- 15 Jan, 2018 32 commits
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Kees Cook authored
This whitelists the FPU register state portion of the thread_struct for copying to userspace, instead of the default entire struct. This is needed because FPU register state is dynamically sized, so it doesn't bypass the hardened usercopy checks. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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Kees Cook authored
While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)). The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct at the end of task_struct. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_task_struct_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...); dup_task_struct(...): ... tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node); copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c: __fpu__restore_sig(...): ... struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu; ... __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size); fpu__restore_sig(...): ... return __fpu__restore_sig(...); arch/x86/kernel/signal.c: restore_sigcontext(...): ... fpu__restore_sig(...) This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct. If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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David Windsor authored
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and !CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_thread_stack_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...) dup_task_struct(...): ... stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...) ... tsk->stack = stack; copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace] Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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David Windsor authored
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the mm_struct slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Only the auxv field is copied to userspace. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: #define allocate_mm() (kmem_cache_alloc(mm_cachep, GFP_KERNEL)) dup_mm(): ... mm = allocate_mm(); copy_mm(...): ... dup_mm(); copy_process(...): ... copy_mm(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: fs/binfmt_elf.c: create_elf_tables(...): ... elf_info = (elf_addr_t *)current->mm->saved_auxv; ... copy_to_user(..., elf_info, ei_index * sizeof(elf_addr_t)) load_elf_binary(...): ... create_elf_tables(...); This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace] Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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Kees Cook authored
Now that protocols have been annotated (the copy of icsk_ca_ops->name is of an ops field from outside the slab cache): $ git grep 'copy_.*_user.*sk.*->' caif/caif_socket.c: copy_from_user(&cf_sk->conn_req.param.data, ov, ol)) { ipv4/raw.c: if (copy_from_user(&raw_sk(sk)->filter, optval, optlen)) ipv4/raw.c: copy_to_user(optval, &raw_sk(sk)->filter, len)) ipv4/tcp.c: if (copy_to_user(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len)) ipv4/tcp.c: if (copy_to_user(optval, icsk->icsk_ulp_ops->name, len)) ipv6/raw.c: if (copy_from_user(&raw6_sk(sk)->filter, optval, optlen)) ipv6/raw.c: if (copy_to_user(optval, &raw6_sk(sk)->filter, len)) sctp/socket.c: if (copy_from_user(&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, optval, optlen)) sctp/socket.c: if (copy_to_user(optval, &sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, len)) sctp/socket.c: if (copy_to_user(optval, &sctp_sk(sk)->initmsg, len)) we can switch the default proto usercopy region to size 0. Any protocols needing to add whitelisted regions must annotate the fields with the useroffset and usersize fields of struct proto. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
The autoclose field can be copied with put_user(), so there is no need to use copy_to_user(). In both cases, hardened usercopy is being bypassed since the size is constant, and not open to runtime manipulation. This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log] Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
The SCTP socket event notification subscription information need to be copied to/from userspace. In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Additionally moves the usercopy fields to be adjacent for the region to cover both. example usage trace: net/sctp/socket.c: sctp_getsockopt_events(...): ... copy_to_user(..., &sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, len) sctp_setsockopt_events(...): ... copy_from_user(&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, ..., optlen) sctp_getsockopt_initmsg(...): ... copy_to_user(..., &sctp_sk(sk)->initmsg, len) This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: split from network patch, move struct members adjacent] [kees: add SCTPv6 struct whitelist, provide usage trace] Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
The CAIF channel connection request parameters need to be copied to/from userspace. In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. example usage trace: net/caif/caif_socket.c: setsockopt(...): ... copy_from_user(&cf_sk->conn_req.param.data, ..., ol) This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: split from network patch, provide usage trace] Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
