- 22 Jul, 2020 31 commits
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Dinghao Liu authored
commit 0187294d upstream. When devm_regmap_init_i2c() returns an error code, a pairing runtime PM usage counter decrement is needed to keep the counter balanced. For error paths after ak8974_set_power(), ak8974_detect() and ak8974_reset(), things are the same. However, When iio_triggered_buffer_setup() returns an error code, there will be two PM usgae counter decrements. Signed-off-by:
Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn> Fixes: 7c94a8b2 ("iio: magn: add a driver for AK8974") Reviewed-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jonathan Cameron authored
commit ea5e7a7b upstream. One of a class of bugs pointed out by Lars in a recent review. iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp assumes the buffer used is aligned to the size of the timestamp (8 bytes). This is not guaranteed in this driver which uses an array of smaller elements on the stack. As Lars also noted this anti pattern can involve a leak of data to userspace and that indeed can happen here. We close both issues by moving to a suitable structure in the iio_priv() data. This data is allocated with kzalloc so no data can leak apart from previous readings. Fixes: 16bf793f ("iio: humidity: hdc100x: add triggered buffer support for HDC100X") Reported-by:
Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Acked-by:
Matt Ranostay <matt.ranostay@konsulko.com> Cc: Alison Schofield <amsfield22@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jonathan Cameron authored
commit 838e00b1 upstream. One of a class of bugs pointed out by Lars in a recent review. iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp assumes the buffer used is aligned to the size of the timestamp (8 bytes). This is not guaranteed in this driver which uses an array of smaller elements on the stack. As Lars also noted this anti pattern can involve a leak of data to userspace and that indeed can happen here. We close both issues by moving to a suitable structure in the iio_priv() data. This data is allocated with kzalloc so no data can leak appart from previous readings. Fixes: 7c94a8b2 ("iio: magn: add a driver for AK8974") Reported-by:
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
[ Upstream commit 5679b281 ] Commit f7b93d42 ("arm64/alternatives: use subsections for replacement sequences") moved the alternatives replacement sequences into subsections, in order to keep the as close as possible to the code that they replace. Unfortunately, this broke the logic in branch_insn_requires_update, which assumed that any branch into kernel executable code was a branch that required updating, which is no longer the case now that the code sequences that are patched in are in the same section as the patch site itself. So the only way to discriminate branches that require updating and ones that don't is to check whether the branch targets the replacement sequence itself, and so we can drop the call to kernel_text_address() entirely. Fixes: f7b93d42 ("arm64/alternatives: use subsections for replacement sequences") Reported-by:
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Tested-by:
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Andy Shevchenko authored
[ Upstream commit 5f90786b ] The driver can't be loaded automatically because it misses module alias to be provided. Add corresponding MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() call to the driver. Signed-off-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Bob Peterson authored
[ Upstream commit b780cc61 ] Before this patch, only read-write mounts would grab the freeze glock in read-only mode, as part of gfs2_make_fs_rw. So the freeze glock was never initialized. That meant requests to freeze, which request the glock in EX, were granted without any state transition. That meant you could mount a gfs2 file system, which is currently frozen on a different cluster node, in read-only mode. This patch makes read-only mounts lock the freeze glock in SH mode, which will block for file systems that are frozen on another node. Signed-off-by:
Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vasily Averin authored
[ Upstream commit ccf6fb85 ] Found by smatch: drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c:1088 tpm_tis_core_init() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'chip->ops' (see line 979) 'chip->ops' is assigned in the beginning of function in tpmm_chip_alloc->tpm_chip_alloc and is used before first possible goto to error path. Signed-off-by:
Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by:
Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
[ Upstream commit f7b93d42 ] When building very large kernels, the logic that emits replacement sequences for alternatives fails when relative branches are present in the code that is emitted into the .altinstr_replacement section and patched in at the original site and fixed up. The reason is that the linker will insert veneers if relative branches go out of range, and due to the relative distance of the .altinstr_replacement from the .text section where its branch targets usually live, veneers may be emitted at the end of the .altinstr_replacement section, with the relative branches in the sequence pointed at the veneers instead of the actual target. The alternatives patching logic will attempt to fix up the branch to point to its original target, which will be the veneer in this case, but given that the patch site is likely to be far away as well, it will be out of range and so patching will fail. There are other cases where these veneers are problematic, e.g., when the target of the branch is in .text while the patch site is in .init.text, in which case putting the replacement sequence inside .text may not help either. So let's use subsections to emit the replacement code as closely as possible to the patch site, to ensure that veneers are only likely to be emitted if they are required at the patch site as well, in which case they will be in range for the replacement sequence both before and after it is transported to the patch site. This will prevent alternative sequences in non-init code from being released from memory after boot, but this is tolerable given that the entire section is only 512 KB on an allyesconfig build (which weighs in at 500+ MB for the entire Image). Also, note that modules today carry the replacement sequences in non-init sections as well, and any of those that target init code will be emitted into init sections after this change. This fixes an early crash when booting an allyesconfig kernel on a system where any of the alternatives sequences containing relative branches are activated at boot (e.g., ARM64_HAS_PAN on TX2) Signed-off-by:
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Angelo Dureghello authored
