUM 39239680), size 8] ... [(CSUM CSUM 40116224), size 4] | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| Leaf N + 1: slot = 0 slot = btrfs_header_nritems() - 1 |--------------------------------------------------------------------| | [(CSUM CSUM 40161280), size 32] ... [((CSUM CSUM 40615936), size 8 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------| Because we are at the last slot of leaf N, we call btrfs_next_leaf() to find the next highest key, which releases the current path and then searches for that next key. However after releasing the path and before finding that next key, the item at slot 0 of leaf N + 1 gets moved to leaf N, due to a call to ctree.c:push_leaf_left() (via ctree.c:split_leaf()), and therefore btrfs_next_leaf() will returns us a path again with leaf N but with the slot pointing to its new last key (CSUM CSUM 40161280). This new version of leaf N is then: slot = 0 slot = btrfs_header_nritems() - 2 slot = btrfs_header_nritems() - 1 |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [(CSUM CSUM 39239680), size 8] ... [(CSUM CSUM 40116224), size 4] [(CSUM CSUM 40161280), size 32] | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| And incorrecly using slot 0, makes us set next_offset to 39239680 and we jump into the "insert:" label, which will set tmp to: tmp = min((sums->len - total_bytes) >> blocksize_bits, (next_offset - file_key.offset) >> blocksize_bits) = min((16384 - 0) >> 12, (39239680 - 40157184) >> 12) = min(4, (u64)-917504 = 18446744073708634112 >> 12) = 4 and ins_size = csum_size * tmp = 4 * 4 = 16 bytes. In other words, we insert a new csum item in the tree with key (CSUM_OBJECTID CSUM_KEY 40157184 = sums->bytenr) that contains the checksums for all the data (4 blocks of 4096 bytes each = sums->len). Which is wrong, because the item with key (CSUM CSUM 40161280) (the one that was moved from leaf N + 1 to the end of leaf N) contains the old checksums of the last 12288 bytes of our data and won't get those old checksums removed. So this leaves us 2 different checksums for 3 4kb blocks of data in the tree, and breaks the logical rule: Key_N+1.offset >= Key_N.offset + length_of_data_its_checksums_cover An obvious bad effect of this is that a subsequent csum tree lookup to get the checksum of any of the blocks with logical offset of 40161280, 40165376 or 40169472 (the last 3 4kb blocks of file data), will get the old checksums. Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 4eb1f66d upstream. We've got bug reports that btrfs crashes when quota is enabled on 32bit kernel, typically with the Oops like below: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000004 IP: [<f9234590>] find_parent_nodes+0x360/0x1380 [btrfs] *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 151 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G S W 3.15.2-1.gd43d97e-default #1 Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan normal_work_helper [btrfs] task: f1478130 ti: f147c000 task.ti: f147c000 EIP: 0060:[<f9234590>] EFLAGS: 00010213 CPU: 0 EIP is at find_parent_nodes+0x360/0x1380 [btrfs] EAX: f147dda8 EBX: f147ddb0 ECX: 00000011 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: f147dda4 EBP: f147ddf8 ESP: f147dd38 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 8005003b CR2: 00000004 CR3: 00bf3000 CR4: 00000690 Stack: 00000000 00000000 f147dda4 00000050 00000001 00000000 00000001 00000050 00000001 00000000 d3059000 00000001 00000022 000000a8 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000a1 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 11800000 Call Trace: [<f923564d>] __btrfs_find_all_roots+0x9d/0xf0 [btrfs] [<f9237bb1>] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x401/0x760 [btrfs] [<f9206148>] normal_work_helper+0xc8/0x270 [btrfs] [<c025e38b>] process_one_work+0x11b/0x390 [<c025eea1>] worker_thread+0x101/0x340 [<c026432b>] kthread+0x9b/0xb0 [<c0712a71>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x21/0x30 [<c0264290>] kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110 This indicates a NULL corruption in prefs_delayed list. The further investigation and bisection pointed that the call of ulist_add_merge() results in the corruption. ulist_add_merge() takes u64 as aux and writes a 64bit value into old_aux. The callers of this function in backref.c, however, pass a pointer of a pointer to old_aux. That is, the function overwrites 64bit value on 32bit pointer. This caused a NULL in the adjacent variable, in this case, prefs_delayed. Here is a quick attempt to band-aid over this: a new function, ulist_add_merge_ptr() is introduced to pass/store properly a pointer value instead of u64. There are still ugly void ** cast remaining in the callers because void ** cannot be taken implicitly. But, it's safer than explicit cast to u64, anyway. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=887046Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Stephen M. Cameron authored