The ICMP filters for IPv4 and IPv6 raw sockets need to be copied to/from userspace. In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. example usage trace: net/ipv4/raw.c: raw_seticmpfilter(...): ... copy_from_user(&raw_sk(sk)->filter, ..., optlen) raw_geticmpfilter(...): ... copy_to_user(..., &raw_sk(sk)->filter, len) net/ipv6/raw.c: rawv6_seticmpfilter(...): ... copy_from_user(&raw6_sk(sk)->filter, ..., optlen) rawv6_geticmpfilter(...): ... copy_to_user(..., &raw6_sk(sk)->filter, len) This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: split from network patch, provide usage trace] Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Some protocols need to copy objects to/from userspace, and they can declare the region via their proto structure with the new usersize and useroffset fields. Initially, if no region is specified (usersize == 0), the entire field is marked as whitelisted. This allows protocols to be whitelisted in subsequent patches. Once all protocols have been annotated, the full-whitelist default can be removed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split off per-proto patches] [kees: add logic for by-default full-whitelist] Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
SCSI sense buffers, stored in struct scsi_cmnd.sense and therefore contained in the scsi_sense_cache slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c: scsi_select_sense_cache(...): return ... ? scsi_sense_isadma_cache : scsi_sense_cache scsi_alloc_sense_buffer(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(scsi_select_sense_cache(), ...); scsi_init_request(...): ... cmd->sense_buffer = scsi_alloc_sense_buffer(...); ... cmd->req.sense = cmd->sense_buffer example usage trace: block/scsi_ioctl.c: (inline from sg_io) blk_complete_sghdr_rq(...): struct scsi_request *req = scsi_req(rq); ... copy_to_user(..., req->sense, len) scsi_cmd_ioctl(...): sg_io(...); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the scsi_sense_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
CIFS request buffers, stored in the cifs_request slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/cifs/cifsfs.c: cifs_init_request_bufs(): ... cifs_req_poolp = mempool_create_slab_pool(cifs_min_rcv, cifs_req_cachep); fs/cifs/misc.c: cifs_buf_get(): ... ret_buf = mempool_alloc(cifs_req_poolp, GFP_NOFS); ... return ret_buf; In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the cifs_request slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
vxfs symlink pathnames, stored in struct vxfs_inode_info field vii_immed.vi_immed and therefore contained in the vxfs_inode slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/freevxfs/vxfs_super.c: vxfs_alloc_inode(...): ... vi = kmem_cache_alloc(vxfs_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); ... return &vi->vfs_inode; fs/freevxfs/vxfs_inode.c: cxfs_iget(...): ... inode->i_link = vip->vii_immed.vi_immed; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the vxfs_inode slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
The ufs symlink pathnames, stored in struct ufs_inode_info.i_u1.i_symlink and therefore contained in the ufs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/ufs/super.c: ufs_alloc_inode(...): ... ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ufs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS); ... return &ei->vfs_inode; fs/ufs/ufs.h: UFS_I(struct inode *inode): return container_of(inode, struct ufs_inode_info, vfs_inode); fs/ufs/namei.c: ufs_symlink(...): ... inode->i_link = (char *)UFS_I(inode)->i_u1.i_symlink; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the ufs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
orangefs symlink pathnames, stored in struct orangefs_inode_s.link_target and therefore contained in the orangefs_inode_cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/orangefs/super.c: orangefs_alloc_inode(...): ... orangefs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(orangefs_inode_cache, ...); ... return &orangefs_inode->vfs_inode; fs/orangefs/orangefs-utils.c: exofs_symlink(...): ... inode->i_link = orangefs_inode->link_target; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the orangefs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
The exofs short symlink names, stored in struct exofs_i_info.i_data and therefore contained in the exofs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/exofs/super.c: exofs_alloc_inode(...): ... oi = kmem_cache_alloc(exofs_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); ... return &oi->vfs_inode; fs/exofs/namei.c: exofs_symlink(...): ... inode->i_link = (char *)oi->i_data; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the exofs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Boaz Harrosh <ooo@electrozaur.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