[ Upstream commit c43e5579 ] After pulling 5.7.0 (linux-next merge), mcf5441x mmu boot was hanging silently. memblock_add() seems not appropriate, since using MAX_NUMNODES as node id, while memblock_add_node() sets up memory for node id 0. Signed-off-by:
Angelo Dureghello <angelo.dureghello@timesys.com> Signed-off-by:
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
[ Upstream commit d63bd8c8 ] The m68k nommu setup code didn't register the beginning of the physical memory with memblock because it was anyway occupied by the kernel. However, commit fa3354e4 ("mm: free_area_init: use maximal zone PFNs rather than zone sizes") changed zones initialization to use memblock.memory to detect the zone extents and this caused inconsistency between zone PFNs and the actual PFNs: BUG: Bad page state in process swapper pfn:20165 page:41fe0ca0 refcount:0 mapcount:1 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x0() raw: 00000000 00000100 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 page dumped because: nonzero mapcount CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.8.0-rc1-00001-g3a38f8a60c65-dirty #1 Stack from 404c9ebc: 404c9ebc 4029ab28 4029ab28 40088470 41fe0ca0 40299e21 40299df1 404ba2a4 00020165 00000000 41fd2c10 402c7ba0 41fd2c04 40088504 41fe0ca0 40299e21 00000000 40088a12 41fe0ca0 41fe0ca4 0000020a 00000000 00000001 402ca000 00000000 41fe0ca0 41fd2c10 41fd2c10 00000000 00000000 402b2388 00000001 400a0934 40091056 404c9f44 404c9f44 40088db4 402c7ba0 00000001 41fd2c04 41fe0ca0 41fd2000 41fe0ca0 40089e02 4026ecf4 40089e4e 41fe0ca0 ffffffff Call Trace: [<40088470>] 0x40088470 [<40088504>] 0x40088504 [<40088a12>] 0x40088a12 [<402ca000>] 0x402ca000 [<400a0934>] 0x400a0934 Adjust the memory registration with memblock to include the beginning of the physical memory and make sure that the area occupied by the kernel is marked as reserved. Signed-off-by:
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Navid Emamdoost authored
[ Upstream commit d4f5a095 ] in mic_pre_enable, pm_runtime_get_sync is called which increments the counter even in case of failure, leading to incorrect ref count. In case of failure, decrement the ref count before returning. Signed-off-by:
Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Inki Dae <inki.dae@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bernard Zhao authored
[ Upstream commit 177d3819 ] In function msm_submitqueue_create, the queue is a local variable, in return -EINVAL branch, queue didn`t add to ctx`s list yet, and also didn`t kfree, this maybe bring in potential memleak. Signed-off-by:
Bernard Zhao <bernard@vivo.com> [trivial commit msg fixup] Signed-off-by:
Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Toke Høiland-Jørgensen authored
[ Upstream commit 469acedd ] Toshiaki pointed out that we now have two very similar functions to extract the L3 protocol number in the presence of VLAN tags. And Daniel pointed out that the unbounded parsing loop makes it possible for maliciously crafted packets to loop through potentially hundreds of tags. Fix both of these issues by consolidating the two parsing functions and limiting the VLAN tag parsing to a max depth of 8 tags. As part of this, switch over __vlan_get_protocol() to use skb_header_pointer() instead of pskb_may_pull(), to avoid the possible side effects of the latter and keep the skb pointer 'const' through all the parsing functions. v2: - Use limit of 8 tags instead of 32 (matching XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT) Reported-by:
Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Fixes: d7bf2ebe ("sched: consistently handle layer3 header accesses in the presence of VLANs") Signed-off-by:
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Toke Høiland-Jørgensen authored
[ Upstream commit d7bf2ebe ] There are a couple of places in net/sched/ that check skb->protocol and act on the value there. However, in the presence of VLAN tags, the value stored in skb->protocol can be inconsistent based on whether VLAN acceleration is enabled. The commit quoted in the Fixes tag below fixed the users of skb->protocol to use a helper that will always see the VLAN ethertype. However, most of the callers don't actually handle the VLAN ethertype, but expect to find the IP header type in the protocol field. This means that things like changing the ECN field, or parsing diffserv values, stops working if there's a VLAN tag, or if there are multiple nested VLAN tags (QinQ). To fix this, change the helper to take an argument that indicates whether the caller wants to skip the VLAN tags or not. When skipping VLAN tags, we make sure to skip all of them, so behaviour is consistent even in QinQ mode. To make the helper usable from the ECN code, move it to if_vlan.h instead of pkt_sched.h. v3: - Remove empty lines - Move vlan variable definitions inside loop in skb_protocol() - Also use skb_protocol() helper in IP{,6}_ECN_decapsulate() and bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce() v2: - Use eth_type_vlan() helper in skb_protocol() - Also fix code that reads skb->protocol directly - Change a couple of 'if/else if' statements to switch constructs to avoid calling the helper twice Reported-by:
Ilya Ponetayev <i.ponetaev@ndmsystems.com> Fixes: d8b9605d ("net: sched: fix skb->protocol use in case of accelerated vlan path") Signed-off-by:
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 14b032b8 ] In order for no_refcnt and is_data to be the lowest order two bits in the 'val' we have to pad out the bitfield of the u8. Fixes: ad0f75e5 ("cgroup: fix cgroup_sk_alloc() for sk_clone_lock()") Reported-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit ad0f75e5 ] When we clone a socket in sk_clone_lock(), its sk_cgrp_data is copied, so the cgroup refcnt must be taken too. And, unlike the sk_alloc() path, sock_update_netprioidx() is not called here. Therefore, it is safe and necessary to grab the cgroup refcnt even when cgroup_sk_alloc is disabled. sk_clone_lock() is in BH context anyway, the in_interrupt() would terminate this function if called there. And for sk_alloc() skcd->val is always zero. So it's safe to factor out the code to make it more readable. The global variable 'cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled' is used to determine whether to take these reference counts. It is impossible to make the reference counting correct unless we save this bit of information in skcd->val. So, add a new bit there to record whether the socket has already taken the reference counts. This obviously relies on kmalloc() to align cgroup pointers to at least 4 bytes, ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN is certainly larger than that. This bug seems to be introduced since the beginning, commit d979a39d ("cgroup: duplicate cgroup reference when cloning sockets") tried to fix it but not compeletely. It seems not easy to trigger until the recent commit 090e28b2 ("netprio_cgroup: Fix unlimited memory leak of v2 cgroups") was merged. Fixes: bd1060a1 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") Reported-by:
Cameron Berkenpas <cam@neo-zeon.de> Reported-by:
Peter Geis <pgwipeout@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Reported-by:
Daniël Sonck <dsonck92@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Zhang Qiang <qiang.zhang@windriver.com> Tested-by:
Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 1ca0fafd ] This essentially reverts commit 72123032 ("tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets") Mathieu reported that many vendors BGP implementations can actually switch TCP MD5 on established flows. Quoting Mathieu : Here is a list of a few network vendors along with their behavior with respect to TCP MD5: - Cisco: Allows for password to be changed, but within the hold-down timer (~180 seconds). - Juniper: When password is initially set on active connection it will reset, but after that any subsequent password changes no network resets. - Nokia: No notes on if they flap the tcp connection or not. - Ericsson/RedBack: Allows for 2 password (old/new) to co-exist until both sides are ok with new passwords. - Meta-Switch: Expects the password to be set before a connection is attempted, but no further info on whether they reset the TCP connection on a change. - Avaya: Disable the neighbor, then set password, then re-enable. - Zebos: Would normally allow the change when socket connected. We can revert my prior change because commit 9424e2e7 ("tcp: md5: fix potential overestimation of TCP option space") removed the leak of 4 kernel bytes to the wire that was the main reason for my patch. While doing my investigations, I found a bug when a MD5 key is changed, leading to these commits that stable teams want to consider before backporting this revert : Commit 6a2febec ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()") Commit e6ced831 ("tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers") Fixes: 72123032 "tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets" Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit e6ced831 ] My prior fix went a bit too far, according to Herbert and Mathieu. Since we accept that concurrent TCP MD5 lookups might see inconsistent keys, we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() instead of smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() Clearing all key->key[] is needed to avoid possible KMSAN reports, if key->keylen is increased. Since tcp_md5_do_add() is not fast path, using __GFP_ZERO to clear all struct tcp_md5sig_key is simpler. data_race() was added in linux-5.8 and will prevent KCSAN reports, this can safely be removed in stable backports, if data_race() is not yet backported. v2: use data_race() both in tcp_md5_hash_key() and tcp_md5_do_add() Fixes: 6a2febec ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()") Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit e114e1e8 ] Whenever cookie_init_timestamp() has been used to encode ECN,SACK,WSCALE options, we can not remove the TS option in the SYNACK. Otherwise, tcp_synack_options() will still advertize options like WSCALE that we can not deduce later when receiving the packet from the client to complete 3WHS. Note that modern linux TCP stacks wont use MD5+TS+SACK in a SYN packet, but we can not know for sure that all TCP stacks have the same logic. Before the fix a tcpdump would exhibit this wrong exchange : 10:12:15.464591 IP C > S: Flags [S], seq 4202415601, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 456965269 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8], length 0 10:12:15.464602 IP S > C: Flags [S.], seq 253516766, ack 4202415602, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 8], length 0 10:12:15.464611 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 0 10:12:15.464678 IP C > S: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 12 10:12:15.464685 IP S > C: Flags [.], ack 13, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 0 After this patch the exchange looks saner : 11:59:59.882990 IP C > S: Flags [S], seq 517075944, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 1751508483 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8], length 0 11:59:59.883002 IP S > C: Flags [S.], seq 1902939253, ack 517075945, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 1751508479 ecr 1751508483,nop,wscale 8], length 0 11:59:59.883012 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508479], length 0 11:59:59.883114 IP C > S: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508479], length 12 11:59:59.883122 IP S > C: Flags [.], ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508483], length 0 11:59:59.883152 IP S > C: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508484 ecr 1751508483], length 12 11:59:59.883170 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508484 ecr 1751508484], length 0 Of course, no SACK block will ever be added later, but nothing should break. Technically, we could remove the 4 nops included in MD5+TS options, but again some stacks could break seeing not conventional alignment. Fixes: 4957faad ("TCPCT part 1g: Responder Cookie => Initiator") Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 6a2febec ] MD5 keys are read with RCU protection, and tcp_md5_do_add() might update in-place a prior key. Normally, typical RCU updates would allocate a new piece of memory. In this case only key->key and key->keylen might be updated, and we do not care if an incoming packet could see the old key, the new one, or some intermediate value, since changing the key on a live flow is known to be problematic anyway. We only want to make sure that in the case key->keylen is changed, cpus in tcp_md5_hash_key() wont try to use uninitialized data, or crash because key->keylen was read twice to feed sg_init_one() and ahash_request_set_crypt() Fixes: 9ea88a15 ("tcp: md5: check md5 signature without socket lock") Signed-off-by:
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Christoph Paasch authored
