- 16 Jun, 2021 26 commits
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Alex Vesker authored
Decapsulation L3 on small inner packets which are less than 64 Bytes was done incorrectly. In small packets there is an extra padding added in L2 which should not be included in L3 length. The issue was that after decapL3 the extra L2 padding caused an update on the L3 length. To avoid this issue the new header is pushed to the beginning of the packet (offset 0) which should not cause a HW reparse and update the L3 length. Fixes: c349b413 ("net/mlx5: DR, Add STEv1 modify header logic") Reviewed-by:
Erez Shitrit <erezsh@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by:
Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Vesker <valex@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Parav Pandit authored
When auxiliary bus autoprobe is disabled and SF is in ACTIVE state, on SF port deletion it transitions from ACTIVE->ALLOCATED->INVALID. When VHCA event handler queries the state, it is already transition to INVALID state. In this scenario, event handler missed to delete the SF device. Fix it by deleting the SF when SF state is INVALID. Fixes: 90d010b8 ("net/mlx5: SF, Add auxiliary device support") Signed-off-by:
Parav Pandit <parav@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by:
Vu Pham <vuhuong@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
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Parav Pandit authored
E-switch should be able to set the GUID of host PF vport. Currently it returns an error. This results in below error when user attempts to configure MAC address of the PF of an external controller. $ devlink port function set pci/0000:03:00.0/196608 \ hw_addr 00:00:00:11:22:33 mlx5_core 0000:03:00.0: mlx5_esw_set_vport_mac_locked:1876:(pid 6715):\ "Failed to set vport 0 node guid, err = -22. RDMA_CM will not function properly for this VF." Check for zero vport is no longer needed. Fixes: 330077d1 ("net/mlx5: E-switch, Supporting setting devlink port function mac address") Signed-off-by:
Yuval Avnery <yuvalav@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
Bodong Wang <bodong@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by:
Alaa Hleihel <alaa@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
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Parav Pandit authored
External controller PF's MAC address is not read from the device during vport setup. Fail to read this results in showing all zeros to user while the factory programmed MAC is a valid value. $ devlink port show eth1 -jp { "port": { "pci/0000:03:00.0/196608": { "type": "eth", "netdev": "eth1", "flavour": "pcipf", "controller": 1, "pfnum": 0, "splittable": false, "function": { "hw_addr": "00:00:00:00:00:00" } } } } Hence, read it when enabling a vport. After the fix, $ devlink port show eth1 -jp { "port": { "pci/0000:03:00.0/196608": { "type": "eth", "netdev": "eth1", "flavour": "pcipf", "controller": 1, "pfnum": 0, "splittable": false, "function": { "hw_addr": "98:03:9b:a0:60:11" } } } } Fixes: f099fde1 ("net/mlx5: E-switch, Support querying port function mac address") Signed-off-by: -
Leon Romanovsky authored
The device can be requested to be attached despite being not probed. This situation is possible if devlink reload races with module removal, and the following kernel panic is an outcome of such race. mlx5_core 0000:00:09.0: firmware version: 4.7.9999 mlx5_core 0000:00:09.0: 0.000 Gb/s available PCIe bandwidth (8.0 GT/s PCIe x255 link) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffff0 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 3218067 P4D 3218067 PUD 321a067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 7 PID: 250 Comm: devlink Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2+ #2836 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5_attach_device+0x80/0x280 [mlx5_core] Code: f8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 80 01 00 00 48 8b 45 68 48 8d 78 f0 48 89 fe 48 c1 ee 03 42 80 3c 3e 00 0f 85 70 01 00 00 <48> 8b 40 f0 48 85 c0 74 0d 48 89 ef ff d0 85 c0 0f 85 84 05 0e 00 RSP: 0018:ffff8880129675f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff827407f1 RDX: 1ffff110011336cf RSI: 1ffffffffffffffe RDI: fffffffffffffff0 RBP: ffff888008e0c000 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: ffffffffa0662ee7 R10: fffffbfff40cc5dc R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88800ea002e0 R13: ffffed1001d459f7 R14: ffffffffa05ef4f8 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f51dfeaf740(0000) GS:ffff88806d5c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffffffffffff0 CR3: 000000000bc82006 CR4: 0000000000370ea0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: mlx5_load_one+0x117/0x1d0 [mlx5_core] devlink_reload+0x2d5/0x520 ? devlink_remote_reload_actions_performed+0x30/0x30 ? mutex_trylock+0x24b/0x2d0 ? devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0x62b/0x1070 devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0x66d/0x1070 ? devlink_reload+0x520/0x520 ? devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x64/0x4d0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1e9/0x2f0 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1130/0x1130 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x240/0x240 ? security_capable+0x51/0x90 genl_rcv_msg+0x27f/0x4a0 ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? lock_acquire+0x1a9/0x6d0 ? devlink_reload+0x520/0x520 ? lock_release+0x6c0/0x6c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? netlink_ack+0x9f0/0x9f0 ? lock_release+0x1f9/0x6c0 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x433/0x700 ? netlink_attachskb+0x730/0x730 ? _copy_from_iter_full+0x178/0x650 ? __alloc_skb+0x113/0x2b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x6f1/0xbd0 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0 __sys_sendto+0x193/0x240 ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0 ? copy_page_range+0x2300/0x2300 ? __up_read+0x1a1/0x7b0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x219/0xdc0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f51dffb514a Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 83 ec 30 44 89 4c RSP: 002b:00007ffcaef22e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f51dffb514a RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: 000055750daf2440 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000055750daf2410 R08: 00007f51e0081200 R09: 000000000000000c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Modules linked in: mlx5_core(-) ptp pps_core ib_ipoib rdma_ucm rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_umad ib_uverbs ib_core [last unloaded: mlx5_ib] CR2: fffffffffffffff0 ---[ end trace 7789831bfe74fa42 ]--- Fixes: a925b5e3 ("net/mlx5: Register mlx5 devices to auxiliary virtual bus") Signed-off-by:
Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by:
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Leon Romanovsky authored
In the case of the failure to execute mlx5_core_set_hca_defaults(), we used wrong goto label to execute error unwind flow. Fixes: 5bef709d ("net/mlx5: Enable host PF HCA after eswitch is initialized") Reviewed-by:
Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally reading across neighboring array fields. The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array. Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds checking. Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Kees Cook authored
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally reading across neighboring array fields. The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array. Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds checking. Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally reading across neighboring array fields. The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array. Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds checking. Signed-off-by:
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Andrea Righi authored
udpgro_fwd.sh contains many bash specific operators ("[[", "local -r"), but it's using /bin/sh; in some distro /bin/sh is mapped to /bin/dash, that doesn't support such operators. Force the test to use /bin/bash explicitly and prevent false positive test failures. Signed-off-by:Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
While unix_may_send(sk, osk) is called while osk is locked, it appears unix_release_sock() can overwrite unix_peer() after this lock has been released, making KCSAN unhappy. Changing unix_release_sock() to access/change unix_peer() before lock is released should fix this issue. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_dgram_sendmsg / unix_release_sock write to 0xffff88810465a338 of 8 bytes by task 20852 on cpu 1: unix_release_sock+0x4ed/0x6e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:558 unix_release+0x2f/0x50 net/unix/af_unix.c:859 __sock_release net/socket.c:599 [inline] sock_close+0x6c/0x150 net/socket.c:1258 __fput+0x25b/0x4e0 fs/file_table.c:280 ____fput+0x11/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313 task_work_run+0xae/0x130 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:175 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x156/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:209 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:302 do_syscall_64+0x56/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:57 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff88810465a338 of 8 bytes by task 20888 on cpu 0: unix_may_send net/unix/af_unix.c:189 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x923/0x1610 net/unix/af_unix.c:1712 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffff888167905400 -> 0x0000000000000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 20888 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andrea Righi authored
