- 05 Jan, 2016 8 commits
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Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
[ Upstream commit 0e615e96 ] When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example: unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192): comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4.... ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300 [<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910 [<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0 [<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90 [<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0 [<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction. Signed-off-by:
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by:
Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 6900317f ] David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin: (Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.) [ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314 cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr; [ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7 [ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...] [ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8 [ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8 [ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60 [ 1002.296176] Call Trace: [ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57 [ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60 [ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300 [ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930 [ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60 [ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50 [ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60 [ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0 [ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80 [ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40 [ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85 Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets. In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)), where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the control buffer. When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4 bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will overflow in scm_detach_fds(): int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level); if (!err) err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type); if (!err) err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len); if (!err) { cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding msg->msg_control += cmlen; msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ... } ... wrap-around F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes. In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries as well. In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen elsewhere. Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253). Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good! Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg()) and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller, and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control - old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen in the example). Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7a ("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory overflow"). RFC3542, section 20.2. says: The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an application may or may not include padding at the end of last ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation may set MSG_CTRUNC. Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do the same as in 1ac70e7a to avoid an overflow. Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?), thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by David and HacKurx). No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree). Reported-by:
David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz> Reported-by:
HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7e ] Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller) generated program that triggers the WARNING at net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() : WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt && !(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC))); His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange, that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization. Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings. Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a01 ] When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add() with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway) But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid following splat : [ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090934] [ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795: [ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90 [ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500 [ 8451.090958] [ 8451.090958] stack backtrace: [ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_ [ 8451.091215] Call Trace: [ 8451.091216] <IRQ> [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76 [ 8451.091229] [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110 [ 8451.091235] [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0 [ 8451.091239] [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0 [ 8451.091242] [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190 [ 8451.091246] [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500 [ 8451.091249] [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190 [ 8451.091253] [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0 [ 8451.091256] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091260] [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0 [ 8451.091263] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091267] [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80 [ 8451.091270] [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700 [ 8451.091273] [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0 [ 8451.091277] [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90 Fixes: a8afca03 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU") Signed-off-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bjørn Mork authored
[ Upstream commit 68242a5a ] Thomas reports " 4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name. .. The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega" .. Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for network and MI01\6 for modem. .. echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32 S: Manufacturer=USB Modem S: Product=USB Modem S: SerialNumber= C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage Now all important things are there: wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at) There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at. The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager. " Reported-by:
Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de> Signed-off-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
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Neil Horman authored
[ Upstream commit 41033f02 ] the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its not needed Validated by the reporter, with good results Signed-off-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by:
Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com> CC: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com> CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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lucien authored
[ Upstream commit ed5a377d ] now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs. even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(): if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) return -EOPNOTSUPP; so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility. Fixes: 65b07e5d ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit c72219b7 ] In case no struct sockaddr_ll has been passed to packet socket's sendmsg() when doing a TX_RING flush run, then skb->protocol is set to po->num instead, which is the protocol passed via socket(2)/bind(2). Applications only xmitting can go the path of allocating the socket as socket(PF_PACKET, <mode>, 0) and do a bind(2) on the TX_RING with sll_protocol of 0. That way, register_prot_hook() is neither called on creation nor on bind time, which saves cycles when there's no interest in capturing anyway. That leaves us however with po->num 0 instead and therefore the TX_RING flush run sets skb->protocol to 0 as well. Eric reported that this leads to problems when using tools like trafgen over bonding device. I.e. the bonding's hash function could invoke the kernel's flow dissector, which depends on skb->protocol being properly set. In the current situation, all the traffic is then directed to a single slave. Fix it up by inferring skb->protocol from the Ethernet header when not set and we have ARPHRD_ETHER device type. This is only done in case of SOCK_RAW and where we have a dev->hard_header_len length. In case of ARPHRD_ETHER devices, this is guaranteed to cover ETH_HLEN, and therefore being accessed on the skb after the skb_store_bits(). Reported-by:
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- 15 Dec, 2015 2 commits
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit efdfa2f7 ] In tpacket_fill_skb() commit c1aad275 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit") and later on 40893fd0 ("net: switch to use skb_probe_transport_header()") was probing for a transport header on the skb from a ring buffer slot, but at a time, where the skb has _not even_ been filled with data yet. So that call into the flow dissector is pretty useless. Lets do it after we've set up the skb frags. Fixes: c1aad275 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit") Reported-by:
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Rainer Weikusat authored
[ Upstream commit 7d267278 ] Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes: An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a wait queue with epoll. Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring that no blocked writer sleeps forever. Signed-off-by:
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> Fixes: ec0d215f ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets") Reviewed-by:
Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Dec, 2015 3 commits
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James Hogan authored
commit 585bb8f9 upstream. If either of the memory allocations in kvm_arch_vcpu_create() fail, the vcpu which has been allocated and kvm_vcpu_init'd doesn't get uninit'd in the error handling path. Add a call to kvm_vcpu_uninit() to fix this. Fixes: 669e846e ("KVM/MIPS32: MIPS arch specific APIs for KVM") Signed-off-by:
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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James Hogan authored
commit c5c2a3b9 upstream. The immediate field of the CACHE instruction is signed, so ensure that it gets sign extended by casting it to an int16_t rather than just masking the low 16 bits. Fixes: e685c689 ("KVM/MIPS32: Privileged instruction/target branch emulation.") Signed-off-by:
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James Hogan authored
commit 002374f3 upstream. ASID restoration on guest resume should determine the guest execution mode based on the guest Status register rather than bit 30 of the guest PC. Fix the two places in locore.S that do this, loading the guest status from the cop0 area. Note, this assembly is specific to the trap & emulate implementation of KVM, so it doesn't need to check the supervisor bit as that mode is not implemented in the guest. Fixes: b680f70f ("KVM/MIPS32: Entry point for trampolining to...") Signed-off-by:
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- 30 Nov, 2015 1 commit
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Michal Kubeček authored
commit ebac62fe upstream. Both tunnel6_protocol and tunnel46_protocol share the same error handler, tunnel6_err(), which traverses through tunnel6_handlers list. For ipip6 tunnels, we need to traverse tunnel46_handlers as we do e.g. in tunnel46_rcv(). Current code can generate an ICMPv6 error message with an IPv4 packet embedded in it. Fixes: 73d605d1 ("[IPSEC]: changing API of xfrm6_tunnel_register") Signed-off-by:
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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- 23 Nov, 2015 1 commit
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Jiri Slaby authored
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- 18 Nov, 2015 10 commits
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Yasuaki Ishimatsu authored
commit 9661d5bc upstream. When hot-adding/removing memory, sync_global_pgds() is called for synchronizing PGD to PGD entries of all processes MM. But when hot-removing memory, sync_global_pgds() does not work correctly. At first, sync_global_pgds() checks whether target PGD is none or not. And if PGD is none, the PGD is skipped. But when hot-removing memory, PGD may be none since PGD may be cleared by free_pud_table(). So when sync_global_pgds() is called after hot-removing memory, sync_global_pgds() should not skip PGD even if the PGD is none. And sync_global_pgds() must clear PGD entries of all processes MM. Currently sync_global_pgds() does not clear PGD entries of all processes MM when hot-removing memory. So when hot adding memory which is same memory range as removed memory after hot-removing memory, following call traces are shown: kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/init_64.c:206! ... [<ffffffff815e0c80>] kernel_physical_mapping_init+0x1b2/0x1d2 [<ffffffff815ced94>] init_memory_mapping+0x1d4/0x380 [<ffffffff8104aebd>] arch_add_memory+0x3d/0xd0 [<ffffffff815d03d9>] add_memory+0xb9/0x1b0 [<ffffffff81352415>] acpi_memory_device_add+0x1af/0x28e [<ffffffff81325dc4>] acpi_bus_device_attach+0x8c/0xf0 [<ffffffff813413b9>] acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0xc8/0x17f [<ffffffff81325d38>] ? acpi_bus_type_and_status+0xb7/0xb7 [<ffffffff81325d38>] ? acpi_bus_type_and_status+0xb7/0xb7 [<ffffffff813418ed>] acpi_walk_namespace+0x95/0xc5 [<ffffffff81326b4c>] acpi_bus_scan+0x9a/0xc2 [<ffffffff81326bff>] acpi_scan_bus_device_check+0x8b/0x12e [<ffffffff81326cb5>] acpi_scan_device_check+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff81320122>] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x25/0x32 [<ffffffff8107e02b>] process_one_work+0x17b/0x460 [<ffffffff8107edfb>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x400 [<ffffffff8107ece0>] ? rescuer_thread+0x400/0x400 [<ffffffff81085aef>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0 [<ffffffff81085a20>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140 [<ffffffff815fc76c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81085a20>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140 This patch clears PGD entries of all processes MM when sync_global_pgds() is called after hot-removing memory Signed-off-by:
Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by:
Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Gu Zheng <guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yasuaki Ishimatsu authored
commit 5255e0a7 upstream. When hot-adding memory after hot-removing memory, following call traces are shown: kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/init_64.c:206! ... [<ffffffff815e0c80>] kernel_physical_mapping_init+0x1b2/0x1d2 [<ffffffff815ced94>] init_memory_mapping+0x1d4/0x380 [<ffffffff8104aebd>] arch_add_memory+0x3d/0xd0 [<ffffffff815d03d9>] add_memory+0xb9/0x1b0 [<ffffffff81352415>] acpi_memory_device_add+0x1af/0x28e [<ffffffff81325dc4>] acpi_bus_device_attach+0x8c/0xf0 [<ffffffff813413b9>] acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0xc8/0x17f [<ffffffff81325d38>] ? acpi_bus_type_and_status+0xb7/0xb7 [<ffffffff81325d38>] ? acpi_bus_type_and_status+0xb7/0xb7 [<ffffffff813418ed>] acpi_walk_namespace+0x95/0xc5 [<ffffffff81326b4c>] acpi_bus_scan+0x9a/0xc2 [<ffffffff81326bff>] acpi_scan_bus_device_check+0x8b/0x12e [<ffffffff81326cb5>] acpi_scan_device_check+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff81320122>] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x25/0x32 [<ffffffff8107e02b>] process_one_work+0x17b/0x460 [<ffffffff8107edfb>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x400 [<ffffffff8107ece0>] ? rescuer_thread+0x400/0x400 [<ffffffff81085aef>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0 [<ffffffff81085a20>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140 [<ffffffff815fc76c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81085a20>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140 The patch-set fixes the issue. This patch (of 2): remove_pagetable() gets start argument and passes the argument to sync_global_pgds(). In this case, the argument must not be modified. If the argument is modified and passed to sync_global_pgds(), sync_global_pgds() does not correctly synchronize PGD to PGD entries of all processes MM since synchronized range of memory [start, end] is wrong. Unfortunately the start argument is modified in remove_pagetable(). So this patch fixes the issue. Signed-off-by:
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Marcelo Leitner authored
commit 77751427 upstream. Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet drops. If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values too small, but not for too big ones.) The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU. Note that similar check is already performed at ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA. Signed-off-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 4be4de7e upstream. Replace the current canonical address check with the new function which is identical. Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 7e46dddd upstream. Commit d1442d85 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps") introduced a bug that caused the fix to be incomplete. Due to incorrect evaluation, far jump to segment with L bit cleared (i.e., 32-bit segment) and RIP with any of the high bits set (i.e, RIP[63:32] != 0) set may not trigger #GP. As we know, this imposes a security problem. In addition, the condition for two warnings was incorrect. Fixes: d1442d85Reported-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit cbdb967a upstream. This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104). VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS, it already intercepts #DB unconditionally. Reported-by:
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Northup authored
commit 54a20552 upstream. It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the effects (CVE-2015-5307). Signed-off-by:
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
commit c9cdd085 upstream. Defining XE, XM and VE vector numbers. Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit f05819df upstream. The following sequence of commands: i=`keyctl add user a a @s` keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t keyctl unlink $i @s tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty() on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error. Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names list - which oopses like this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 ... Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40 RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000 ... CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY. The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully instantiated. Reported-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by:
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David Howells authored
commit 94c4554b upstream. There appears to be a race between: (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0 (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up). Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data - including key->security. Reported-by:
Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Nov, 2015 15 commits
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Ilya Dryomov authored
commit 6d69bb53 upstream. Mapping an image with a long parent chain (e.g. image foo, whose parent is bar, whose parent is baz, etc) currently leads to a kernel stack overflow, due to the following recursion in the reply path: rbd_osd_req_callback() rbd_obj_request_complete() rbd_img_obj_callback() rbd_img_parent_read_callback() rbd_obj_request_complete() ... Limit the parent chain to 16 images, which is ~5K worth of stack. When the above recursion is eliminated, this limit can be lifted. Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/12538Signed-off-by:
Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Josh Durgin <jdurgin@redhat.com> [idryomov@gmail.com: backport to 3.10: rbd_dev->opts, context] Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Ilya Dryomov authored