[ Upstream commit ce69e563 ] syzkaller found its way into setsockopt with TCP_CONGESTION "cdg". tcp_cdg_init() does a kcalloc to store the gradients. As sk_clone_lock just copies all the memory, the allocated pointer will be copied as well, if the app called setsockopt(..., TCP_CONGESTION) on the listener. If now the socket will be destroyed before the congestion-control has properly been initialized (through a call to tcp_init_transfer), we will end up freeing memory that does not belong to that particular socket, opening the door to a double-free: [ 11.413102] ================================================================== [ 11.414181] BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.415329] [ 11.415560] CPU: 3 PID: 4884 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2 #80 [ 11.416544] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 11.418148] Call Trace: [ 11.418534] <IRQ> [ 11.418834] dump_stack+0x7d/0xb0 [ 11.419297] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x210 [ 11.422079] kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80 [ 11.423433] __kasan_slab_free+0x15e/0x170 [ 11.424761] kfree+0x8c/0x230 [ 11.425157] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.425872] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0 [ 11.426493] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0 [ 11.427093] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0xb29/0x1100 [ 11.427731] tcp_get_cookie_sock+0xc3/0x4a0 [ 11.429457] cookie_v4_check+0x13d0/0x2500 [ 11.433189] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x60e/0x780 [ 11.433727] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2869/0x2e10 [ 11.437143] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x23/0x190 [ 11.437810] ip_local_deliver+0x294/0x350 [ 11.439566] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15d/0x1a0 [ 11.441995] process_backlog+0x1b1/0x6b0 [ 11.443148] net_rx_action+0x37e/0xc40 [ 11.445361] __do_softirq+0x18c/0x61a [ 11.445881] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 11.446409] </IRQ> [ 11.446716] do_softirq_own_stack+0x34/0x40 [ 11.447259] do_softirq.part.0+0x26/0x30 [ 11.447827] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x50 [ 11.448406] ip_finish_output2+0x60f/0x1bc0 [ 11.450109] __ip_queue_xmit+0x71c/0x1b60 [ 11.451861] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1727/0x3bb0 [ 11.453789] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x3070/0x4d3a [ 11.456810] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ad/0x780 [ 11.457995] __release_sock+0x14b/0x2c0 [ 11.458529] release_sock+0x4a/0x170 [ 11.459005] __inet_stream_connect+0x467/0xc80 [ 11.461435] inet_stream_connect+0x4e/0xa0 [ 11.462043] __sys_connect+0x204/0x270 [ 11.465515] __x64_sys_connect+0x6a/0xb0 [ 11.466088] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 [ 11.466617] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 11.467341] RIP: 0033:0x7f56046dc469 [ 11.467844] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 11.468282] RSP: 002b:00007f5604dccdd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a [ 11.469326] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000068bf00 RCX: 00007f56046dc469 [ 11.470379] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 11.471311] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 11.472286] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 11.473341] R13: 000000000041427c R14: 00007f5604dcd5c0 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 11.474321] [ 11.474527] Allocated by task 4884: [ 11.475031] save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 11.475548] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 [ 11.476182] tcp_cdg_init+0xf0/0x150 [ 11.476744] tcp_init_congestion_control+0x9b/0x3a0 [ 11.477435] tcp_set_congestion_control+0x270/0x32f [ 11.478088] do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.0+0x521/0x1a00 [ 11.478744] __sys_setsockopt+0xff/0x1e0 [ 11.479259] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0x150 [ 11.479895] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 [ 11.480395] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 11.481097] [ 11.481321] Freed by task 4872: [ 11.481783] save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 11.482230] __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170 [ 11.482839] kfree+0x8c/0x230 [ 11.483240] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.483948] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0 [ 11.484502] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0 [ 11.485144] tcp_close+0x932/0xfe0 [ 11.485642] inet_release+0xc1/0x1c0 [ 11.486131] __sock_release+0xc0/0x270 [ 11.486697] sock_close+0xc/0x10 [ 11.487145] __fput+0x277/0x780 [ 11.487632] task_work_run+0xeb/0x180 [ 11.488118] __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x15a/0x160 [ 11.488834] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x70 [ 11.489326] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Wei Wang fixed a part of these CDG-malloc issues with commit c1201444 ("tcp: memset ca_priv data to 0 properly"). This patch here fixes the listener-scenario: We make sure that listeners setting the congestion-control through setsockopt won't initialize it (thus CDG never allocates on listeners). For those who use AF_UNSPEC to reuse a socket, tcp_disconnect() is changed to cleanup afterwards. (The issue can be reproduced at least down to v4.4.x.) Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Fixes: 2b0a8c9e ("tcp: add CDG congestion control") Signed-off-by:
Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit ba3bb0e7 ] Whenever tcp_try_rmem_schedule() returns an error, we are under trouble and should make sure to wakeup readers so that they can drain socket queues and eventually make room. Fixes: 03f45c88 ("tcp: avoid extra wakeups for SO_RCVLOWAT users") Signed-off-by:
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AceLan Kao authored
[ Upstream commit f815dd5c ] Add support for Quectel Wireless Solutions Co., Ltd. EG95 LTE modem T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 5 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=0195 Rev=03.18 S: Manufacturer=Android S: Product=Android C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=(none) I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=(none) I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=(none) I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) Signed-off-by:
AceLan Kao <acelan.kao@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 306381ae ] When tcf_block_get() fails inside atm_tc_init(), atm_tc_put() is called to release the qdisc p->link.q. But the flow->ref prevents it to do so, as the flow->ref is still zero. Fix this by moving the p->link.ref initialization before tcf_block_get(). Fixes: 6529eaba ("net: sched: introduce tcf block infractructure") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d411cff6ab29cc2c311b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Signed-off-by:
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Martin Varghese authored