commit 0758f4f7 upstream. When copy_from_user fails, return -EFAULT, not -ENOMEM Signed-off-by:
Stephen M. Cameron <scameron@beardog.cce.hp.com> Reported-by:
Robert Elliott <elliott@hp.com> Reviewed-by:
Joe Handzik <joseph.t.handzik@hp.com> Reviewed-by:
Scott Teel <scott.teel@hp.com> Reviewed by: Mike MIller <michael.miller@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
commit b38af472 upstream. Sasha Levin has shown oopses on ffffea0003480048 and ffffea0003480008 at mm/memory.c:1132, running Trinity on different 3.16-rc-next kernels: where zap_pte_range() checks page->mapping to see if PageAnon(page). Those addresses fit struct pages for pfns d2001 and d2000, and in each dump a register or a stack slot showed d2001730 or d2000730: pte flags 0x730 are PCD ACCESSED PROTNONE SPECIAL IOMAP; and Sasha's e820 map has a hole between cfffffff and 100000000, which would need special access. Commit c46a7c81 ("x86: define _PAGE_NUMA by reusing software bits on the PMD and PTE levels") has broken vm_normal_page(): a PROTNONE SPECIAL pte no longer passes the pte_special() test, so zap_pte_range() goes on to try to access a non-existent struct page. Fix this by refining pte_special() (SPECIAL with PRESENT or PROTNONE) to complement pte_numa() (SPECIAL with neither PRESENT nor PROTNONE). A hint that this was a problem was that c46a7c81 added pte_numa() test to vm_normal_page(), and moved its is_zero_pfn() test from slow to fast path: This was papering over a pte_special() snag when the zero page was encountered during zap. This patch reverts vm_normal_page() to how it was before, relying on pte_special(). It still appears that this patch may be incomplete: aren't there other places which need to be handling PROTNONE along with PRESENT? For example, pte_mknuma() clears _PAGE_PRESENT and sets _PAGE_NUMA, but on a PROT_NONE area, that would make it pte_special(). This is side-stepped by the fact that NUMA hinting faults skipped PROT_NONE VMAs and there are no grounds where a NUMA hinting fault on a PROT_NONE VMA would be interesting. Fixes: c46a7c81 ("x86: define _PAGE_NUMA by reusing software bits on the PMD and PTE levels") Reported-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Tested-by:
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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David Vrabel authored
commit 8d5999df upstream. If the timer irqs are resumed during device resume it is possible in certain circumstances for the resume to hang early on, before device interrupts are resumed. For an Ubuntu 14.04 PVHVM guest this would occur in ~0.5% of resume attempts. It is not entirely clear what is occuring the point of the hang but I think a task necessary for the resume calls schedule_timeout(), waiting for a timer interrupt (which never arrives). This failure may require specific tasks to be running on the other VCPUs to trigger (processes are not frozen during a suspend/resume if PREEMPT is disabled). Add IRQF_EARLY_RESUME to the timer interrupts so they are resumed in syscore_resume(). Signed-off-by:
David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Vrabel authored
commit 7d951f3c upstream. Commit b7dd0e35 (x86/xen: safely map and unmap grant frames when in atomic context) causes PVH guests to crash in arch_gnttab_map_shared() when they attempted to map the pages for the grant table. This use of a PV-specific function during the PVH grant table setup is non-obvious and not needed. The standard vmap() function does the right thing. Signed-off-by:
Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Tested-by:
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Matt Fleming authored
commit 7b2a583a upstream. Without CONFIG_RELOCATABLE the early boot code will decompress the kernel to LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. While this may have been fine in the BIOS days, that isn't going to fly with UEFI since parts of the firmware code/data may be located at LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. Straying outside of the bounds of the regions we've explicitly requested from the firmware will cause all sorts of trouble. Bruno reports that his machine resets while trying to decompress the kernel image. We already go to great pains to ensure the kernel is loaded into a suitably aligned buffer, it's just that the address isn't necessarily LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, because we can't guarantee that address isn't in-use by the firmware. Explicitly enforce CONFIG_RELOCATABLE for the EFI boot stub, so that we can load the kernel at any address with the correct alignment. Reported-by:
Bruno Prémont <bonbons@linux-vserver.org> Tested-by:
Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Vrabel authored