commit 1f2c6651 upstream. Currently we leak parent_spec and trigger a "parent reference underflow" warning if rbd_dev_create() in rbd_dev_probe_parent() fails. The problem is we take the !parent out_err branch and that only drops refcounts; parent_spec that would've been freed had we called rbd_dev_unparent() remains and triggers rbd_warn() in rbd_dev_parent_put() - at that point we have parent_spec != NULL and parent_ref == 0, so counter ends up being -1 after the decrement. Redo rbd_dev_probe_parent() to fix this. Signed-off-by:
Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Florian Fainelli authored
commit d836ace6 upstream. DSA expects the host_dev pointer to be the device structure associated with the MDIO bus controller driver. First commit breaking that was c3a07134 ("mv643xx_eth: convert to use the Marvell Orion MDIO driver"), and then, it got completely under the radar for a while. Reported-by:
Frans van de Wiel <fvdw@fvdw.eu> Fixes: c3a07134 ("mv643xx_eth: convert to use the Marvell Orion MDIO driver") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Hurley authored
commit 7fd6f640 upstream. Trying to write console output from within the serial console driver while the port->lock is held causes recursive deadlock: CPU 0 spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock) printk() console_unlock() call_console_drivers() serial8250_console_write() spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock) ** DEADLOCK ** The 8250_dw i/o accessors try to write a console error message if the LCR workaround was unsuccessful. When the port->lock is already held (eg., when called from serial8250_set_termios()), this deadlocks. Make the error message a FIXME until a general solution is devised. Cc: Tim Kryger <tim.kryger@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Zhang Zhen <zhenzhang.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by:
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hayeswang authored
commit b51ecea8 upstream. For RTL8411, RTL8111G, RTL8402, RTL8105, and RTL8106, disable the feature of entering the L2/L3 link state of the PCIe. When the nic starts the process of entering the L2/L3 link state and the PCI reset occurs before the work is finished, the work would be queued and continue after the next the PCI reset occurs. This causes the device stays in L2/L3 link state, and the system couldn't find the device. Signed-off-by:
Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com> Acked-by:
Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com> Signed-off-by:
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hayeswang authored
commit f75761b6 upstream. The tx descriptor version of RTL8111B belong to RTL_TD_0. Signed-off-by:
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Wei Yongjun authored
commit 06a2feb9 upstream. Add missing platform_set_drvdata() in mace_probe(), otherwise calling platform_get_drvdata() in mac_mace_device_remove() may returns NULL. Signed-off-by:
Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Signed-off-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
commit 2670cc69 upstream. Upon reception of a new frame, the emac driver checks for a number of error conditions, and flag the packet as "bad" if any of these are present. It then allocates a skb unconditionally, but only uses it if the packet is "good". On the error path, the skb is just forgotten, and the system leaks memory. The piece of junk I have on my desk seems to encounter such error frequently enough so that the box goes OOM after a couple of days, which makes me grumpy. Fix this by moving the allocation on the "good_packet" path (and convert it to netdev_alloc_skb while we're at it). Tested on a random Allwinner A20 board. Cc: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de> Cc: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by:
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Acked-by:
Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yan, Zheng authored
commit 282c1052 upstream. __do_request() may unregister the request. So we should update iterator 'p' before calling __do_request() Signed-off-by:
"Yan, Zheng" <zheng.z.yan@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yan, Zheng authored
commit 656e4382 upstream. Signed-off-by:
"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yan, Zheng authored
commit 03974e81 upstream. we may corrupt waiting list if a request in the waiting list is kicked. Signed-off-by:
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Ani Sinha authored
commit 6a2a2b3a upstream. Linux manpage for recvmsg and sendmsg calls does not explicitly mention setting msg_namelen to 0 when msg_name passed set as NULL. When developers don't set msg_namelen member in msghdr, it might contain garbage value which will fail the validation check and sendmsg and recvmsg calls from kernel will return EINVAL. This will break old binaries and any code for which there is no access to source code. To fix this, we set msg_namelen to 0 when msg_name is passed as NULL from userland. Signed-off-by:
Ani Sinha <ani@arista.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vasily Averin authored
commit aff09ce3 upstream. Currently bridge can silently drop ipv4 fragments. If node have loaded nf_defrag_ipv4 module but have no nf_conntrack_ipv4, br_nf_pre_routing defragments incoming ipv4 fragments but nfct check in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit does not allow re-fragment combined packet back, and therefore it is dropped in br_dev_queue_push_xmit without incrementing of any failcounters It seems the only way to hit the ip_fragment code in the bridge xmit path is to have a fragment list whose reassembled fragments go over the mtu. This only happens if nf_defrag is enabled. Thanks to Florian Westphal for providing feedback to clarify this. Defragmentation ipv4 is required not only in conntracks but at least in TPROXY target and socket match, therefore #ifdef is changed from NF_CONNTRACK_IPV4 to NF_DEFRAG_IPV4 Signed-off-by:
Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Anton Blanchard authored
commit 733187e2 upstream. commit f13c13a0 (powerpc: Stop using non-architected shared_proc field in lppaca) fixed a potential issue with shared/dedicated partition detection. The old method of detection relied on an unarchitected field (shared_proc), and this patch switched to using something architected (a non zero yield_count). Unfortunately the assertion in the Linux header that yield_count is only non zero on shared processor partitions is not true. It turns out dedicated processor partitions can increment yield_count and as such we falsely detect dedicated partitions as shared. Fix the comment, and switch back to using the old method. Signed-off-by:
Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
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Holger Eitzenberger authored
commit d9547773 upstream. V3 of the NFQUEUE target ignores the --queue-bypass flag, causing packets to be dropped when the userspace listener isn't running. Regression is in since 8746ddcf ("netfilter: xt_NFQUEUE: introduce CPU fanout"). Reported-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
Holger Eitzenberger <holger@eitzenberger.org> Signed-off-by:
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