[ Upstream commit 394de110 ] The packets from tunnel devices (eg bareudp) may have only metadata in the dst pointer of skb. Hence a pointer check of neigh_lookup is needed in dst_neigh_lookup_skb Kernel crashes when packets from bareudp device is processed in the kernel neighbour subsytem. [ 133.384484] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 133.385240] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode [ 133.385828] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page [ 133.386603] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 133.386875] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP PTI [ 133.387275] CPU: 0 PID: 5045 Comm: ping Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc2+ #15 [ 133.388052] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 133.391076] RIP: 0010:0x0 [ 133.392401] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 133.394029] RSP: 0018:ffffb79980003d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 133.396656] RAX: 0000000080000102 RBX: ffff9de2fe0d6600 RCX: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 [ 133.399018] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 RDI: ffff9de2fc21b400 [ 133.399685] RBP: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 133.400350] R10: ffff9de2fbc6be22 R11: ffff9de2fe0d6600 R12: ffff9de2fc21b400 [ 133.401010] R13: ffff9de2fe0d6628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 133.401667] FS: 00007fe014918740(0000) GS:ffff9de2fec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 133.402412] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 133.402948] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000003bb72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 133.403611] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 133.404270] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 133.404933] Call Trace: [ 133.405169] <IRQ> [ 133.405367] __neigh_update+0x5a4/0x8f0 [ 133.405734] arp_process+0x294/0x820 [ 133.406076] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x866/0xe70 [ 133.406557] arp_rcv+0x129/0x1c0 [ 133.406882] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x95/0xb0 [ 133.407340] process_backlog+0xa7/0x150 [ 133.407705] net_rx_action+0x2af/0x420 [ 133.408457] __do_softirq+0xda/0x2a8 [ 133.408813] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 133.409290] </IRQ> [ 133.409519] do_softirq_own_stack+0x39/0x50 [ 133.410036] do_softirq+0x50/0x60 [ 133.410401] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60 [ 133.410871] ip_finish_output2+0x195/0x530 [ 133.411288] ip_output+0x72/0xf0 [ 133.411673] ? __ip_finish_output+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 133.412122] ip_send_skb+0x15/0x40 [ 133.412471] raw_sendmsg+0x853/0xab0 [ 133.412855] ? insert_pfn+0xfe/0x270 [ 133.413827] ? vvar_fault+0xec/0x190 [ 133.414772] sock_sendmsg+0x57/0x80 [ 133.415685] __sys_sendto+0xdc/0x160 [ 133.416605] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d4/0x2b0 [ 133.417679] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x1d9/0x280 [ 133.418753] ? __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x5d/0x1a0 [ 133.419819] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 [ 133.420848] do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90 [ 133.421768] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 133.422833] RIP: 0033:0x7fe013689c03 [ 133.423749] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 133.424624] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7288f418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 133.425940] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056151fc63720 RCX: 00007fe013689c03 [ 133.427225] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000056151fc63720 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 133.428481] RBP: 00007ffc72890b30 R08: 000056151fc60500 R09: 0000000000000010 [ 133.429757] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 133.431041] R13: 000056151fc636e0 R14: 000056151fc616bc R15: 0000000000000080 [ 133.432481] Modules linked in: mpls_iptunnel act_mirred act_tunnel_key cls_flower sch_ingress veth mpls_router ip_tunnel bareudp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel macsec udp_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag binfmt_misc xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat xt_addrtype xt_conntrack nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables overlay ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2 pcspkr i2c_piix4 virtio_balloon joydev ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic qxl pata_acpi drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ata_piix libata virtio_net net_failover virtio_console failover virtio_blk i2c_core virtio_pci virtio_ring serio_raw floppy virtio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 133.444045] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 133.445082] ---[ end trace f4aeee1958fd1638 ]--- [ 133.446236] RIP: 0010:0x0 [ 133.447180] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 133.448152] RSP: 0018:ffffb79980003d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 133.449363] RAX: 0000000080000102 RBX: ffff9de2fe0d6600 RCX: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 [ 133.450835] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 RDI: ffff9de2fc21b400 [ 133.452237] RBP: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 133.453722] R10: ffff9de2fbc6be22 R11: ffff9de2fe0d6600 R12: ffff9de2fc21b400 [ 133.455149] R13: ffff9de2fe0d6628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 133.456520] FS: 00007fe014918740(0000) GS:ffff9de2fec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 133.458046] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 133.459342] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000003bb72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 133.460782] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 133.462240] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 133.463697] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 133.465226] Kernel Offset: 0xfa00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 133.467025] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: aaa0c23c ("Fix dst_neigh_lookup/dst_neigh_lookup_skb return value handling bug") Signed-off-by:
Martin Varghese <martin.varghese@nokia.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit a9b11101 ] syzbot was to trigger a bug by tricking AF_LLC with non sensible addr->sllc_arphrd It seems clear LLC requires an Ethernet device. Back in commit abf9d537 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE") Octavian Purdila added possibility for application to use a zero value for sllc_arphrd, convert it to ARPHRD_ETHER to not cause regressions on existing applications. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e0b4078 by task ksoftirqd/3/27 CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline] list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline] waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline] wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline] skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline] sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813 sock_wfree+0x1e1/0x260 net/core/sock.c:1958 skb_release_head_state+0xeb/0x260 net/core/skbuff.c:652 skb_release_all+0x16/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:663 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline] consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:838 [inline] consume_skb+0xfb/0x410 net/core/skbuff.c:832 __dev_kfree_skb_any+0xa4/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:2967 dev_kfree_skb_any include/linux/netdevice.h:3650 [inline] e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource.isra.0+0x21b/0x3a0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1963 e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3854 [inline] e1000_clean+0x4cc/0x1d10 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3796 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6532 [inline] net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6600 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595 smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165 kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Allocated by task 8247: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:521 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3320 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x121/0x710 mm/slab.c:3484 sock_alloc_inode+0x1c/0x1d0 net/socket.c:240 alloc_inode+0x68/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:230 new_inode_pseudo+0x19/0xf0 fs/inode.c:919 sock_alloc+0x41/0x270 net/socket.c:560 __sock_create+0xc2/0x730 net/socket.c:1384 sock_create net/socket.c:1471 [inline] __sys_socket+0x103/0x220 net/socket.c:1513 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1522 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1520 [inline] __ia32_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1520 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:337 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x27b/0xe16 arch/x86/entry/common.c:408 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 Freed by task 17: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3694 sock_free_inode+0x20/0x30 net/socket.c:261 i_callback+0x44/0x80 fs/inode.c:219 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2183 [inline] rcu_core+0x570/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2408 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2417 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e0b4000 which belongs to the cache sock_inode_cache of size 1152 The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of 1152-byte region [ffff88801e0b4000, ffff88801e0b4480) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0000782d00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88807aa59c40 index:0xffff88801e0b4ffd raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00008e6c88 ffffea0000782d48 ffff88807aa59c40 raw: ffff88801e0b4ffd ffff88801e0b4000 0000000100000003 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88801e0b3f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff88801e0b3f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88801e0b4000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88801e0b4080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88801e0b4100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: abf9d537 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE") Signed-off-by:
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Xin Long authored
[ Upstream commit 27d53323 ] In the tx path of l2tp, l2tp_xmit_skb() calls skb_dst_set() to set skb's dst. However, it will eventually call inet6_csk_xmit() or ip_queue_xmit() where skb's dst will be overwritten by: skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst); without releasing the old dst in skb. Then it causes dst/dev refcnt leak: unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1 This can be reproduced by simply running: # modprobe l2tp_eth && modprobe l2tp_ip # sh ./tools/testing/selftests/net/l2tp.sh So before going to inet6_csk_xmit() or ip_queue_xmit(), skb's dst should be dropped. This patch is to fix it by removing skb_dst_set() from l2tp_xmit_skb() and moving skb_dst_drop() into l2tp_xmit_core(). Fixes: 3557baab ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") Reported-by:
Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by:
James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Tested-by:
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Sabrina Dubroca authored
[ Upstream commit 5eff0690 ] IPv4 ping sockets don't set fl4.fl4_icmp_{type,code}, which leads to incomplete IPsec ACQUIRE messages being sent to userspace. Currently, both raw sockets and IPv6 ping sockets set those fields. Expected output of "ip xfrm monitor": acquire proto esp sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 8 code 0 dev ens4 policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 <snip> Currently with ping sockets: acquire proto esp sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 0 code 0 dev ens4 policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 <snip> The Libreswan test suite found this problem after Fedora changed the value for the sysctl net.ipv4.ping_group_range. Fixes: c319b4d7 ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Reported-by:
Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com> Tested-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Tranchetti authored
[ Upstream commit 1e82a62f ] A potential deadlock can occur during registering or unregistering a new generic netlink family between the main nl_table_lock and the cb_lock where each thread wants the lock held by the other, as demonstrated below. 1) Thread 1 is performing a netlink_bind() operation on a socket. As part of this call, it will call netlink_lock_table(), incrementing the nl_table_users count to 1. 2) Thread 2 is registering (or unregistering) a genl_family via the genl_(un)register_family() API. The cb_lock semaphore will be taken for writing. 3) Thread 1 will call genl_bind() as part of the bind operation to handle subscribing to GENL multicast groups at the request of the user. It will attempt to take the cb_lock semaphore for reading, but it will fail and be scheduled away, waiting for Thread 2 to finish the write. 4) Thread 2 will call netlink_table_grab() during the (un)registration call. However, as Thread 1 has incremented nl_table_users, it will not be able to proceed, and both threads will be stuck waiting for the other. genl_bind() is a noop, unless a genl_family implements the mcast_bind() function to handle setting up family-specific multicast operations. Since no one in-tree uses this functionality as Cong pointed out, simply removing the genl_bind() function will remove the possibility for deadlock, as there is no attempt by Thread 1 above to take the cb_lock semaphore. Fixes: c380d9a7 ("genetlink: pass multicast bind/unbind to families") Suggested-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Reported-by:
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Taehee Yoo authored