commit dcecb8fd upstream. When using the FIFO-based ABI on x86_64, if the last port is at the end of an event array page then sync_test_bit() on this port's event word will read beyond the end of the page and in certain circumstances this may fault. The fault requires the following page in the kernel's direct mapping to be not present, which would mean: a) the array page is the last page of RAM; or b) the following page is ballooned out /and/ it has been used for a foreign mapping by a kernel driver (such as netback or blkback) /and/ the grant has been unmapped. Use the infrastructure added for arm64 to ensure that all bitops operating on event words are unsigned long aligned. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit ed5c41d3 upstream. Commit ea431643 ("x86/mce: Fix CMCI preemption bugs") breaks RT by the completely unrelated conversion of the cmci_discover_lock to a regular (non raw) spinlock. This lock was annotated in commit 59d958d2 ("locking, x86: mce: Annotate cmci_discover_lock as raw") with a proper explanation why. The argument for converting the lock back to a regular spinlock was: - it does percpu ops without disabling preemption. Preemption is not disabled due to the mistaken use of a raw spinlock. Which is complete nonsense. The raw_spinlock is disabling preemption in the same way as a regular spinlock. In mainline spinlock maps to raw_spinlock, in RT spinlock becomes a "sleeping" lock. raw_spinlock has on RT exactly the same semantics as in mainline. And because this lock is taken in non preemptible context it must be raw on RT. Undo the locking brainfart. Reported-by:
Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com> Reported-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit 0b9e7b74 upstream. commit 28e13446 "[SCSI] hpsa: enable unit attention reporting" turns on unit attention notifications, but got the change wrong for all architectures other than x86, which now store an uninitialized value into the device register. Gcc helpfully warns about this: ../drivers/scsi/hpsa.c: In function 'hpsa_set_driver_support_bits': ../drivers/scsi/hpsa.c:6373:17: warning: 'driver_support' is used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized] driver_support |= ENABLE_UNIT_ATTN; ^ This moves the #ifdef so only the prefetch-enable is conditional on x86, not also reading the initial register contents. Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Fixes: 28e13446 "[SCSI] hpsa: enable unit attention reporting" Acked-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 53b884ac upstream. This commit in Linux 3.6: commit c767a54b Author: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Date: Mon May 21 19:50:07 2012 -0700 x86/debug: Add KERN_<LEVEL> to bare printks, convert printks to pr_<level> caused warn_bad_vsyscall to output garbage in the middle of the line. Revert the bad part of it. The printk in question isn't actually bare; the level is "%s". The bug this fixes is purely cosmetic; backports are optional. Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/03eac1f24110bbe496ecc12a4df467e0d88466d4.1406330947.git.luto@amacapital.netSigned-off-by:
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brian W Hart authored
commit a32305bf upstream. powerpc defines various machine-specific routines for handling pci_set_dma_mask(). The routines for machine "PowerNV" may neglect to set dev->dma_mask. This could confuse anyone (e.g. drivers) that consult dev->dma_mask to find the current mask. Set the dma_mask in the PowerNV leaf routine. Signed-off-by:
Brian W. Hart <hartb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
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Tyrel Datwyler authored
commit 73400565 upstream. Commit bcdde7e2 made __sysfs_remove_dir() recursive and introduced a BUG_ON during PHB removal while attempting to delete the power managment attribute group of the bus. This is a result of tearing the bridge and bus devices down out of order in remove_phb_dynamic. Since, the the bus resides below the bridge in the sysfs device tree it should be torn down first. This patch simply moves the device_unregister call for the PHB bridge device after the device_unregister call for the PHB bus. Fixes: bcdde7e2 ("sysfs: make __sysfs_remove_dir() recursive") Signed-off-by:
Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mike Qiu authored