befs symlink pathnames, stored in struct befs_inode_info.i_data.symlink and therefore contained in the befs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/befs/linuxvfs.c: befs_alloc_inode(...): ... bi = kmem_cache_alloc(befs_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); ... return &bi->vfs_inode; befs_iget(...): ... strlcpy(befs_ino->i_data.symlink, raw_inode->data.symlink, BEFS_SYMLINK_LEN); ... inode->i_link = befs_ino->i_data.symlink; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the befs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org> Cc: Salah Triki <salah.triki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org>
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David Windsor authored
The jfs symlink pathnames, stored in struct jfs_inode_info.i_inline and therefore contained in the jfs_ip slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/jfs/super.c: jfs_alloc_inode(...): ... jfs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(jfs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS); ... return &jfs_inode->vfs_inode; fs/jfs/jfs_incore.h: JFS_IP(struct inode *inode): return container_of(inode, struct jfs_inode_info, vfs_inode); fs/jfs/inode.c: jfs_iget(...): ... inode->i_link = JFS_IP(inode)->i_inline; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the jfs_ip slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@kernel.org> Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
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David Windsor authored
The ext2 symlink pathnames, stored in struct ext2_inode_info.i_data and therefore contained in the ext2_inode_cache slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/ext2/super.c: ext2_alloc_inode(...): struct ext2_inode_info *ei; ... ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext2_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS); ... return &ei->vfs_inode; fs/ext2/ext2.h: EXT2_I(struct inode *inode): return container_of(inode, struct ext2_inode_info, vfs_inode); fs/ext2/namei.c: ext2_symlink(...): ... inode->i_link = (char *)&EXT2_I(inode)->i_data; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined into vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the ext2_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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David Windsor authored
The ext4 symlink pathnames, stored in struct ext4_inode_info.i_data and therefore contained in the ext4_inode_cache slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/ext4/super.c: ext4_alloc_inode(...): struct ext4_inode_info *ei; ... ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS); ... return &ei->vfs_inode; include/trace/events/ext4.h: #define EXT4_I(inode) \ (container_of(inode, struct ext4_inode_info, vfs_inode)) fs/ext4/namei.c: ext4_symlink(...): ... inode->i_link = (char *)&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len) (inlined into vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the ext4_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
The mnt_id field can be copied with put_user(), so there is no need to use copy_to_user(). In both cases, hardened usercopy is being bypassed since the size is constant, and not open to runtime manipulation. This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log] Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
VFS pathnames are stored in the names_cache slab cache, either inline or across an entire allocation entry (when approaching PATH_MAX). These are copied to/from userspace, so they must be entirely whitelisted. cache object allocation: include/linux/fs.h: #define __getname() kmem_cache_alloc(names_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) example usage trace: strncpy_from_user+0x4d/0x170 getname_flags+0x6f/0x1f0 user_path_at_empty+0x23/0x40 do_mount+0x69/0xda0 SyS_mount+0x83/0xd0 fs/namei.c: getname_flags(...): ... result = __getname(); ... kname = (char *)result->iname; result->name = kname; len = strncpy_from_user(kname, filename, EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX); ... if (unlikely(len == EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX)) { const size_t size = offsetof(struct filename, iname[1]); kname = (char *)result; result = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); ... result->name = kname; len = strncpy_from_user(kname, filename, PATH_MAX); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines the entire cache object in the names_cache slab cache as whitelisted, since it may entirely hold name strings to be copied to/from userspace. This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, add usage trace] Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
When a dentry name is short enough, it can be stored directly in the dentry itself (instead in a separate kmalloc allocation). These dentry short names, stored in struct dentry.d_iname and therefore contained in the dentry_cache slab cache, need to be coped to userspace. cache object allocation: fs/dcache.c: __d_alloc(...): ... dentry = kmem_cache_alloc(dentry_cache, ...); ... dentry->d_name.name = dentry->d_iname; example usage trace: filldir+0xb0/0x140 dcache_readdir+0x82/0x170 iterate_dir+0x142/0x1b0 SyS_getdents+0xb5/0x160 fs/readdir.c: (called via ctx.actor by dir_emit) filldir(..., const char *name, ...): ... copy_to_user(..., name, namlen) fs/libfs.c: dcache_readdir(...): ... next = next_positive(dentry, p, 1) ... dir_emit(..., next->d_name.name, ...) In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the dentry_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamic copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust hunks for kmalloc-specific things moved later] [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common, but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches as whitelisted. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