commit 2a762e9e upstream. There are two types of the lower interface of rmnet that are VND and BRIDGE. Each lower interface can have only one type either VND or BRIDGE. But, there is a case, which uses both lower interface types. Due to this unexpected behavior, lower interface leak occurs. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add dummy1 type dummy ip link add rmnet0 link dummy0 type rmnet mux_id 1 ip link set dummy1 master rmnet0 ip link add rmnet1 link dummy1 type rmnet mux_id 2 ip link del rmnet0 The dummy1 was attached as BRIDGE interface of rmnet0. Then, it also was attached as VND interface of rmnet1. This is unexpected behavior and there is no code for handling this case. So that below splat occurs when the rmnet0 interface is deleted. Splat looks like: [ 53.254112][ C1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1192 at net/core/dev.c:8992 rollback_registered_many+0x986/0xcf0 [ 53.254117][ C1] Modules linked in: rmnet dummy openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nfx [ 53.254182][ C1] CPU: 1 PID: 1192 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.8.0-rc1+ #620 [ 53.254188][ C1] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 53.254192][ C1] RIP: 0010:rollback_registered_many+0x986/0xcf0 [ 53.254200][ C1] Code: 41 8b 4e cc 45 31 c0 31 d2 4c 89 ee 48 89 df e8 e0 47 ff ff 85 c0 0f 84 cd fc ff ff 0f 0b e5 [ 53.254205][ C1] RSP: 0018:ffff888050a5f2e0 EFLAGS: 00010287 [ 53.254214][ C1] RAX: ffff88805756d658 RBX: ffff88804d99c000 RCX: ffffffff8329d323 [ 53.254219][ C1] RDX: 1ffffffff0be6410 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff85f32080 [ 53.254223][ C1] RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: fffffbfff0be6411 R09: fffffbfff0be6411 [ 53.254228][ C1] R10: ffffffff85f32087 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888050a5f480 [ 53.254233][ C1] R13: ffff88804d99c0b8 R14: ffff888050a5f400 R15: ffff8880548ebe40 [ 53.254238][ C1] FS: 00007f6b86b370c0(0000) GS:ffff88806c200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 53.254243][ C1] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 53.254248][ C1] CR2: 0000562c62438758 CR3: 000000003f600005 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [ 53.254253][ C1] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 53.254257][ C1] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 53.254261][ C1] Call Trace: [ 53.254266][ C1] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x379/0x540 [ 53.254270][ C1] ? netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x780/0x780 [ 53.254275][ C1] ? rmnet_unregister_real_device+0x56/0x90 [rmnet] [ 53.254279][ C1] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x126/0x150 [ 53.254283][ C1] ? kfree+0xdc/0x320 [ 53.254288][ C1] ? rmnet_unregister_real_device+0x56/0x90 [rmnet] [ 53.254293][ C1] unregister_netdevice_many.part.135+0x13/0x1b0 [ 53.254297][ C1] rtnl_delete_link+0xbc/0x100 [ 53.254301][ C1] ? rtnl_af_register+0xc0/0xc0 [ 53.254305][ C1] rtnl_dellink+0x2dc/0x840 [ 53.254309][ C1] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1d0 [ 53.254314][ C1] ? valid_fdb_dump_strict+0x620/0x620 [ 53.254318][ C1] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x457/0x890 [ 53.254322][ C1] ? lock_contended+0xd20/0xd20 [ 53.254326][ C1] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4a8/0x890 [ ... ] [ 73.813696][ T1192] unregister_netdevice: waiting for rmnet0 to become free. Usage count = 1 Fixes: 037f9cdf ("net: rmnet: use upper/lower device infrastructure") Signed-off-by:
Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Changbin Du authored
commit 0ada120c upstream. libbfd has changed the bfd_section_* macros to inline functions bfd_section_<field> since 2019-09-18. See below two commits: o http://www.sourceware.org/ml/gdb-cvs/2019-09/msg00064.html o https://www.sourceware.org/ml/gdb-cvs/2019-09/msg00072.html This fix make perf able to build with both old and new libbfd. Signed-off-by:
Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200128152938.31413-1-changbin.du@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jianmin Wang <jianmin@iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by:
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- 16 Jul, 2020 9 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Janosch Frank authored
commit 528a9539 upstream. If the pmd is soft dirty we must mark the pte as soft dirty (and not dirty). This fixes some cases for guest migration with huge page backings. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.8 Fixes: bc29b7ac ("s390/mm: clean up pte/pmd encoding") Reviewed-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vineet Gupta authored
commit b7faf971 upstream. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vineet Gupta authored
commit 00fdec98 upstream. Trap handler for syscall tracing reads EFA (Exception Fault Address), in case strace wants PC of trap instruction (EFA is not part of pt_regs as of current code). However this EFA read is racy as it happens after dropping to pure kernel mode (re-enabling interrupts). A taken interrupt could context-switch, trigger a different task's trap, clobbering EFA for this execution context. Fix this by reading EFA early, before re-enabling interrupts. A slight side benefit is de-duplication of FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN in trap handler. The trap handler is common to both ARCompact and ARCv2 builds too. This just came out of code rework/review and no real problem was reported but is clearly a potential problem specially for strace. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Mikulas Patocka authored
commit 6958c1c6 upstream. kobject_uevent may allocate memory and it may be called while there are dm devices suspended. The allocation may recurse into a suspended device, causing a deadlock. We must set the noio flag when sending a uevent. The observed deadlock was reported here: https://www.redhat.com/archives/dm-devel/2020-March/msg00025.htmlReported-by:
Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com> Reported-by:
Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Reported-by:
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tom Rix authored
commit 41855a89 upstream. clang static analysis flags this error drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/ci_dpm.c:5652:9: warning: Use of memory after it is freed [unix.Malloc] kfree(rdev->pm.dpm.ps[i].ps_priv); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/ci_dpm.c:5654:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc] kfree(rdev->pm.dpm.ps); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ problem is reported in ci_dpm_fini, with these code blocks. for (i = 0; i < rdev->pm.dpm.num_ps; i++) { kfree(rdev->pm.dpm.ps[i].ps_priv); } kfree(rdev->pm.dpm.ps); The first free happens in ci_parse_power_table where it cleans up locally on a failure. ci_dpm_fini also does a cleanup. ret = ci_parse_power_table(rdev); if (ret) { ci_dpm_fini(rdev); return ret; } So remove the cleanup in ci_parse_power_table and move the num_ps calculation to inside the loop so ci_dpm_fini will know how many array elements to free. Fixes: cc8dbbb4 ("drm/radeon: add dpm support for CI dGPUs (v2)") Signed-off-by:
Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Boris Burkov authored
commit 6bf9cd2e upstream. Under somewhat convoluted conditions, it is possible to attempt to release an extent_buffer that is under io, which triggers a BUG_ON in btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages. This relies on a few different factors. First, extent_buffer reads done as readahead for searching use WAIT_NONE, so they free the local extent buffer reference while the io is outstanding. However, they should still be protected by TREE_REF. However, if the system is doing signficant reclaim, and simultaneously heavily accessing the extent_buffers, it is possible for releasepage to race with two concurrent readahead attempts in a way that leaves TREE_REF unset when the readahead extent buffer is released. Essentially, if two tasks race to allocate a new extent_buffer, but the winner who attempts the first io is rebuffed by a page being locked (likely by the reclaim itself) then the loser will still go ahead with issuing the readahead. The loser's call to find_extent_buffer must also race with the reclaim task reading the extent_buffer's refcount as 1 in a way that allows the reclaim to re-clear the TREE_REF checked by find_extent_buffer. The following represents an example execution demonstrating the race: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 reada_for_search reada_for_search readahead_tree_block readahead_tree_block find_create_tree_block find_create_tree_block alloc_extent_buffer alloc_extent_buffer find_extent_buffer // not found allocates eb lock pages associate pages to eb insert eb into radix tree set TREE_REF, refs == 2 unlock pages read_extent_buffer_pages // WAIT_NONE not uptodate (brand new eb) lock_page if !trylock_page goto unlock_exit // not an error free_extent_buffer release_extent_buffer atomic_dec_and_test refs to 1 find_extent_buffer // found try_release_extent_buffer take refs_lock reads refs == 1; no io atomic_inc_not_zero refs to 2 mark_buffer_accessed check_buffer_tree_ref // not STALE, won't take refs_lock refs == 2; TREE_REF set // no action read_extent_buffer_pages // WAIT_NONE clear TREE_REF release_extent_buffer atomic_dec_and_test refs to 1 unlock_page still not uptodate (CPU1 read failed on trylock_page) locks pages set io_pages > 0 submit io return free_extent_buffer release_extent_buffer dec refs to 0 delete from radix tree btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages BUG_ON(io_pages > 0)!!! We observe this at a very low rate in production and were also able to reproduce it in a test environment by introducing some spurious delays and by introducing probabilistic trylock_page failures. To fix it, we apply check_tree_ref at a point where it could not possibly be unset by a competing task: after io_pages has been incremented. All the codepaths that clear TREE_REF check for io, so they would not be able to clear it after this point until the io is done. Stack trace, for reference: [1417839.424739] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [1417839.435328] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4841! [1417839.447024] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [1417839.502972] RIP: 0010:btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0x20/0x1f0 [1417839.517008] Code: ed e9 ... [1417839.558895] RSP: 0018:ffffc90020bcf798 EFLAGS: 00010202 [1417839.570816] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888102d6def0 RCX: 0000000000000028 [1417839.586962] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff8887f0296482 RDI: ffff888102d6def0 [1417839.603108] RBP: ffff88885664a000 R08: 0000000000000046 R09: 0000000000000238 [1417839.619255] R10: 0000000000000028 R11: ffff88885664af68 R12: 0000000000000000 [1417839.635402] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88875f573ad0 R15: ffff888797aafd90 [1417839.651549] FS: 00007f5a844fa700(0000) GS:ffff88885f680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1417839.669810] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [1417839.682887] CR2: 00007f7884541fe0 CR3: 000000049f609002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [1417839.699037] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [1417839.715187] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [1417839.731320] Call Trace: [1417839.737103] release_extent_buffer+0x39/0x90 [1417839.746913] read_block_for_search.isra.38+0x2a3/0x370 [1417839.758645] btrfs_search_slot+0x260/0x9b0 [1417839.768054] btrfs_lookup_file_extent+0x4a/0x70 [1417839.778427] btrfs_get_extent+0x15f/0x830 [1417839.787665] ? submit_extent_page+0xc4/0x1c0 [1417839.797474] ? __do_readpage+0x299/0x7a0 [1417839.806515] __do_readpage+0x33b/0x7a0 [1417839.815171] ? btrfs_releasepage+0x70/0x70 [1417839.824597] extent_readpages+0x28f/0x400 [1417839.833836] read_pages+0x6a/0x1c0 [1417839.841729] ? startup_64+0x2/0x30 [1417839.849624] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x13c/0x1a0 [1417839.860590] filemap_fault+0x6c7/0x990 [1417839.869252] ? xas_load+0x8/0x80 [1417839.876756] ? xas_find+0x150/0x190 [1417839.884839] ? filemap_map_pages+0x295/0x3b0 [1417839.894652] __do_fault+0x32/0x110 [1417839.902540] __handle_mm_fault+0xacd/0x1000 [1417839.912156] handle_mm_fault+0xaa/0x1c0 [1417839.921004] __do_page_fault+0x242/0x4b0 [1417839.930044] ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 [1417839.937933] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [1417839.945631] RIP: 0033:0x33c4bae [1417839.952927] Code: Bad RIP value. [1417839.960411] RSP: 002b:00007f5a844f7350 EFLAGS: 00010206 [1417839.972331] RAX: 000000000000006e RBX: 1614b3ff6a50398a RCX: 0000000000000000 [1417839.988477] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002 [1417840.004626] RBP: 00007f5a844f7420 R08: 000000000000006e R09: 00007f5a94aeccb8 [1417840.020784] R10: 00007f5a844f7350 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5a94aecc79 [1417840.036932] R13: 00007f5a94aecc78 R14: 00007f5a94aecc90 R15: 00007f5a94aecc40 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
This reverts commit bdf4d37b which is commit 2bbcaaee upstream. It is being reverted upstream, just hasn't made it there yet and is causing lots of problems. Reported-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain@gmail.com> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
commit 63960260 upstream. When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated file->f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred. Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7105e828 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump") Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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