veth.sh is a shell script that uses /bin/sh; some distro (Ubuntu for example) use dash as /bin/sh and in this case the test reports the following error: # ./veth.sh: 21: local: -r: bad variable name # ./veth.sh: 21: local: -r: bad variable name This happens because dash doesn't support the option "-r" with local. Moreover, in case of missing bpf object, the script is exiting -1, that is an illegal number for dash: exit: Illegal number: -1 Change the script to be compatible both with bash and dash and prevent the errors above. Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
Eric Dumazet says: ==================== net/packet: annotate data races KCSAN sent two reports about data races in af_packet. Nothing serious, but worth fixing. ==================== Signed-off-by: -
Eric Dumazet authored
Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po->ifindex For instance, packet_getname() is reading po->ifindex (twice) while another thread is able to change po->ifindex. KCSAN reported: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1: packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0: packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525 __sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline] __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show() can read po->num without holding a lock. This means other threads can change po->num at the same time. KCSAN complained about this known fact [1] Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0: packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1: packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x1200 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
Merge tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-5.13-20210616' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can Marc Kleine-Budde says: ==================== pull-request: can 2021-06-16 this is a pull request of 4 patches for net/master. The first patch is by Oleksij Rempel and fixes a Use-after-Free found by syzbot in the j1939 stack. The next patch is by Tetsuo Handa and fixes hung task detected by syzbot in the bcm, raw and isotp protocols. Norbert Slusarek's patch fixes a infoleak in bcm's struct bcm_msg_head. Pavel Skripkin's patch fixes a memory leak in the mcba_usb driver. ==================== Signed-off-by:
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Chengyang Fan authored
BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888101bc4c00 (size 32): comm "syz-executor527", pid 360, jiffies 4294807421 (age 19.329s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ac 14 14 bb 00 00 02 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000f17c5244>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:558 [inline] [<00000000f17c5244>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:688 [inline] [<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add1_src net/ipv4/igmp.c:1971 [inline] [<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add_src+0x95f/0xdb0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2095 [<000000001cb99709>] ip_mc_source+0x84c/0xea0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2416 [<0000000052cf19ed>] do_ip_setsockopt net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1294 [inline] [<0000000052cf19ed>] ip_setsockopt+0x114b/0x30c0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1423 [<00000000477edfbc>] raw_setsockopt+0x13d/0x170 net/ipv4/raw.c:857 [<00000000e75ca9bb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x158/0x270 net/socket.c:2117 [<00000000bdb993a8>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2128 [inline] [<00000000bdb993a8>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2125 [inline] [<00000000bdb993a8>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2125 [<000000006a1ffdbd>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [<00000000b11467c4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae In commit 24803f38 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info when set link down"), the ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() was removed, because it was also called in igmpv3_clear_delrec(). Rough callgraph: inetdev_destroy -> ip_mc_destroy_dev -> igmpv3_clear_delrec -> ip_mc_clear_src -> RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->ip_ptr, NULL) However, ip_mc_clear_src() called in igmpv3_clear_delrec() doesn't release in_dev->mc_list->sources. And RCU_INIT_POINTER() assigns the NULL to dev->ip_ptr. As a result, in_dev cannot be obtained through inetdev_by_index() and then in_dev->mc_list->sources cannot be released by ip_mc_del1_src() in the sock_close. Rough call sequence goes like: sock_close -> __sock_release -> inet_release -> ip_mc_drop_socket -> inetdev_by_index -> ip_mc_leave_src -> ip_mc_del_src -> ip_mc_del1_src So we still need to call ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() to free in_dev->mc_list->sources. Fixes: 24803f38 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info ...") Reported-by:Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Chengyang Fan <cy.fan@huawei.com> Acked-by:
Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
Joakim Zhang says: ==================== net: fixes for fec ptp Small fixes for fec ptp. ==================== Signed-off-by: -
Joakim Zhang authored
Commit da722186 ("net: fec: set GPR bit on suspend by DT configuration.") refactor the fec_devtype, need adjust ptp driver accordingly. Fixes: da722186 ("net: fec: set GPR bit on suspend by DT configuration.") Signed-off-by:
Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com> Signed-off-by:
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Fugang Duan authored
Add clock rate zero check to fix coverity issue of "divide by 0". Fixes: commit 85bd1798 ("net: fec: fix spin_lock dead lock") Signed-off-by:
Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dongliang Mu authored
The commit 46a8b29c ("net: usb: fix memory leak in smsc75xx_bind") fails to clean up the work scheduled in smsc75xx_reset-> smsc75xx_set_multicast, which leads to use-after-free if the work is scheduled to start after the deallocation. In addition, this patch also removes a dangling pointer - dev->data[0]. This patch calls cancel_work_sync to cancel the scheduled work and set the dangling pointer to NULL. Fixes: 46a8b29c ("net: usb: fix memory leak in smsc75xx_bind") Signed-off-by:
Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Joakim Zhang authored
Platform drivers may call stmmac_probe_config_dt() to parse dt, could call stmmac_remove_config_dt() in error handing after dt parsed, so need disable clocks in stmmac_remove_config_dt(). Go through all platforms drivers which use stmmac_probe_config_dt(), none of them disable clocks manually, so it's safe to disable them in stmmac_remove_config_dt(). Fixes: commit d2ed0a77 ("net: ethernet: stmmac: fix of-node and fixed-link-phydev leaks") Signed-off-by:
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Pavel Skripkin authored
Syzbot reported memory leak in SocketCAN driver for Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer Tool. The problem was in unfreed usb_coherent. In mcba_usb_start() 20 coherent buffers are allocated and there is nothing, that frees them: 1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all 2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER is not set (see mcba_usb_start) and this flag cannot be used with coherent buffers. Fail log: | [ 1354.053291][ T8413] mcba_usb 1-1:0.0 can0: device disconnected | [ 1367.059384][ T8420] kmemleak: 20 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmem) So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent() explicitly NOTE: The same pattern for allocating and freeing coherent buffers is used in drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_core.c Fixes: 51f3baad ("can: mcba_usb: Add support for Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609215833.30393-1-paskripkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+57281c762a3922e14dfe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Norbert Slusarek authored
On 64-bit systems, struct bcm_msg_head has an added padding of 4 bytes between struct members count and ival1. Even though all struct members are initialized, the 4-byte hole will contain data from the kernel stack. This patch zeroes out struct bcm_msg_head before usage, preventing infoleaks to userspace. Fixes: ffd980f9 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/trinity-7c1b2e82-e34f-4885-8060-2cd7a13769ce-1623532166177@3c-app-gmx-bs52 Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net> Acked-by:
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
syzbot is reporting hung task at register_netdevice_notifier() [1] and unregister_netdevice_notifier() [2], for cleanup_net() might perform time consuming operations while CAN driver's raw/bcm/isotp modules are calling {register,unregister}_netdevice_notifier() on each socket. Change raw/bcm/isotp modules to call register_netdevice_notifier() from module's __init function and call unregister_netdevice_notifier() from module's __exit function, as with gw/j1939 modules are doing. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=391b9498827788b3cc6830226d4ff5be87107c30 [1] Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1724d278c83ca6e6df100a2e320c10d991cf2bce [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/54a5f451-05ed-f977-8534-79e7aa2bcc8f@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by:syzbot <syzbot+355f8edb2ff45d5f95fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzbot+0f1827363a305f74996f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Tested-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by:
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Oleksij Rempel authored
This patch fixes a Use-after-Free found by the syzbot. The problem is that a skb is taken from the per-session skb queue, without incrementing the ref count. This leads to a Use-after-Free if the skb is taken concurrently from the session queue due to a CTS. Fixes: 9d71dd0c ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210521115720.7533-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+220c1a29987a9a490903@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+45199c1b73b4013525cf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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- 15 Jun, 2021 6 commits