commit 9e5c6e5a upstream. pci_get_slot() is called with hold of PCI bus semaphore and it's not safe to be called in interrupt context. However, we possibly checks EEH error and calls the function in interrupt context. To avoid using pci_get_slot(), we turn into device tree for fetching location code. Otherwise, we might run into WARN_ON() as following messages indicate: WARNING: at drivers/pci/search.c:223 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc3+ #72 task: c000000001367af0 ti: c000000001444000 task.ti: c000000001444000 NIP: c000000000497b70 LR: c000000000037530 CTR: 000000003003d114 REGS: c000000001446fa0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (3.16.0-rc3+) MSR: 9000000000029032 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 48002422 XER: 20000000 CFAR: c00000000003752c SOFTE: 0 : NIP [c000000000497b70] .pci_get_slot+0x40/0x110 LR [c000000000037530] .eeh_pe_loc_get+0x150/0x190 Call Trace: .of_get_property+0x30/0x60 (unreliable) .eeh_pe_loc_get+0x150/0x190 .eeh_dev_check_failure+0x1b4/0x550 .eeh_check_failure+0x90/0xf0 .lpfc_sli_check_eratt+0x504/0x7c0 [lpfc] .lpfc_poll_eratt+0x64/0x100 [lpfc] .call_timer_fn+0x64/0x190 .run_timer_softirq+0x2cc/0x3e0 Signed-off-by:
Mike Qiu <qiudayu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christoph Schulz authored
commit cbace46a upstream. Commit 30919b0b ("x86: avoid low BIOS area when allocating address space") moved the test for resource allocations that fall within the first 1MB of address space from the PCI-specific path to a generic path, such that all resource allocations will avoid this area. However, this breaks ISA cards which need to allocate a memory region within the first 1MB. An example is the i82365 PCMCIA controller and derivatives like the Ricoh RF5C296/396 which map part of the PCMCIA socket memory address space into the first 1MB of system memory address space. They do not work anymore as no usable memory region exists due to this change: Intel ISA PCIC probe: Ricoh RF5C296/396 ISA-to-PCMCIA at port 0x3e0 ofs 0x00, 2 sockets host opts [0]: none host opts [1]: none ISA irqs (scanned) = 3,4,5,9,10 status change on irq 10 pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: pccard: PCMCIA card inserted into slot 1 pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: IO port probe 0xc00-0xcff: excluding 0xcf8-0xcff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: IO port probe 0xa00-0xaff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: IO port probe 0x100-0x3ff: excluding 0x170-0x177 0x1f0-0x1f7 0x2f8-0x2ff 0x370-0x37f 0x3c0-0x3e7 0x3f0-0x3ff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: memory probe 0x0a0000-0x0affff: excluding 0xa0000-0xaffff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: memory probe 0x0b0000-0x0bffff: excluding 0xb0000-0xbffff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: memory probe 0x0c0000-0x0cffff: excluding 0xc0000-0xcbfff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: memory probe 0x0d0000-0x0dffff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: memory probe 0x0e0000-0x0effff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: memory probe 0x60000000-0x60ffffff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket0: cs: memory probe 0xa0000000-0xa0ffffff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: IO port probe 0xc00-0xcff: excluding 0xcf8-0xcff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: IO port probe 0xa00-0xaff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: IO port probe 0x100-0x3ff: excluding 0x170-0x177 0x1f0-0x1f7 0x2f8-0x2ff 0x370-0x37f 0x3c0-0x3e7 0x3f0-0x3ff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: memory probe 0x0a0000-0x0affff: excluding 0xa0000-0xaffff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: memory probe 0x0b0000-0x0bffff: excluding 0xb0000-0xbffff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: memory probe 0x0c0000-0x0cffff: excluding 0xc0000-0xcbfff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: memory probe 0x0d0000-0x0dffff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: memory probe 0x0e0000-0x0effff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: memory probe 0x60000000-0x60ffffff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: memory probe 0xa0000000-0xa0ffffff: clean. pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: memory probe 0x0cc000-0x0effff: excluding 0xe0000-0xeffff pcmcia_socket pcmcia_socket1: cs: unable to map card memory! If filtering out the first 1MB is reverted, everything works as expected. Tested-by:
Robert Resch <fli4l@robert.reschpara.de> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Schulz <develop@kristov.de> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Simone Gotti authored