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Kees Cook authored
This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive. If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists immediately. Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Kees Cook authored
This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's defined usercopy region. Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor. Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Windsor authored
This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
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Kees Cook authored
The size of fields within a structure is needed in a few places in the kernel already, and will be needed for the usercopy whitelisting when declaring whitelist regions within structures. This creates a dedicated macro and redefines offsetofend() to use it. Existing usage, ignoring the 1200+ lustre assert uses: $ git grep -E 'sizeof\(\(\((struct )?[a-zA-Z_]+ \*\)0\)->' | \ grep -v staging/lustre | wc -l 65 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Kees Cook authored
Instead of doubling the size, push the start position up by 16 bytes to still trigger an overflow. This allows to verify that offset reporting is working correctly. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Kees Cook authored
This refactors the hardened usercopy code so that failure reporting can happen within the checking functions instead of at the top level. This simplifies the return value handling and allows more details and offsets to be included in the report. Having the offset can be much more helpful in understanding hardened usercopy bugs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Kees Cook authored
In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is, adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports, makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail" and "offset" arguments. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Kees Cook authored
Using %p was already mostly useless in the usercopy overflow reports, so this removes it entirely to avoid confusion now that %p-hashing is enabled. Fixes: ad67b74d ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 03 Dec, 2017 5 commits
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Linus Torvalds authored
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git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-armLinus Torvalds authored
Pull ARM fix from Russell King: "Just one fix this time around, for the late commit in the merge window that triggered a problem with qemu. Qemu is apparently also going to receive a fix for the discovered issue" * 'fixes' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm: ARM: avoid faulting on qemu
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wsa/linuxLinus Torvalds authored
Pull i2c fixes from Wolfram Sang: "Here are two bugfixes for I2C, fixing a memleak in the core and irq allocation for i801. Also three bugfixes for the at24 eeprom driver which Bartosz collected while taking over maintainership for this driver" * 'i2c/for-current' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wsa/linux: eeprom: at24: check at24_read/write arguments eeprom: at24: fix reading from 24MAC402/24MAC602 eeprom: at24: correctly set the size for at24mac402 i2c: i2c-boardinfo: fix memory leaks on devinfo i2c: i801: Fix Failed to allocate irq -2147483648 error
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.15-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging Pull hwmon fixes from Guenter Roeck: "Fixes: - Drop reference to obsolete maintainer tree - Fix overflow bug in pmbus driver - Fix SMBUS timeout problem in jc42 driver For the SMBUS timeout handling, we had a brief discussion if this should be considered a bug fix or a feature. Peter says "it fixes real problems where the application misbehave due to faulty content when reading from an eeprom", and he needs the patch in his company's v4.14 images. This is good enough for me and warrants backport to stable kernels" * tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.15-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging: hwmon: (jc42) optionally try to disable the SMBUS timeout hwmon: (pmbus) Use 64bit math for DIRECT format values hwmon: Drop reference to Jean's tree
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Wolfram Sang authored
Merge tag 'at24-4.15-fixes-for-wolfram' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brgl/linux into i2c/for-current Please consider pulling the following fixes for v4.15. While it doesn't fix any regression introduced in the v4.15 merge window, we have a feature in at24 since linux v4.8 - reading the mac address block from at24mac series - which turned out to be not working. This pull request contains changes that fix it together with a patch that hardens the read and write argument sanitization with out-of-bounds checks that were missing.