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpfDavid S. Miller authored
Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf 2021-06-15 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree. We've added 5 non-merge commits during the last 11 day(s) which contain a total of 10 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Fix marking incorrect umem ring as done in libbpf's xsk_socket__create_shared() helper, from Kev Jackson. 2) Fix oob leakage under a spectre v1 type confusion attack, from Daniel Borkmann. ==================== Signed-off-by: -
Aleksander Jan Bajkowski authored
The previous commit didn't fix the bug properly. By mistake, it replaces the pointer of the next skb in the descriptor ring instead of the current one. As a result, the two descriptors are assigned the same SKB. The error is seen during the iperf test when skb_put tries to insert a second packet and exceeds the available buffer. Fixes: c7718ee9 ("net: lantiq: fix memory corruption in RX ring ") Signed-off-by:
Aleksander Jan Bajkowski <olek2@wp.pl> Signed-off-by:
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Kristian Evensen authored
When the QMI_WWAN_FLAG_PASS_THROUGH is set, netif_rx() is called from qmi_wwan_rx_fixup(). When the call to netif_rx() is successful (which is most of the time), usbnet_skb_return() is called (from rx_process()). usbnet_skb_return() will then call netif_rx() a second time for the same skb. Simplify the code and avoid the redundant netif_rx() call by changing qmi_wwan_rx_fixup() to always return 1 when QMI_WWAN_FLAG_PASS_THROUGH is set. We then leave it up to the existing infrastructure to call netif_rx(). Suggested-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Maciej Żenczykowski authored
This is meant to make the host side cdc_ncm interface consistently named just like the older CDC protocols: cdc_ether & cdc_ecm (and even rndis_host), which all use 'FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_POINTTOPOINT'. include/linux/usb/usbnet.h: #define FLAG_ETHER 0x0020 /* maybe use "eth%d" names */ #define FLAG_WLAN 0x0080 /* use "wlan%d" names */ #define FLAG_WWAN 0x0400 /* use "wwan%d" names */ #define FLAG_POINTTOPOINT 0x1000 /* possibly use "usb%d" names */ drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c @ line 1711: strcpy (net->name, "usb%d"); ... // heuristic: "usb%d" for links we know are two-host, // else "eth%d" when there's reasonable doubt. userspace // can rename the link if it knows better. if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_ETHER) != 0 && ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_POINTTOPOINT) == 0 || (net->dev_addr [0] & 0x02) == 0)) strcpy (net->name, "eth%d"); /* WLAN devices should always be named "wlan%d" */ if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WLAN) != 0) strcpy(net->name, "wlan%d"); /* WWAN devices should always be named "wwan%d" */ if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WWAN) != 0) strcpy(net->name, "wwan%d"); So by using ETHER | POINTTOPOINT the interface naming is either usb%d or eth%d based on the global uniqueness of the mac address of the device. Without this 2.5gbps ethernet dongles which all seem to use the cdc_ncm driver end up being called usb%d instead of eth%d even though they're definitely not two-host. (All 1gbps & 5gbps ethernet usb dongles I've tested don't hit this problem due to use of different drivers, primarily r8152 and aqc111) Fixes tag is based purely on git blame, and is really just here to make sure this hits LTS branches newer than v4.5. Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Fixes: 4d06dd53 ("cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind") Signed-off-by:Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Changbin Du authored
The function get_net_ns_by_fd() could be inlined when NET_NS is not enabled. Signed-off-by:
Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jakub Kicinski authored
Scaled PPM conversion to PPB may (on 64bit systems) result in a value larger than s32 can hold (freq/scaled_ppm is a long). This means the kernel will not correctly reject unreasonably high ->freq values (e.g. > 4294967295ppb, 281474976645 scaled PPM). The conversion is equivalent to a division by ~66 (65.536), so the value of ppb is always smaller than ppm, but not small enough to assume narrowing the type from long -> s32 is okay. Note that reasonable user space (e.g. ptp4l) will not use such high values, anyway, 4289046510ppb ~= 4.3x, so the fix is somewhat pedantic. Fixes: d39a7435 ("ptp: validate the requested frequency adjustment.") Fixes: d94ba80e ("ptp: Added a brand new class driver for ptp clocks.") Signed-off-by:
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Jun, 2021 8 commits