commit dcfa9be8 upstream. Fix errors in handling "device label" _DSM return values. If _DSM returns a Unicode string, the ACPI type is ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER, not ACPI_TYPE_STRING. Fix dsm_label_utf16s_to_utf8s() to convert UTF-16 from acpi_object->buffer instead of acpi_object->string. Prior to v3.14, we accepted Unicode labels (ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER return values). But after 1d0fcef7, we accepted only ASCII (ACPI_TYPE_STRING) (and we incorrectly tried to convert those ASCII labels from UTF-16 to UTF-8). Rejecting Unicode labels made us return -EPERM when reading sysfs "acpi_index" or "label" files, which in turn caused on-board network interfaces on a Dell PowerEdge E420 to be renamed (by udev net_id internal) from eno1/eno2 to enp2s0f0/enp2s0f1. Fix this by accepting either ACPI_TYPE_STRING (and treating it as ASCII) or ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER (and converting from UTF-16 to UTF-8). [bhelgaas: changelog] Fixes: 1d0fcef7 ("ACPI / PCI: replace open-coded _DSM code with helper functions") Signed-off-by:
Simone Gotti <simone.gotti@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Myron Stowe authored
commit 0d25d35c upstream. During PCIe hot-plug initialization - pciehp_probe() - data structures related to slot capabilities are set up. As part of this set up, ISRs are put in place to handle slot events and all event bits are cleared out. This patch adds the Data Link Layer State Changed (PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_DLLSC) Slot Status bit to the event bits that are cleared out during initialization. If the BIOS doesn't clear DLLSC before handoff to the OS, pciehp notices that it's set and interprets it as a new Link Up event, which results in spurious messages: pciehp 0000:82:04.0:pcie24: slot(4): Link Up event pciehp 0000:82:04.0:pcie24: Device 0000:83:00.0 already exists at 0000:83:00, cannot hot-add pciehp 0000:82:04.0:pcie24: Cannot add device at 0000:83:00 Prior to e48f1b67 ("PCI: pciehp: Use link change notifications for hot-plug and removal"), pciehp ignored DLLSC. Reference: PCI-SIG. PCI Express Base Specification Revision 4.0 Version 0.3 (PCI-SIG, 2014): 7.8.11. Slot Status Register (Offset 1Ah). [bhelgaas: add e48f1b67 ref and stable tag] Fixes: e48f1b67 ("PCI: pciehp: Use link change notifications for hot-plug and removal") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79611Signed-off-by:
Myron Stowe <myron.stowe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Guo Chao authored
commit c3337708 upstream. If we have space assigned to a resource, we try to expand the resource (e.g., to accommodate SR-IOV resources), and the expansion attempt fails, we should keep the original assignment. After bd064f0a ("PCI: Mark resources as IORESOURCE_UNSET if we can't assign them"), we left the resource marked IORESOURCE_UNSET when the expansion failed, even if it had originally been set. That caused errors like this: pci 0003:00:00.0: can't enable device: BAR 15 [mem size 0x0c000000 64bit pref] not assigned pci 0003:00:00.0: Error enabling bridge (-22), continuing Fix this by restoring the original flags when reassignment fails. [bhelgaas: reworked to simplify, changelog] Fixes: bd064f0a ("PCI: Mark resources as IORESOURCE_UNSET if we can't assign them") Signed-off-by:
Guo Chao <yan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vidya Sagar authored
commit 1f6ae47e upstream. We can't do ASPM configuration at enumeration-time because enabling it makes some defective hardware unresponsive, even if ASPM is disabled later (see 41cd766b ("PCI: Don't enable aspm before drivers have had a chance to veto it"). Therefore, we have to do it after a driver claims the device. We previously configured ASPM in pci_set_power_state(), but that's not a very good place because it's not really related to setting the PCI device power state, and doing it there means: - We incorrectly skipped ASPM config when setting a device that's already in D0 to D0. - We unnecessarily configured ASPM when setting a device to a low-power state (the ASPM feature only applies when the device is in D0). - We unnecessarily configured ASPM when called from a .resume() method (ASPM configuration needs to be restored during resume, but pci_restore_pcie_state() should already do this). Move ASPM configuration from pci_set_power_state() to do_pci_enable_device() so we do it when a driver enables a device. [bhelgaas: changelog] Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79621 Fixes: db288c9c ("PCI / PM: restore the original behavior of pci_set_power_state()") Suggested-by:
Vidya Sagar <sagar.tv@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 37dbeab7 upstream. Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 5fc540ed upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 6dc14baf upstream. bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=82912Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit c99d1e6e upstream. If we suffer a block allocation failure (for example due to a memory allocation failure), it's possible that we will call ext4_discard_allocated_blocks() before we've actually allocated any blocks. In that case, fe_len and fe_start in ac->ac_f_ex will still be zero, and this will result in mb_free_blocks(inode, e4b, 0, 0) triggering the BUG_ON on mb_free_blocks(): BUG_ON(last >= (sb->s_blocksize << 3)); Fix this by bailing out of ext4_discard_allocated_blocks() if fs_len is zero. Also fix a missing ext4_mb_unload_buddy() call in ext4_discard_allocated_blocks(). Google-Bug-Id: 16844242 Fixes: 86f0afd4Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by:
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Michael S. Tsirkin authored
commit 350b8bdd upstream. The third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages is wrong, It should be 'gfn - slot->base_gfn'. By making gfn very large, malicious guest or userspace can cause kvm to go to this error path, and subsequently to pass a huge value as size. Alternatively if gfn is small, then pages would be pinned but never unpinned, causing host memory leak and local DOS. Passing a reasonable but large value could be the most dangerous case, because it would unpin a page that should have stayed pinned, and thus allow the device to DMA into arbitrary memory. However, this cannot happen because of the condition that can trigger the error: - out of memory (where you can't allocate even a single page) should not be possible for the attacker to trigger - when exceeding the iommu's address space, guest pages after gfn will also exceed the iommu's address space, and inside kvm_iommu_put_pages() the iommu_iova_to_phys() will fail. The page thus would not be unpinned at all. Reported-by:
Jack Morgenstein <jackm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 0d234daf upstream. This reverts commit 682367c4, which causes 32-bit SMP Windows 7 guests to panic. SeaBIOS has a limit on the number of MTRRs that it can handle, and this patch exceeded the limit. Better revert it. Thanks to Nadav Amit for debugging the cause. Reported-by:
Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Wanpeng Li authored
commit 56cc2406 upstream. After commit 77b0f5d6 (KVM: nVMX: Ack and write vector info to intr_info if L1 asks us to), "Acknowledge interrupt on exit" behavior can be emulated. To do so, KVM will ask the APIC for the interrupt vector if during a nested vmexit if VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT is set. With APICv, kvm_get_apic_interrupt would return -1 and give the following WARNING: Call Trace: [<ffffffff81493563>] dump_stack+0x49/0x5e [<ffffffff8103f0eb>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7c/0x96 [<ffffffffa059709a>] ? nested_vmx_vmexit+0xa4/0x233 [kvm_intel] [<ffffffff8103f11a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x15/0x17 [<ffffffffa059709a>] nested_vmx_vmexit+0xa4/0x233 [kvm_intel] [<ffffffffa0594295>] ? nested_vmx_exit_handled+0x6a/0x39e [kvm_intel] [<ffffffffa0537931>] ? kvm_apic_has_interrupt+0x80/0xd5 [kvm] [<ffffffffa05972ec>] vmx_check_nested_events+0xc3/0xd3 [kvm_intel] [<ffffffffa051ebe9>] inject_pending_event+0xd0/0x16e [kvm] [<ffffffffa051efa0>] vcpu_enter_guest+0x319/0x704 [kvm] To fix this, we cannot rely on the processor's virtual interrupt delivery, because "acknowledge interrupt on exit" must only update the virtual ISR/PPR/IRR registers (and SVI, which is just a cache of the virtual ISR) but it should not deliver the interrupt through the IDT. Thus, KVM has to deliver the interrupt "by hand", similar to the treatment of EOI in commit fc57ac2c (KVM: lapic: sync highest ISR to hardware apic on EOI, 2014-05-14). The patch modifies kvm_cpu_get_interrupt to always acknowledge an interrupt; there are only two callers, and the other is not affected because it is never reached with kvm_apic_vid_enabled() == true. Then it modifies apic_set_isr and apic_clear_irr to update SVI and RVI in addition to the registers. Suggested-by:
"Zhang, Yang Z" <yang.z.zhang@intel.com> Tested-by:
Liu, RongrongX <rongrongx.liu@intel.com> Tested-by:
Felipe Reyes <freyes@suse.com> Fixes: 77b0f5d6Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
commit a0840240 upstream. Unfortunately, the LPCR got defined as a 32-bit register in the one_reg interface. This is unfortunate because KVM allows userspace to control the DPFD (default prefetch depth) field, which is in the upper 32 bits. The result is that DPFD always get set to 0, which reduces performance in the guest. We can't just change KVM_REG_PPC_LPCR to be a 64-bit register ID, since that would break existing userspace binaries. Instead we define a new KVM_REG_PPC_LPCR_64 id which is 64-bit. Userspace can still use the old KVM_REG_PPC_LPCR id, but it now only modifies those fields in the bottom 32 bits that userspace can modify (ILE, TC and AIL). If userspace uses the new KVM_REG_PPC_LPCR_64 id, it can modify DPFD as well. Signed-off-by:
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by:
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Christian Borntraeger authored