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- 02 Dec, 2017 3 commits
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git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfsLinus Torvalds authored
Pull NFS client fixes from Anna Schumaker: "These patches fix a problem with compiling using an old version of gcc, and also fix up error handling in the SUNRPC layer. - NFSv4: Ensure gcc 4.4.4 can compile initialiser for "invalid_stateid" - SUNRPC: Allow connect to return EHOSTUNREACH - SUNRPC: Handle ENETDOWN errors" * tag 'nfs-for-4.15-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfs: SUNRPC: Handle ENETDOWN errors SUNRPC: Allow connect to return EHOSTUNREACH NFSv4: Ensure gcc 4.4.4 can compile initialiser for "invalid_stateid"
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linuxLinus Torvalds authored
Pull xfs fixes from Darrick Wong: "Here are some bug fixes for 4.15-rc2. - fix memory leaks that appeared after removing ifork inline data buffer - recover deferred rmap update log items in correct order - fix memory leaks when buffer construction fails - fix memory leaks when bmbt is corrupt - fix some uninitialized variables and math problems in the quota scrubber - add some omitted attribution tags on the log replay commit - fix some UBSAN complaints about integer overflows with large sparse files - implement an effective inode mode check in online fsck - fix log's inability to retry quota item writeout due to transient errors" * tag 'xfs-4.15-fixes-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux: xfs: Properly retry failed dquot items in case of error during buffer writeback xfs: scrub inode mode properly xfs: remove unused parameter from xfs_writepage_map xfs: ubsan fixes xfs: calculate correct offset in xfs_scrub_quota_item xfs: fix uninitialized variable in xfs_scrub_quota xfs: fix leaks on corruption errors in xfs_bmap.c xfs: fortify xfs_alloc_buftarg error handling xfs: log recovery should replay deferred ops in order xfs: always free inline data before resetting inode fork during ifree
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-4.15-rc2_cleanups' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/palmer/linux Pull RISC-V cleanups and ABI fixes from Palmer Dabbelt: "This contains a handful of small cleanups that are a result of feedback that didn't make it into our original patch set, either because the feedback hadn't been given yet, I missed the original emails, or we weren't ready to submit the changes yet. I've been maintaining the various cleanup patch sets I have as their own branches, which I then merged together and signed. Each merge commit has a short summary of the changes, and each branch is based on your latest tag (4.15-rc1, in this case). If this isn't the right way to do this then feel free to suggest something else, but it seems sane to me. Here's a short summary of the changes, roughly in order of how interesting they are. - libgcc.h has been moved from include/lib, where it's the only member, to include/linux. This is meant to avoid tab completion conflicts. - VDSO entries for clock_get/gettimeofday/getcpu have been added. These are simple syscalls now, but we want to let glibc use them from the start so we can make them faster later. - A VDSO entry for instruction cache flushing has been added so userspace can flush the instruction cache. - The VDSO symbol versions for __vdso_cmpxchg{32,64} have been removed, as those VDSO entries don't actually exist. - __io_writes has been corrected to respect the given type. - A new READ_ONCE in arch_spin_is_locked(). - __test_and_op_bit_ord() is now actually ordered. - Various small fixes throughout the tree to enable allmodconfig to build cleanly. - Removal of some dead code in our atomic support headers. - Improvements to various comments in our atomic support headers" * tag 'riscv-for-linus-4.15-rc2_cleanups' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/palmer/linux: (23 commits) RISC-V: __io_writes should respect the length argument move libgcc.h to include/linux RISC-V: Clean up an unused include RISC-V: Allow userspace to flush the instruction cache RISC-V: Flush I$ when making a dirty page executable RISC-V: Add missing include RISC-V: Use define for get_cycles like other architectures RISC-V: Provide stub of setup_profiling_timer() RISC-V: Export some expected symbols for modules RISC-V: move empty_zero_page definition to C and export it RISC-V: io.h: type fixes for warnings RISC-V: use RISCV_{INT,SHORT} instead of {INT,SHORT} for asm macros RISC-V: use generic serial.h RISC-V: remove spin_unlock_wait() RISC-V: `sfence.vma` orderes the instruction cache RISC-V: Add READ_ONCE in arch_spin_is_locked() RISC-V: __test_and_op_bit_ord should be strongly ordered RISC-V: Remove smb_mb__{before,after}_spinlock() RISC-V: Remove __smp_bp__{before,after}_atomic RISC-V: Comment on why {,cmp}xchg is ordered how it is ...
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