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Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan authored
Update the function prototype of mhi_ndo_xmit to match ndo_start_xmit. This otherwise leads to run time failures when CFI is enabled in kernel. Fixes: 3ffec6a1 ("net: Add mhi-net driver") Signed-off-by:
Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
In almost all cases from test_verifier that have been changed in here, we've had an unreachable path with a load from a register which has an invalid address on purpose. This was basically to make sure that we never walk this path and to have the verifier complain if it would otherwise. Change it to match on the right error for unprivileged given we now test these paths under speculative execution. There's one case where we match on exact # of insns_processed. Due to the extra path, this will of course mismatch on unprivileged. Thus, restrict the test->insn_processed check to privileged-only. In one other case, we result in a 'pointer comparison prohibited' error. This is similarly due to verifying an 'invalid' branch where we end up with a value pointer on one side of the comparison. Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by:
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
The verifier only enumerates valid control-flow paths and skips paths that are unreachable in the non-speculative domain. And so it can miss issues under speculative execution on mispredicted branches. For example, a type confusion has been demonstrated with the following crafted program: // r0 = pointer to a map array entry // r6 = pointer to readable stack slot // r9 = scalar controlled by attacker 1: r0 = *(u64 *)(r0) // cache miss 2: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 4 3: r6 = r9 4: if r0 != 0x1 goto line 6 5: r9 = *(u8 *)(r6) 6: // leak r9 Since line 3 runs iff r0 == 0 and line 5 runs iff r0 == 1, the verifier concludes that the pointer dereference on line 5 is safe. But: if the attacker trains both the branches to fall-through, such that the following is speculatively executed ... r6 = r9 r9 = *(u8 *)(r6) // leak r9 ... then the program will dereference an attacker-controlled value and could leak its content under speculative execution via side-channel. This requires to mistrain the branch predictor, which can be rather tricky, because the branches are mutually exclusive. However such training can be done at congruent addresses in user space using different branches that are not mutually exclusive. That is, by training branches in user space ... A: if r0 != 0x0 goto line C B: ... C: if r0 != 0x0 goto line D D: ... ... such that addresses A and C collide to the same CPU branch prediction entries in the PHT (pattern history table) as those of the BPF program's lines 2 and 4, respectively. A non-privileged attacker could simply brute force such collisions in the PHT until observing the attack succeeding. Alternative methods to mistrain the branch predictor are also possible that avoid brute forcing the collisions in the PHT. A reliable attack has been demonstrated, for example, using the following crafted program: // r0 = pointer to a [control] map array entry // r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0), training/attack phase // r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 8), oob address // [...] // r0 = pointer to a [data] map array entry 1: if r7 == 0x3 goto line 3 2: r8 = r0 // crafted sequence of conditional jumps to separate the conditional // branch in line 193 from the current execution flow 3: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 5 4: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit 5: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 7 6: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit [...] 187: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 189 188: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit // load any slowly-loaded value (due to cache miss in phase 3) ... 189: r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0x1200) // ... and turn it into known zero for verifier, while preserving slowly- // loaded dependency when executing: 190: r3 &= 1 191: r3 &= 2 // speculatively bypassed phase dependency 192: r7 += r3 193: if r7 == 0x3 goto exit 194: r4 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0) // leak r4 As can be seen, in training phase (phase != 0x3), the condition in line 1 turns into false and therefore r8 with the oob address is overridden with the valid map value address, which in line 194 we can read out without issues. However, in attack phase, line 2 is skipped, and due to the cache miss in line 189 where the map value is (zeroed and later) added to the phase register, the condition in line 193 takes the fall-through path due to prior branch predictor training, where under speculation, it'll load the byte at oob address r8 (unknown scalar type at that point) which could then be leaked via side-channel. One way to mitigate