commit 55e4283c upstream. commit ec66ad66 (s390/mm: enable split page table lock for PMD level) activated the split pmd lock for s390. Turns out that we missed one place: We also have to take the pmd lock instead of the page table lock when we reallocate the page tables (==> changing entries in the PMD) during sie enablement. Signed-off-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 0f6c0a74 upstream. Currently, the EOI exit bitmap (used for APICv) does not include interrupts that are masked. However, this can cause a bug that manifests as an interrupt storm inside the guest. Alex Williamson reported the bug and is the one who really debugged this; I only wrote the patch. :) The scenario involves a multi-function PCI device with OHCI and EHCI USB functions and an audio function, all assigned to the guest, where both USB functions use legacy INTx interrupts. As soon as the guest boots, interrupts for these devices turn into an interrupt storm in the guest; the host does not see the interrupt storm. Basically the EOI path does not work, and the guest continues to see the interrupt over and over, even after it attempts to mask it at the APIC. The bug is only visible with older kernels (RHEL6.5, based on 2.6.32 with not many changes in the area of APIC/IOAPIC handling). Alex then tried forcing bit 59 (corresponding to the USB functions' IRQ) on in the eoi_exit_bitmap and TMR, and things then work. What happens is that VFIO asserts IRQ11, then KVM recomputes the EOI exit bitmap. It does not have set bit 59 because the RTE was masked, so the IOAPIC never sees the EOI and the interrupt continues to fire in the guest. My guess was that the guest is masking the interrupt in the redirection table in the interrupt routine, i.e. while the interrupt is set in a LAPIC's ISR, The simplest fix is to ignore the masking state, we would rather have an unnecessary exit rather than a missed IRQ ACK and anyway IOAPIC interrupts are not as performance-sensitive as for example MSIs. Alex tested this patch and it fixed his bug. [Thanks to Alex for his precise description of the problem and initial debugging effort. A lot of the text above is based on emails exchanged with him.] Reported-by:
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Tested-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 9e8919ae upstream. Return unhandlable error on inter-privilege level ret instruction. This is since the current emulation does not check the privilege level correctly when loading the CS, and does not pop RSP/SS as needed. Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by:
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Steven Rostedt authored
commit 485d4402 upstream. [ I'm currently running my tests on it now, and so far, after a few hours it has yet to blow up. I'll run it for 24 hours which it never succeeded in the past. ] The tracing code has a way to make directories within the debugfs file system as well as deleting them using mkdir/rmdir in the instance directory. This is very limited in functionality, such as there is no renames, and the parent directory "instance" can not be modified. The tracing code creates the instance directory from the debugfs code and then replaces the dentry->d_inode->i_op with its own to allow for mkdir/rmdir to work. When these are called, the d_entry and inode locks need to be released to call the instance creation and deletion code. That code has its own accounting and locking to serialize everything to prevent multiple users from causing harm. As the parent "instance" directory can not be modified this simplifies things. I created a stress test that creates several threads that randomly creates and deletes directories thousands of times a second. The code stood up to this test and I submitted it a while ago. Recently I added a new test that adds readers to the mix. While the instance directories were being added and deleted, readers would read from these directories and even enable tracing within them. This test was able to trigger a bug: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: ... CPU: 3 PID: 17789 Comm: rmdir Tainted: G W 3.15.0-rc2-test+ #41 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS SDBLI944.86P 05/08/2007 task: ffff88003786ca60 ti: ffff880077018000 task.ti: ffff880077018000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ed5eb>] [<ffffffff811ed5eb>] debugfs_remove_recursive+0x1bd/0x367 RSP: 0018:ffff880077019df8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88006f0fe490 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: dead000000100058 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff88003786d454 RBP: ffff88006f0fe640 R08: 0000000000000628 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000628 R11: ffff8800795110a0 R12: ffff88006f0fe640 R13: ffff88006f0fe640 R14: ffffffff81817d0b R15: ffffffff818188b7 FS: 