these is to 'branch off' an unreachable path, meaning, the current verification path keeps following the is_branch_taken() path and we push the other branch to the verification stack. Given this is unreachable from the non-speculative domain, this branch's vstate is explicitly marked as speculative. This is needed for two reasons: i) if this path is solely seen from speculative execution, then we later on still want the dead code elimination to kick in in order to sanitize these instructions with jmp-1s, and ii) to ensure that paths walked in the non-speculative domain are not pruned from earlier walks of paths walked in the speculative domain. Additionally, for robustness, we mark the registers which have been part of the conditional as unknown in the speculative path given there should be no assumptions made on their content. The fix in here mitigates type confusion attacks described earlier due to i) all code paths in the BPF program being explored and ii) existing verifier logic already ensuring that given memory access instruction references one specific data structure. An alternative to this fix that has also been looked at in this scope was to mark aux->alu_state at the jump instruction with a BPF_JMP_TAKEN state as well as direction encoding (always-goto, always-fallthrough, unknown), such that mixing of different always-* directions themselves as well as mixing of always-* with unknown directions would cause a program rejection by the verifier, e.g. programs with constructs like 'if ([...]) { x = 0; } else { x = 1; }' with subsequent 'if (x == 1) { [...] }'. For unprivileged, this would result in only single direction always-* taken paths, and unknown taken paths being allowed, such that the former could be patched from a conditional jump to an unconditional jump (ja). Compared to this approach here, it would have two downsides: i) valid programs that otherwise are not performing any pointer arithmetic, etc, would potentially be rejected/broken, and ii) we are required to turn off path pruning for unprivileged, where both can be avoided in this work through pushing the invalid branch to the verification stack. The issue was originally discovered by Adam and Ofek, and later independently discovered and reported as a result of Benedict and Piotr's research work. Fixes: b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by:Adam Morrison <mad@cs.tau.ac.il> Reported-by:
Ofek Kirzner <ofekkir@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Reported-by:
Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
... in such circumstances, we do not want to mark the instruction as seen given the goal is still to jmp-1 rewrite/sanitize dead code, if it is not reachable from the non-speculative path verification. We do however want to verify it for safety regardless. With the patch as-is all the insns that have been marked as seen before the patch will also be marked as seen after the patch (just with a potentially different non-zero count). An upcoming patch will also verify paths that are unreachable in the non-speculative domain, hence this extension is needed. Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
Instead of relying on current env->pass_cnt, use the seen count from the old aux data in adjust_insn_aux_data(), and expand it to the new range of patched instructions. This change is valid given we always expand 1:n with n>=1, so what applies to the old/original instruction needs to apply for the replacement as well. Not relying on env->pass_cnt is a prerequisite for a later change where we want to avoid marking an instruction seen when verified under speculative execution path. Signed-off-by:
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetoothDavid S. Miller authored
Luiz Augusto von Dentz says: ==================== bluetooth pull request for net: - Fix crash on SMP when debug is enabled ==================== Signed-off-by: -
Luiz Augusto von Dentz authored
When receiving a new connection pchan->conn won't be initialized so the code cannot use bt_dev_dbg as the pointer to hci_dev won't be accessible. Fixes: 2e1614f7 ("Bluetooth: SMP: Convert BT_ERR/BT_DBG to bt_dev_err/bt_dev_dbg") Signed-off-by:
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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Pavel Skripkin authored
Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds Read in qrtr_endpoint_post. The problem was in wrong _size_ type: if (len != ALIGN(size, 4) + hdrlen) goto err; If size from qrtr_hdr is 4294967293 (0xfffffffd), the result of ALIGN(size, 4) will be 0. In case of len == hdrlen and size == 4294967293 in header this check won't fail and skb_put_data(skb, data + hdrlen, size); will read out of bound from data, which is hdrlen allocated block. Fixes: 194ccc88 ("net: qrtr: Support decoding incoming v2 packets") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1917d778024161609247@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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