00007ff13ae24700(0000) GS:ffff88007d580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000003054ec7be0 CR3: 0000000076d51000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 Stack: ffff88007a41ebe0 dead000000100058 00000000fffffffe ffff88006f0fe640 0000000000000000 ffff88006f0fe678 ffff88007a41ebe0 ffff88003793a000 00000000fffffffe ffffffff810bde82 ffff88006f0fe640 ffff88007a41eb28 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810bde82>] ? instance_rmdir+0x15b/0x1de [<ffffffff81132e2d>] ? vfs_rmdir+0x80/0xd3 [<ffffffff81132f51>] ? do_rmdir+0xd1/0x139 [<ffffffff8124ad9e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3c [<ffffffff814fea62>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: fe ff ff 48 8d 75 30 48 89 df e8 c9 fd ff ff 85 c0 75 13 48 c7 c6 b8 cc d2 81 48 c7 c7 b0 cc d2 81 e8 8c 7a f5 ff 48 8b 54 24 08 <48> 8b 82 a8 00 00 00 48 89 d3 48 2d a8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 RIP [<ffffffff811ed5eb>] debugfs_remove_recursive+0x1bd/0x367 RSP <ffff880077019df8> It took a while, but every time it triggered, it was always in the same place: list_for_each_entry_safe(child, next, &parent->d_subdirs, d_u.d_child) { Where the child->d_u.d_child seemed to be corrupted. I added lots of trace_printk()s to see what was wrong, and sure enough, it was always the child's d_u.d_child field. I looked around to see what touches it and noticed that in __dentry_kill() which calls dentry_free(): static void dentry_free(struct dentry *dentry) { /* if dentry was never visible to RCU, immediate free is OK */ if (!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_RCUACCESS)) __d_free(&dentry->d_u.d_rcu); else call_rcu(&dentry->d_u.d_rcu, __d_free); } I also noticed that __dentry_kill() unlinks the child->d_u.child under the parent->d_lock spin_lock. Looking back at the loop in debugfs_remove_recursive() it never takes the parent->d_lock to do the list walk. Adding more tracing, I was able to prove this was the issue: ftrace-t-15385 1.... 246662024us : dentry_kill <ffffffff81138b91>: free ffff88006d573600 rmdir-15409 2.... 246662024us : debugfs_remove_recursive <ffffffff811ec7e5>: child=ffff88006d573600 next=dead000000100058 The dentry_kill freed ffff88006d573600 just as the remove recursive was walking it. In order to fix this, the list walk needs to be modified a bit to take the parent->d_lock. The safe version is no longer necessary, as every time we remove a child, the parent->d_lock must be released and the list walk must start over. Each time a child is removed, even though it may still be on the list, it should be skipped by the first check in the loop: if (!debugfs_positive(child)) continue; Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit e1f8859e upstream. The interrupt handler in the ux500 crypto driver has an obviously incorrect way to access the data buffer, which for a while has caused this build warning: ../ux500/cryp/cryp_core.c: In function 'cryp_interrupt_handler': ../ux500/cryp/cryp_core.c:234:5: warning: passing argument 1 of '__fswab32' makes integer from pointer without a cast [enabled by default] writel_relaxed(ctx->indata, ^ In file included from ../include/linux/swab.h:4:0, from ../include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:12, from ../include/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:4, from ../arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/byteorder.h:19, from ../include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:5, from ../arch/arm/include/asm/bitops.h:340, from ../include/linux/bitops.h:33, from ../include/linux/kernel.h:10, from ../include/linux/clk.h:16, from ../drivers/crypto/ux500/cryp/cryp_core.c:12: ../include/uapi/linux/swab.h:57:119: note: expected '__u32' but argument is of type 'const u8 *' static inline __attribute_const__ __u32 __fswab32(__u32 val) There are at least two, possibly three problems here: a) when writing into the FIFO, we copy the pointer rather than the actual data we want to give to the hardware b) the data pointer is an array of 8-bit values, while the FIFO is 32-bit wide, so both the read and write access fail to do a proper type conversion c) This seems incorrect for big-endian kernels, on which we need to byte-swap any register access, but not normally FIFO accesses, at least the DMA case doesn't do it either. This converts the bogus loop to use the same readsl/writesl pair that we use for the two other modes (DMA and polling). This is more efficient and consistent, and probably correct for endianess. The bug has existed since the driver was first merged, and was probably never detected because nobody tried to use interrupt mode. It might make sense to backport this fix to stable kernels, depending on how the crypto maintainers feel about that. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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